Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

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MAY–JUNE 1979

COMMUNIST STRATEGIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

John C. Campbell

The USSR, China, and the Middle East — Edward E. Azar

Eurocommunists and the West — Heinz Timmermann

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Problems of Communism

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Cover: A Soviet warship passes through the Turkish Bosporus, connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, in the last minutes of daylight. Photo by EUPRA.

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Communist Strategies in the Mediterranean

by John C. Campbell

In looking at Communist strategies in the Mediterranean, one is first and foremost dealing with the policies of the Soviet Union in the region. Yet, use of the plural form "strategies" is more appropriate than it might initially appear. "Strategies" reflects the pluralism that has befallen the international Communist movement. Or perhaps there never was a Communist strategy, but only a Soviet strategy which Communist leaders, parties, and front organizations supported in greater or less degree, or which, to describe today's situation more accurately, they have in greater or less degree opposed. "Strategies" also reflects the diversity of approaches required to deal with the complex politics of the Mediterranean region. Thus, when examining Soviet policies, we should always keep in mind two questions. First, how far are those policies affected, positively or negatively, by the views and actions of other Communist states and parties? And second, how far can the Soviet Union itself follow a single and consistent strategy in an area of many currents and crosscurrents, most, if not all, of which are outside its control?

The Mediterranean as Object

The facts of geography and of power have made the Mediterranean many things: it is an inland sea, the natural arena for the interests and aspirations of those nations located on its shores; it is a route of empire for powers which need to go through it in order to achieve their purposes somewhere else; it is, to mix a few metaphors, the link between two oceans and among three continents, the fulcrum for any power wishing to expand its influence into Europe, Western Asia, Africa, and the Atlantic and Indian oceans. No power since the Roman Empire has been able to dominate it without challenge. Neither the British in the heyday of their imperial naval power when they controlled the entrances and the exits at Gibraltar and Suez, nor the Americans in the years following World War II when the US 6th Fleet ruled Mediterranean waters, could indefinitely maintain dominance in the face of competition from rival powers and political changes on the local scene.

The two world wars of the 20th century marked the triumph of nationalism in the Balkans and on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Many new states, each determined to decide its own destiny, joined the international community. Thus, politically, the area in the postwar period has comprised many different pieces: the states of southern Europe, some associated with the United States for defense and some not; the Balkan states north of Greece, falling under Communist regimes after World War II but soon split among themselves on the issue of relations with Moscow; Greece and Turkey, taken under the American wing in 1947 when threatened from the north; the newly independent or soon-to-be-independent Arab nations, absorbed by the question of Palestine and by lingering quarrels with the former colonial powers; and the new state of Israel, unaccepted by its neighbors but with powerful support from outside.

No one of these groups of countries had harmony or stability within its own ranks, and each lived in varying conditions of hostility or indifference to the others. The unresolved problems found all around the shores of

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Bulent Ecevit (right), Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, is escorted by Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin as Ecevit reviews an honor guard upon his June 21, 1978, arrival in Moscow for a state visit.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

the Mediterranean created enormous difficulties for the United States and its Western allies in their attempts to organize the area for purposes of security. They could, and did, deploy naval power in Mediterranean waters, and for a time there was no military challenge to that power. But the Western strategy of deterrence and defense required more than warships sailing the sea. It required, for example, air power and air bases, shore-based naval facilities, the ability to bring ground forces and supplies to Greece and Turkey, and the continued use of the Suez Canal. Thus the West was involved—for these strategic reasons, as well as others—in all the political complications and conflicts of the region.

Soviet Policy: Consistency in Variety

The troubles of the West have constituted, in nearly direct ratio, opportunities for the USSR. Yosif Stalin did not successfully exploit them; his attempts to push into the Mediterranean (in Greece, Turkey, Libya, and the Red Sea) came too early and were too crude. N.S. Khrushchev, discovering the technique of playing upon the area's conflicts and tensions, scored some spectacular gains but could not build on them a solid position of strength. Under L.I. Brezhnev, the USSR found the strength, in naval power, but lost the key to political success and compiled a record that was, to put it charitably, a mixed one. The story, of course, is not over. The Soviet Union may be on the verge of new triumphs, especially if the American strategy for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should run aground. Yet in no way will the USSR, any more than the United States, be able to avoid the problem of dealing with the countries of the region in the context of the fundamental differences between their local interests and the global concerns of an outside great power.

Analysts of Soviet policy in the Mediterranean have been wrestling for years with a familiar set of questions. Is this policy primarily offensive, aimed at establishing dominance over the Mediterranean and thus

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sealing the fate of Western Europe militarily by turning its southern flank, or economically by cutting off its lifeblood, the oil of the Middle East? Or is it defensive, aiming to reduce the American threat to Soviet security and to establish the Soviet Union's right to equal status with the United States as a Mediterranean power? Is Moscow following a grand design, or merely responding to opportunities too good to miss? Are the Soviet leaders driven by their ideology—dedicated to the enthronement of Communist parties and the spread of communism—or by a pragmatic pursuit of the national security and other secular interests of the Soviet state?[1] It does not now seem to me useful to try to measure and weigh the evidence in a vain attempt to produce clear answers to those questions. The answer to each of them is "yes and no," and one cannot be more precise than that.

It may be more fruitful to look at the matter from another angle. Despite the different types of leadership in what we can roughly designate as the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev periods, Soviet policy toward the Mediterranean has shown remarkable consistency. The determinants have been, to use Soviet terminology, both subjective and objective, although it is not always possible to distinguish which is which. Together they set lines of policy that have endured through a series of continuing and often unpredictable changes both in Moscow and on the Mediterranean scene.

The first factor is the historic Russian tradition of southward expansion inherited from the tsars. Imperial Russia devoted over a century of effort—never really successful—to breaking out of the Black Sea and becoming a Mediterranean power. However, the impulse remains and continues to move the leaders of the imperial Soviet Union, who have had greater success.

The second factor, geography, both limits Soviet expansionism and spurs it. What profit is it to break the lock at the Bosporus and Dardanelles—which is not really broken, as the Turks still control that gateway even though the arrangements under the Montreux Convention of 1936 permit Soviet warships to pass through in peacetime—if it is but an entrance to another enclosure? For the Mediterranean is virtually an enclosed sea, with only two openings—at Gibraltar and Suez. Can the Soviets really hope for control of the Mediterranean, or even for a major role there, without the assurance of being able to pass at will through those two openings? They may for a time, at the high point of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, have had some hopes of attaining this goal at Suez, but can hardly retain them now.



The Soviet navy's aircraft carrier Kiev photographed under way in the Mediterranean in July 1976 after having transited the Bosporus from the Black Sea. On its deck are four helicopters and two Yak-36 VSTOL aircraft.

—Central Press via Pictorial Parade.

A third factor consistently constraining Soviet actions in the region has been the unfavorable correlation of great-power forces on the scene. As matters have stood throughout the entire period since World War II, the Soviets cannot have looked forward with equanimity to the prospect of war, limited or general, in the confined waters of the Mediterranean. Although it would not be a comfortable place for either side and the Soviet *Eskadra* (squadron) is not a negligible force by any means, the USSR does not have the ships and

1. On this general topic, see Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Mediterranean Policy," in *Military Forces and Political Conflicts in the Mediterranean,* Paris, The Atlantic Institute, 1970, pp. 25–30; Wolfgang Berner, "The Soviet Alliance Policy in the Mediterranean and Détente," in Stefano Silvestri, Ed., *L'Uso politico della forza militare nel Mediterraneo* (The Political Use of Military Force in the Mediterranean), Bologna, Istituto affari internazionali, Società editrice il Mulino, 1977, pp. 83–99; C. B. Joynt and O. M. Smolansky, *Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean,* Bethlehem, PA, Lehigh University, Department of International Relations, 1972.

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the aircraft in the area to match the US 6th Fleet in combat.[2] While Soviet forces could inflict a great deal of damage, their mission in the case of hostilities would probably be a suicidal one. With the balance of forces what it has been, the Soviet leaders have had every reason to avoid war with the United States in the Mediterranean, and their conduct over the years clearly reflects such considerations. From the perspective of regional policy, then, the *Eskadra* has primarily been a force for peacetime use and largely for political rather than military effect within the Mediterranean area itself.

(Of course, from a broader perspective, that of Soviet grand strategy, military strength in the Mediterranean cannot be understood except in terms of its global purpose. Militarily as politically, the Mediterranean is not a separate and self-contained area either for the Soviet Union or for the United States. The fact that both keep naval forces there permanently tends to distort the reality that each of these forces is part of a total aggregation of naval power operating all over the world. Both navies have global missions directed, among other things, at reducing the threat from the other and in the last analysis at fighting a general war. The Soviet *Eskadra* in the Mediterranean is drawn from the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets; it engages in ocean-scale exercises with them[3]; and it has a role in the projection of naval power to the Atlantic and the Indian oceans, and of Soviet influence to the Middle East and Africa. These matters take us beyond our present subject. But they should be mentioned as a corrective to unduly narrow thinking about the specifically Mediterranean military role of naval and other forces of the two superpowers.)

The fourth factor making for consistency, albeit with wide swings, has been the limited effectiveness of Communist ideology, or indeed any ideology, as an instrument for the expansion of Soviet power. Stalin was accustomed to use foreign Communist parties to Soviet ends, and he did not cease to do so after he liquidated the Comintern in 1943. It became apparent in the early postwar years, however, that outside of Eastern Europe, Soviet attempts to manipulate events faced formidable obstacles and heavy risks. The Communist Party of Greece had a strong military force and considerable popular support, but once the British and then the United States took the decision that they would not permit a Communist victory in Greece, Stalin cut his losses and drew back. In France and Italy, the Communist parties were large and well organized, but once dropped by their non-Communist partners in coalition governments, they could not get to power either by elections or by revolution. As the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee pointed out to Josip Broz Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the exchange of correspondence preceding the Soviet-Yugoslav break, the French and Italian comrades were not so fortunate as those of Eastern Europe, who had the Red Army at hand.[4] The Italian election of 1948 was the last clear chance at that time for Soviet power to gain access to the central Mediterranean through the free choice of European voters, but it was the anti-Communist votes that carried the day.

Later in that same year Tito's decision to lead Yugoslavia on an independent Communist course shut off the Kremlin's opportunity to base naval power on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast. Although Albania's few harbors remained available for another decade, Tirana, too, eventually broke its Moscow connection and closed the Soviet submarine base at Saseno. And so, on the European shores of the Mediterranean the Soviets ended up without a foothold. Turkey, Greece Albania, Yugoslavia, Italy, France—all had been subjected to military threat, political pressure, the appeal of Soviet ideology, or all three, and every one of them

2. It is difficult to assess just what the balance is between the two forces. The Soviet force since the late 1960's has averaged about 60 ships, increasing to as many as 90 in times of crisis (as in October 1973) and decreasing at other times (the late 1970's, for example) to about 50. In number of naval vessels and of "ship-days" it has in recent years been ahead of the 6th Fleet. The latter's advantages lie in the presence of two carrier task forces, the availability of Mediterranean bases, and capability to project power ashore. The Soviet force is strong in missile ships and has recently added, at certain times, two helicopter carriers and, on occasion, two new carriers (the Kiev and the Minsk) capable of launching VSTOL aircraft; but it suffers from lack of bases and of air support. Whatever they might be able to do in war, the more the Soviet forces have a presumed capability against US forces, the more effectively they will serve as a deterrent to US actions. On the subject, see Stefano Silvestri, "Military Power and Stability in the Mediterranean," *Lo Spettatore internazionale* (Bologna), January–March 1978, pp. 5–28; Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, "The Political Use of Military Power in the Mediterranean by the United States and the Soviet Union," ibid., pp. 29–66; Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Countering the Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (Annapolis, MD), July 1977, pp. 25–32; and Curt Gasteyger, "The Super-Powers in the Mediterranean," *Survival* (London), November–December 1975.

3. The first worldwide exercises were OKEAN-I, held in 1970 ("Soviet Maneuvers Summarized," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1970, p. 101). On later exercises, see Robert G. Weinland, "The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic," in Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, Eds., *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1977, pp. 412–13. The Commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, gives his concepts of global naval strategy in his *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva* (The Naval Power of the State), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1976.

4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute: Text of the Published Correspondence*, London and New York, NY, 1948, p. 51.

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escaped becoming the Soviet Union's corridor to the Mediterranean or its forward base there.

One point deserves further mention: the relationship that developed between Yugoslavia's League of Communists and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), or more pointedly between Marshal Tito and Palmiro Togliatti. While the latter never defied Moscow in the all-or-nothing way that Tito did, he laid out his party's path to socialism as a specifically Italian one and propagated the theory of polycentrism. Moreover, there was no doubt of the importance he and his successors attached to the continued independence of Yugoslavia as a buffer between the Soviet bloc and Italy. If the Kremlin could use Communist ideology to serve state interests, so could Tito, and so also could the leaders of the PCI (even though their state at the time remained in the hands of the class enemy).

On the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, the situation was quite different. There the Communist parties in the Arab states were minuscule, often fractured, and without political importance. Only Syria's could lay claim to some weight, mainly because of the stature of its leader, Khaled Bagdash. Because they were weak, they needed Moscow's aid. But for that same reason, Moscow was not interested in showering aid upon them. Stalin was content to leave the guidance of some of them in the hands of the major Communist parties of Europe. Thus the PCI could serve as mentor of the Egyptian party, and it was natural to expect the French Communist Party (PCF) to set party strategy for the comrades in Algeria as for those in France. Not until Khrushchev came along with a different approach and, for Arab consumption, a different ideology, did Soviet strategy make some headway in these parts of the Mediterranean.

Khrushchev's Success and Failure

It was Khrushchev's immense contribution that he found a formula for implanting Soviet influence in a number of Mediterranean states. This formula had simple elements: first, the delivery of arms to Arab states, to break their dependence on the West and create a new dependence; second, the building of a political and economic relationship with those states based on the calculated self-interest of each party and the willingness of each to pay something in the coin of the interest of the other; and third, a rather vague ideological solidarity grounded in anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, national liberation, revolutionary change, and "socialism" in a sense broad enough to evade definition, for precision in that respect could undermine and destroy the cooperation.

The third of these elements—ideology—was an elusive quantity. Looked at coldly, it was no more than verbiage. For the Soviets, the proclaimed solidarity was part of a popular-front strategy, which they were applying across the board in the Third World. Moreover, in the Arab context, the local Communists were the least important participants. In classic Soviet theory they might be the vanguard of the revolution, but the fact was that the target Arab states were being run by radical-nationalist political leaders, most of them military officers, and these were the only possible effective partners for the USSR. These Arab leaders paid little attention to the theories of the "national democratic state" and of the "national coalition of progressive forces" which Soviet scholars and party functionaries elaborated to explain why it was all right for the Soviet Union to be working with leaders and parties that were not Communist at all (indeed, some were anti-Communist). Local Communists might be brought into Arab governments, as they were at times in Syria, or they might be told to dissolve their organizations and join those of the national regime, as they were in Egypt and in Algeria.[5] The real basis for cooperation was not, after all, a common ideology but, from the Arab standpoint, Soviet provision of arms, loans, and political support against Israel; and from Moscow's standpoint, anti-Western action by the Arab states, a chance to expand the USSR's political influence, and Soviet access to local military facilities.

Ideology, nonetheless, has played a significant role in the Soviet-Arab relationship, both in building it up and, where the process has reversed, in breaking it down. The reasons for this interaction are not easy to explain. It may be because both Soviet Communists and Arab nationalists are people who live by appeals to the masses, to the logic of history, to the truth of their respective credoes, and to the glory of their destiny. If their relationship was in fact a practical arrangement, even a cynical bargain, between a group of calculating old men and a number of ambitious young men, they did not easily admit it to each other or to themselves. The vague sense of a common socialist cause was a part of the relationship in the early years and in some instances still is. But when differing interests inevitably caused fissure, ideological factors on both sides magnified them, sometimes beyond repair.

5. John K. Cooley, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, pp. 22-42.

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Tension began to appear during the Khrushchev era, with Gamal Abdel Nasser, Moscow's first and favorite Arab partner. Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was centered on Egypt, because of its size, location, and role in the Arab world, and on Nasser, because of what he was. He had a constituency in every Arab country. If he swore by the Soviet Union as the friend and patron of the Arab cause, fraternal Arab governments would follow, or if not, might be replaced by others which would. Yet as the open polemics that broke out between Khrushchev and Nasser in the late 1950's attested, the common cause had not overcome the deep-seated differences. Near the end of Khrushchev's career in 1964, in remarks he chose to make, or was provoked into making, on a formal visit to the high dam at Aswan and in Nasser's presence, he was telling his Arab friends that they should think less about Arab solidarity and more about class solidarity with the USSR.[6] He could not have been more impolitic, but he was only being himself.

The Brezhnev regime in its Mediterranean policy has not escaped the dilemmas posed when ideological "solidarity" confronts real interests. As the Soviet Union and the Arab nationalists have learned more about each other through experience, the earlier illusions and postures have tended to disappear. When concrete interests clash, as those of Egypt and the USSR have since 1972 over arms, military facilities, and Anwar al-Sadat's dealing with the US, the ideological veil is removed. Thus, Egypt's Sadat has become in Soviet eyes not only an ingrate but a traitor to socialism, and he now proclaims communism to be a mortal threat to the security of the Middle East. If Soviet arms are still needed by Syria and Algeria, and may be requested by Jordan as a sign of displeasure

6. *Pravda* (Moscow), May 18, 1964. For comment on this and other Khrushchev speeches on this theme during his visit to Egypt, see Oles M. Smolansky, *The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev*, Lewisburg, PA, Bucknell University Press, 1974, pp. 270–79.

Soviet Premier N. S. Khrushchev addresses assembled guests and dignitaries at the May 16, 1964, dedication of the first section of the Aswan High Dam in the United Arab Republic (Egypt). Seated, from left to right, are: Abd al-Hakim, UAR Vice President; Ahmed Ben Bella, President of Algeria; UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser; and Abd al-Salam Arif, President of Syria. The sign in Russian to the rear reads: "Veterans and Disabled Veterans Welcome the UAR's Guest Nikita Khrushchev, President Nasser, and Presidents of the Arab States."

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

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Yugoslav Chief of State Josip Broz Tito and guests from the Mediterranean and Africa review a military honor guard at Belgrade military airport on August 30, 1961, shortly before the opening of a conference of nonaligned countries. From left to right: Tito; Gamal Abdel Nasser, Chief of State of the United Arab Republic (Egypt); Benyoussef Ben Khedda, Prime Minister of the Algerian government-in-exile; and President Mobido Keita of Mali.

—*Daily Express* (London) via Pictorial Parade.

with the United States, each undertakes such collaboration on its own terms. In recent years, the Soviet Union's principal arms client in the Mediterranean has been Libya,[7] a country on the extremist fringe of the Arab world with a leader, Muammar Qadhafi, who is a vocal anti-Communist. It is a pure gamble, for any resemblance between Soviet aims and the consequences of Qadhafi's foreign policies is coincidental.

Now that Sadat has taken a course that is not just anti-Soviet but in the eyes of most of the Arab world anti-Arab and pro-Israel, the Soviets may be poised to recover some of the ground they have lost among the Arabs since the October war of 1973. But Soviet efforts to capitalize on this opportunity will lack a firm foundation, and serve more to advance the specific Arab purposes of the moment.

The Yugoslav Ingredient

A factor that should not be underestimated among the causes of the general skepticism about the Soviet Union now prevalent in Mediterranean countries is Tito's Yugoslavia—both its policies and its very existence. Yugoslavia's independent Communist system was already firmly established by the time the Soviets began their thrust into the Mediterranean in the mid-1950's. When Eygpt, Syria, Algeria, and other Arab states were using the Soviet Union to free themselves from dependence on the West and to build strength against Israel, they were also cultivating the best of relations with Yugoslavia. Nasser and Tito had a close personal relationship with an ideological base in the evolving theory and practice of positive neutralism or nonalignment. Nasser learned something about the Yugoslav political and economic system and also about Tito's experience with the Russians.[8] Similar conditions pertained with respect to Algeria. Yugoslavia helped the Algerian national liberation movement and recognized its "provisional government" well before it won formal recognition and independence from France; Moscow, meanwhile, was more interested in relations with the French government and with the PCF. After independence, Algeria's new leaders found in Yugoslavia's institutions of "socialist self-management" a body of theory and practice that seemed suited to the Algerian economy.[9] The existence of Yugoslavia, at a time when nationalist Arab leaders attracted to the ideas of socialism were embarking on a new and not closely defined relationship with the Soviet Union, offered a socialist solidarity that was both useful and safe, and at the same time one that counseled caution against socialist solidarity with a superpower which allowed for only one true socialism.

The Yugoslavs, never modest in their aspirations, tried on several occasions to promote conferences and collaboration on a Mediterranean-wide basis, of Communist, socialist, and other "progressive" parties and political organizations. The principal meeting, with the

7. The main arms agreement with Libya, concluded in 1974, provided for delivery of about US$1 billion in Soviet weapons. See US Department of State, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed World*, Washington, DC, August 1977, pp. 3-4; and David E. Albright, "The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1978, p. 33.

8. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 233-83.

9. Ibid., pp. 85-89, 204-07.

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PCI as cohost, was held in Italy in 1968.[10] These efforts were directed primarily against American imperialism and had as a goal ridding the Mediterranean of US armed forces; and if that goal were to be attained, there would be no need for Soviet forces to balance them, and the socialist and progressive forces in the area would then be able to take in hand their own destiny. Predictably, this bit of Yugoslav logic ran into opposition from orthodox Communist parties taking their line from Moscow and had no concrete results. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia's persistent missionary work in favor of nonalignment and of a nondoctrinaire view of socialism brought a message home throughout the Mediterranean—to Arab countries, to nationalist leaders in Cyprus and in Malta, to socialists of varying hues, and to the Communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain. With all of them, it helped to strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as an outsider, with its own great-power interests, to be dealt with not timidly, not provocatively, but circumspectly and, if necessary, firmly.

This was Tito's own way of dealing with the Russians. When Brezhnev stuck to normal and correct relations, Tito was correct too. When Brezhnev tried pressure, Tito resisted, and the world knew about it. Yugoslavia permitted Soviet warships to use its ports for rest and repair, but on the basis of a law that allowed the same privileges to other navies.[11] The only instances in which Belgrade seemed to bend its nonalignment in Moscow's favor were connected with the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, when Tito went to Moscow to declare solidarity with the Soviet bloc, and that of 1973, when the Soviets were allowed to use Yugoslav facilities and airspace for supply operations to Egypt.[12] But Yugoslavia never pretended to be neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was on Egypt's side and willing to join the states of the Warsaw Pact in announcing and supporting that position. These decisions displeased the United States, but they pleased the Arabs and most of the peoples of the Mediterranean, as they were calculated to do.

It was the Yugoslavs, also, who led the lengthy and successful campaign during the negotiations on European security leading to the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975 to get the Mediterranean recognized as an area urgently requiring international exchanges of views and negotiations on security and cooperation.[13] Those exchanges are now moving forward, at an unhurried pace and with no great display of interest on the part of the superpowers.

If, in a period of uncertainty and possible weakness surrounding Yugoslavia's transition to the post-Tito era, the Soviets should embark on a campaign of pressure or intervention, the reaction throughout the Mediterranean would be one of anger and of fear. Those countries might not be able to do anything effective for Yugoslavia, but whatever the Soviets might gain there, in influence or in access to the Adriatic, would be not only at high risk of war with the West but at high cost in political losses elsewhere.

The Ultimate Constraint

The most compelling constraint on Soviet Mediterranean strategy, and therefore also a factor in its relative consistency, has been the countervailing power of the United States and its allies, which we have mentioned in connection with the naval competition. Perhaps it should be put in broader terms. Whether the context is one of cold war or of détente, what the Soviets do in the Mediterranean or in any other area is conditioned by the requirements of the superpower relationship. In simplest form, it is a calculation of the risk of war. In other aspects, it is a complex weighing of priorities, of how much a political or military gain in the Mediterranean is worth in comparison to the damage it causes to prospects for SALT, relaxed East-West relations in Europe, imports of technology, American good will, and other things the Soviets hope to gain as the fruits of détente.

Soviet policy in the Mediterranean is, of course, simultaneously active both in military measures such as the placement of weapons and the movement of ships and in political and diplomatic activity in two dozen countries. We have said enough about the purposes and practices of this policy to indicate its general thrust: to assert the Soviet Union's right to be there, as a world power and, by virtue of its Black Sea

10. Milorad Mijovic, "Denuclearization of the Mediterranean," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), No. 344-5, Aug. 5-20, 1964, p. 7; Jospi Djerdja, "Missed Opportunities," ibid., No. 434, May 5, 1968, pp. 6-8; and V. Vladisavljevic, "Mediterranean Confontation," ibid., No. 449, Dec. 20, 1968, pp. 2-4.

11. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 2, 1976.

12. John C. Campbell, "Yugoslavia," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Eds., *The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971*, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1972, pp. 182-83; idem, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1974, p. 9; and *The New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1973, and Jan. 9, 1977.

13. "Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), No. 1888, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323-50, especially pp. 338-39. See also Radovan Vukadinovic, "The Mediterranean and European Security and Cooperation," *Review of International Affairs*, No. 639, Nov. 20, 1976, pp. 26-29; and the series of articles in ibid., No. 692, Feb. 5, 1979, pp. 8-15.

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coast, as a Mediterranean state (which the United States is not); to neutralize and, in time, to eliminate the US naval presence represented by the 6th Fleet and by submarines with nuclear missiles; to reduce American political influence and enhance its own; to use the Mediterranean to expand its power beyond, into the Middle East, Africa, and Western Europe; and to help along the shift in the global correlation of forces in favor of "socialism."

Merely to list these purposes is to call attention to how far they are from realization, as the Soviet leaders themselves are doubtless well aware. The record, not the grand purpose, defines the strategy in action. We cannot in one article look into how the Soviets have pursued their policies in all the different Mediterranean countries and situations: how they have exploited instability in Turkey and in Greece and the disputes between the two; how they have built positions of strength in certain Arab states and cultivated the Palestine Liberation Organization; how they have preached nonalignment for Cyprus, Malta, Tunisia, and Morocco in order to draw these states away from the West, while trying to undermine nonalignment in Belgrade and pull Yugoslavia back into the Soviet camp; how they have encouraged tendencies in Western Europe opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In all these instances, the record is a mixture of advances and retreats, of brilliance and of blunders.

The best tests of strategy are situations of crisis when hard decisions must be made. Let us therefore take as examples two series of crises in which the Soviet Union involved itself, both in its regional policy and in its global interests. These are the crises, actually wars, that arose in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and two critical episodes in the dispute over Cyprus. Both series of crises were in the Eastern Mediterranean, the most sensitive area for the USSR.

Moscow and the Arab-Israeli Wars

Let us compare, first, the Soviet course of conduct in three Arab-Israeli wars (1956, 1967, and 1973) and the semi-war that took place in 1969–70. The following summary of the principal declarations and moves may seem like canned history, but it demonstrates a pattern.[14]

The war of 1956. In 1955, the Soviets made the famous arms deal with Egypt. In February 1956, they warned the Western powers against military intervention in the area. In April, they asserted the right of the USSR, as an interested great power and member of the United Nations Security Council, to take part with the Western powers in dealing with the impending crisis. In July, they supported Nasser's takeover of the Suez Canal Company, insisting that the dispute be resolved by peaceful means. In August, they warned the Western powers against using force, implying that the Soviet Union would be involved if they did. In September, they declared that an aggression against Egypt would touch upon the security of the USSR. In October, they denounced Israel's attack in the Sinai and called for a cease-fire and withdrawal. In November, they announced that volunteers were enrolling in the Soviet Union to fight for Egypt; sent messages to Britain and France saying the USSR was fully resolved to use force to crush their aggression, with veiled threats to hit London and Paris with nuclear weapons; sent a similar note to Israel with the threat of nuclear annihilation; and proposed to the United States a joint US-Soviet military intervention to enforce peace.

All this can be described as bombast and bluff, since the Soviet Union was not in a position to intervene in the fighting and had no intention of doing so. The "volunteers" were never assembled as a force. The Soviets could hardly have intended a nuclear attack on France and Britain. They made their threats after it was clear that the United States had taken a strong stand against its own allies and against Israel and would carry through. Thus, Soviet policy was basically a propaganda operation intended to give the impression that Moscow's warnings had forced the

14. Instead of documenting the specific individual points made in describing these wars, I shall list here a number of general works covering them, with special emphasis on the role of the Soviet Union: Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948–1967,* New York, NY, Pegasus, 1969; Kenneth Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War,* New York, NY, and Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1969; Oles M. Smolansky, *The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev;* Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East,* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1974; Jon D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East,* Baltimore, MD, and London, Johns Hopkins Press, 1975; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977; Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970,* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1975; Yaacov Ro'i, Ed., *From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945–1973,* New York, NY, and Toronto, John Wiley & Sons, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1974; Galia Golan, Ed., *Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis,* London, Cambridge University Press, 1977; William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–76,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, and London, University of California Press, 1977; and Yaacov Ro'i, Ed., *The Limits of Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East,* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

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aggressors to stop, and that Egypt was saved by the Soviet Union rather than by the United States, which was pictured as a participant in the aggression. In sum, the Soviet Union made no military moves, took no risks, and maximized its political advantages.

The war of 1967. A decade later, the Soviet Union was in a stronger position, more active, and less successful. In the intervening years, the Soviets had armed Egypt and Syria and had begun to create a naval force in the Mediterranean. In April 1967, they gave demonstrative political support to Syria after it had engaged Israel in serious air battles. In May, they gave false information to Egypt that Israel was about to attack Syria; encouraged Nasser to mobilize against Israel; vocally supported his declaration of a blockade of the Strait of Tiran (though it is not clear they knew in advance of his decision); warned that an aggressor (Israel) would receive an energetic Arab and Soviet riposte; and reiterated the vital interest of the USSR in the Middle East because of the danger to Soviet security. In June, they denounced Israel's attack and declared the USSR to be at the Arabs' side (but did not promise actual intervention); sent a threatening note to Israel; proposed in the United Nations a cease-fire and return to prewar lines (a proposal which was defeated); turned aside new Arab appeals for military help; accepted a UN resolution for a cease-fire without conditions; and warned Israel, after its conquest of the Golan Heights, not to push on to Damascus. After failing in an attempt to work out a compromise directly with the United States, the USSR in November accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242, which fell short of demanding total and immediate Israeli withdrawal from territory seized in the six-day conflict.

The war of 1967 was a bad experience for the Soviets. There was not much time for them to weigh decisions, so devastating was the initial Israeli attack and so rapid the campaign on the three fronts. Moscow had a role in starting the war, and as in 1956, it made a series of threats. But, again as in 1956, the Soviets did not send substantial military supplies or bring military power to bear on the outcome, despite the growth in their naval strength in the intervening period. Unlike 1956, this war ended in a political as well as a military defeat for the Arab side. As a saving gesture, the Soviet "ultimatum" to Israel to halt on the Syrian front was an attempt to show real support, though it is not clear that the Israelis intended to march to Damascus, or that the Soviet Union was prepared to move its own forces into Syria if they had. All in all, the Soviets lost politically among the Arabs and were not compensated by being able, as one of the superpowers, to participate in a postwar settlement (other than to go along with Resolution 242). There was no settlement other than the continuance of the status quo resulting from Israel's victory.

It is likely that the Soviet leadership had to face questions from its own ranks as to whether the pro-Arab policy had been worth the price. But they found no satisfactory alternative, since they were not ready to take the consequences of abandoning the Arab connection. They decided to give more arms than ever, in order to restore a balance with Israel, and to accompany the aid with training programs, a substantial military presence, and moves to gain access to naval and air facilities and to seek a greater degree of control over Arab decisions affecting Soviet interests. Despite these measures, however, Moscow still had no real control over Arab or Israeli decisions for war, no policy for dealing with another round of war that Soviet policy made likely, and no understanding with the United States on limiting the risks in such a development.

The war of 1973. For Moscow, there was no avoiding the war of 1973. Although the Soviets did not want war, they created a situation which made it possible (as in 1967) and were resigned to its outbreak, or at least did nothing effective to stop it. In April 1973, they made a joint statement with Egypt that if occupied Arab territory was not recovered peacefully, it could be recovered by force. In June, Brezhnev stressed to US President Richard M. Nixon the danger of the situation in the Middle East but did not warn him of the Arab decision for war, despite the agreement the two were at that moment signing on joint consultation to prevent just such an eventuality. In October, when the Arabs attacked, the Soviets declared their support, but privately recommended a cease-fire to Egypt (which was rejected). However, Moscow did undertake a massive resupply of the Arab military effort. Then, as the tide on the Suez front turned in Israel's favor, the USSR urged Sadat to accept a truce; negotiated with Kissinger a formula for a cease-fire and a UN resolution on settlement; told Sadat the USSR would send troops to Egypt if necessary to maintain the cease-fire; proposed a joint US-Soviet force to maintain it (which the United States refused); sent the famous letter to Nixon saying that if America would not act jointly, the USSR might find it necessary to act alone; made military moves which could indicate an intention to do so; and reacted to the US nuclear alert by stressing the spirit of détente and expressing a willingness to agree on a UN force including great-power contingents.

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

At the right, Egyptian soldiers train artillery barrages on Israeli positions across the Suez Canal during the 1970 "war of attrition"; at the left, a 1971 photo of what is purportedly a Soviet SAM-3 missile installation on the shores of the Mediterranean in Alexandria, Egypt.

—Pictorial Parade.

This bare outline of events tells the story of a situation out of control. The Soviet leaders had tried to restrict Sadat's choices by limiting the weapons they provided, but, not wishing to lose their political investment in the Arab cause, gave him enough to start the war anyway. They kept the Arab armies in action with Soviet supplies, but then had to insist these armies stop fighting in order to prevent a repetition of the disaster of 1967. The affair of the supposed planned unilateral Soviet intervention and the American nuclear alert seems like an aberration on both sides, a horrifying look into the abyss at the moment when the two powers were congratulating themselves on having found a solution to the crisis. Did the Soviets really intend to intervene, or did they make a bluff to get the Americans to bring Israel to heel (which the US did)? What did Washington intend by the alert, and what would it have done if the Soviets had sent troops to Egypt? Fortunately, these questions did not have to be answered in action, but the episode is instructive.

What can be concluded from this brief review of Soviet policy in the three wars? It shows, to repeat a theme, consistency. However, consistency in ineffective policy over a period in which the Soviet Union was steadily growing in military capability and in international prestige is nothing for the Kremlin to cheer about. One sees two conflicting strands of policy and a consequent dilemma of how far to go with one without too much risk of damage to the other. The first is support for the Arab cause as the broad avenue for the Soviet advance into the Mediterranean and Middle East; the second, the need to avoid armed conflict with the United States and the desire to play a superpower role on a basis of equality with the Americans. The great difficulty has been that whether the idea of equality and partnership is accepted—and, if so, on what terms—depends on the United States. These concepts comprise part of the mythology of détente, but just as Moscow interprets détente in its own way in areas where it has the power to do so, it has had to come to terms with the American advantage in the Mediterranean.

In 1956, American power determined the outcome, and the power of the Soviet Union, though it favored the same outcome, was generally irrelevant. In 1967, as the Soviets saw it, America won a war through the military prowess of its proxy, Israel, and nothing could be done about it. Moscow could only begin all over again the game of arming the Arab states. So long as those states, after each lost war, turned again to the Soviet Union, there was always a prospect for the entrenchment of Soviet influence and control. But after the 1973 war, the formula did not work as before. Egypt, the centerpiece of Soviet policy in the region, broke the pattern, and Syria did so in a partial way. The USSR was left with its nominal position of cochairman of the Middle East peace talks in Geneva, but it is only the United States that has been active and influential in the process of negotiating a settlement.

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An experiment in risk: the 1969–70 "war of attrition." Soviet actions in the "war of attrition" on the Suez front in 1969–70 provide something of a contrast to those in the other three Arab-Israeli clashes just discussed. It was a less cataclysmic, more controlled situation, and it could be more favorably exploited by the Kremlin. This conflict, started by Nasser, turned into something of a proxy war between the USSR and the US, with each pouring in the latest-model weapons and keenly observing the performance and the results but avoiding public commitment. When Israel made its superior power felt and Nasser desperately appealed for Soviet help early in 1970, Moscow's decision was no easy one. Since the survival of Nasser's regime hung in the balance, Brezhnev and his colleagues took the plunge and sent not only advanced aircraft and missiles but crews to operate them in combat. In the following months, Soviet military personnel in Egypt reached a total of about 20,000.[15]

Sending combat forces into action in a Mediterranean country well beyond the Soviet empire was something new. It carried considerable risks: that there would be encounters with Israeli forces on such a scale that the USSR would be at war with Israel, or that the United States would match the Soviet intervention with its own or take military action against the Soviet Union somewhere else. Actually, the Soviets did not calculate so badly. They were able to avoid large-scale fighting with Israeli forces. Their presence caused Israel to cease its deep raids into Egypt, which had shaken the Nasser regime. The United States, despite rumblings from Washington and San Clemente about the need to expel the Russians from Egypt, did not resort to military action. Nevertheless, the situation was a ticklish one for the Soviets, and they do not seem to have wished the proxy war, with its attendant risks, to continue indefinitely. Consequently, in June 1970, when US Secretary of State William P. Rogers proposed a cease-fire, both they and Nasser were ready to accept it. Soviet forces stayed on in Egypt for two more years, but in an atmosphere not always comfortable, for they were a hostage to both Egypt and Israel. Sadat solved the problem for Moscow by demanding their withdrawal. Whether the Soviet leadership was just as glad to see it happen we do not know.

The episode is significant in that it showed Soviet willingness, in a situation involving active fighting, to send combat forces to join the fray. The question is why they chose in this instance to act in a way they had not acted in the full-scale war of 1967, nor would act in the war of 1973. The answer appears to lie in the fact that it could be done unobtrusively, gradually, and still effectively. It could be done in a way that made it possible to gauge the American reaction as the steps were taken, and thus to control the risks. But one need not conclude from this instance that the Soviet leadership would do the same thing again in a comparable situation, or, for that matter, that a similar request for help would be forthcoming from a Mediterranean country.

The USSR and the Cyprus Situation

The pattern of strong declaratory policy and cautious action or inaction evident in Soviet behavior during the various Arab-Israeli clashes, is also observable in Moscow's posture in the Cyprus crises of 1964 and 1974.[16] The first of those episodes started with squabbling between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus President Makarios's suspension of the constitution late in 1963. The UN Security Council voted for a cease-fire and sent a peacekeeping force, but Turkey continued to threaten intervention to protect the Turkish Cypriots. In July 1964, Khrushchev declared that foreign interference must be stopped; called for the withdrawal of British forces (from bases established by treaty); and warned the Turks against invading the island, which could cause "a dangerous chain reaction." In August, after the Turkish air force bombed Cyprus, US President Lyndon B. Johnson's famous and ill-considered letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu—saying that Turkey could not count on American support if it moved against Cyprus and the

15. Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, Glasgow, Fontana/Collins, 1976, pp. 81–88. On the war of attrition, see A. S. Becker, "The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in A. S. Becker et al., *The Economics and Politics of the Middle East*, New York, NY, American Elsevier, 1975, pp. 77–120.

16. The series of crises over Cyprus in the years following the establishment of independence in 1960 has been covered in a number of general works, none focused specifically on the role of the Soviet Union. The evidence here on Soviet policy and attitudes comes from the Soviet press and academic articles. For Western writing, most of it emphasizing American policy, see Philip Windsor, *NATO and the Cyprus Crisis*, Adelphi Paper No. 14, London, Institute of Strategic Studies, 1964; Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1975, pp. 34–78; Van Coufoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy," in Theodore A. Couloumbis and Sallie M. Hicks, Eds., *Foreign Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus: The Clash of Principle and Pragmatism*, Washington, DC, Center for Mediterranean Studies, 1975, pp. 106–38; and John C. Campbell, "The United States and the Cyprus Question, 1974–1975," in Van Coufoudakis, Ed., *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, New York, NY, Pella, 1976, pp. 13–25.

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

Members of the UN Peacekeeping Force sent to police the cease-fire established in Cyprus after the 1974 crisis.

—***Daily Express*** **(London) via Pictorial Parade.**

USSR in turn attacked Turkey—opened the door to further Soviet pressure. Khrushchev told the Turks their use of force would intensify the threat of war; warned that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the threat of armed conflict near to its southern border because the security of the country was at stake; condemned the Turkish bombing of Cyprus; and asked what the Turkish government would think if other countries used the same or more serious means against its territory and people. In September, the Soviets promised arms to Makarios at his request. But in November, after Khrushchev was out of power, the wind shifted. The USSR and Turkey agreed on a joint statement recognizing that there were two national communities in Cyprus. Then in January 1965, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko called for a settlement in which the two communities might choose federation. That statement evoked protests from Makarios and from Athens and was welcomed by the Turks as support for their position. However, Moscow was not taking sides, but trying to engineer an independent and nonaligned Cyprus.

By this time, the crisis was over. There was no Cyprus settlement. Makarios remained president of a nominally independent state, but there was de facto partition as a result of the fighting, and no solution of the constitutional problem. The Soviet Union has played a political and propaganda game only, and remained an outsider. It had not dared much, nor had it accomplished much. The arms support to Makarios was a gesture, not a decisive move. The Soviet Union had tried to assert a role for itself through the United Nations and as a great power, but the United States and Britain were not listening. The latter wanted to keep the affair within the framework of existing treaties and of the Western alliance, and by and large they succeeded, in spite of Makarios. Both Greece and Turkey, however—to say nothing of Makarios—began to take greater account of the ways in which ties with Moscow might serve their respective interests.

What happened 10 years later in the new Cyprus crisis, when the Soviet Union, with its Mediterranean fleet in place, was much stronger, and NATO, owing to persistent Greek-Turkish differences, was weaker? Nothing very different. In July 1974, when a coup blessed by the colonels' junta in Athens unseated Makarios, Moscow condemened it and blamed it on "NATO circles." This time the Turks invaded Cyprus in force, and the Soviet Union kept on blaming NATO, defended the right of Cyprus to integrity and independence, and called for the withdrawal of foreign troops (without specifying the Turks by name). Moscow insisted on projecting itself into the negotiations for a settlement by sending an observer to the British-Greek-Turkish talks in Geneva (where the United States was an invited observer), and it made the now familiar argument in notes to Greece and Turkey that the presence of large NATO forces in the area constituted a threat to the southern borders of the USSR. In August, the Soviets proposed sending to Cyprus a UN commission (of which the USSR would be a member), and later called for an international conference to resolve the crisis. No such commission or conference came into being.

In 1974, as in 1964, Moscow's declared policy was at times loud, but its conduct was cautious. The USSR said little about Turkish aggression and made no move to supply arms to the Republic of Cyprus. Soviet leaders knew that they could not really affect what was done about Cyprus, but that was not so important to them. The Western powers could not settle the problem, and the result was to keep Greece and Turkey at loggerheads. It was those two nations, not the status of Cyprus, that were the larger objects of Soviet policy, and thanks to American mismanagement of the crisis rather than to Soviet cleverness, both became further alienated from NATO and the United States. When each sees the other as the principal enemy and cannot get satisfactory support from America, both are inclined to regard closer relations with the USSR as useful rather than dangerous. The desire to promote Greek-Turkish discord and the ultimate disintegration of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean is one reason

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why the Soviet Union did not throw its weight around militarily in the crises over Cyprus, for such action would have revived Greek and Turkish fears of the menace from the north and breathed new life into the Western alliance.

The Relative Stability of Unequal Balance

As our case studies confirm, Soviet caution in the Mediterranean is induced by America's military presence and commitments. The Greece-Turkey-Cyprus area, despite all the wrangling and consequent weakness, is "NATO country" and not the place to mount a Soviet military challenge. The same considerations apply to the entire Eastern Mediterranean. The USSR has lost its bases in Egypt, which are not fully compensated for by use of facilities made available by Syria and Libya.[17] Although America and Western Europe may not see eye to eye on Israel, the strong American commitment to that country and the new American involvement with Egypt, against the background of the 6th Fleet, make it highly unlikely that the Kremlin will seek change in this part of the region through the use of its own military power.

Could the USSR somehow get rid of the American military presence? Khrushchev used to fill the air with proposals for atom-free zones in the Balkans and the Mediterranean,[18] but the West did not take them seriously. Brezhnev, in 1971, in 1974, and again in 1976, publicly floated the idea of extending détente to the Mediterranean, particularly through the reduction or withdrawal of American and Soviet naval forces with nuclear weapons,[19] but it is not clear what, if anything, he really wanted to negotiate. Agreed limitations might be conceivable; however, the two superpowers cannot be expected to withdraw, although a goodly number of Mediterranean countries might like to see them both do so. It has yet to be proved that turning over the security of the Mediterranean to the Mediterranean countries, logical as it sounds, would in fact provide security. The present military balance may serve much better.

It is an unequal balance, not just in the sense that the 6th Fleet and the allied navies outweigh the Soviet naval force, but because the military dispositions reflect the fact that the entire sea is part of the North Atlantic Treaty area and is vital to the security of Europe. The Soviet Union might use similar logic to say that the region is vital to its security and that this justifies Soviet military superiority there, yet we are dealing here not with symmetry of argument but with historical fact and national conviction and international commitments.[20] That is why the establishment of naval superiority on the Soviet side or the introduction of Soviet ground and air forces in the area—whether they were sent on invitation to Syria, Libya, or Cyprus, or were moved from Hungary into Yugoslavia or from Bulgaria into Greece—would be a dangerous shifting of the balance. If we judge from the past, Soviet lead-



A Soviet Krupnyy-class guided-missile destroyer takes a close look at a British Royal Navy Buccaneer on the flight deck of the HMS Hermes in April 1970 in the Mediterranean.

—Keystone.

17. Amnon Sella, "Changes in Soviet Political-Military Policy in the Middle East after 1973," in Yaacov Ro'i, *The Limits to Power . . .*, pp. 32–64.

18. John C. Campbell, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans," pp. 14–16.

19. Ye. M. Primakov, "The Mainsprings of US Middle East Policy," *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* (Moscow), November 1976, p. 5; and Anne M. Kelly and Charles Petersen, *Recent Changes in Soviet Naval Policy: Prospects for Arms Limitations in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean,* Professional Paper No. 150, Arlington, VA, Center for Naval Analyses, April 1976, pp. 1–11.

20. Soviet writers often point out that Americans deny the right of the USSR to make precisely the same kinds of military deployments and take the same kinds of actions in the Mediterranean—in an area much closer to Russia than to America—that the US does. See, for example, the article by Primakov cited in fn. 19.

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ers have known that very well. They have been liberal with warnings that they would take military action in the Mediterranean on behalf of their security or their friends, but they have not done so, except in the limited Egyptian venture of 1970. And, for its part, the United States has not had occasion to use its forces in a Mediterranean crisis since the landings in Lebanon in 1958.

The Uncertain Future

Is there any permanence in this balance? Does the Soviet Union accept it? From the continuing buildup of overall Soviet strategic and conventional power, one is led to think not. How far the USSR has gained on or surpassed the United States can be endlessly argued, but that the Soviet Union has greatly increased its power, absolutely and relatively, is beyond question. There are two possibilities of a shift in Soviet policy and in the Mediterranean balance as a result of this stronger global position: (1) that the United States will be inhibited from standing up to Soviet pressures against local Mediterranean states, which will then give way; or (2) that the USSR will push toward military superiority in the Mediterranean theater, with consequent readiness to risk conflict there.

There is little doubt their now massive strategic nuclear power has given the Soviet leaders greater confidence to make military moves on the fringes of the Middle East and Africa, though still without committing Soviet combat forces. Is there a momentum in these events, combined with an American passivity as some critics charge, that will carry Moscow into the heart of the Middle East and to the Mediterranean, areas vital to the West? It is not possible to say what Soviet plans may be. We do not have evidence that either of the strategies mentioned above has been adopted. It is still within the power of decision of the West to safeguard its own security. If the West has the will to maintain the balance in the Mediterranean, it can do so.

Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat confers with Yugoslav President Tito in Cairo in February 1971.

—EUPRA.

A new generation of Soviet leaders is in the wings, although not yet identifiable. Whether new leaders will be as circumspect as Brezhnev we do not know. They will have major problems at home, but they will also have the confidence of possessing great military power and may find many situations beckoning them to make use of it or at least to take risks in the knowledge of its availability. A few of these situations would be: Turkey shaken by a deep economic crisis and political unrest; the Greek-Turkish disputes, including Cyprus, still unresolved; the American-sponsored peace settlement process in the Middle East stalled, and Egypt under seige by other Arab states bound to be looking for Soviet support; Yugoslavia facing a plunge into the unknown of life without Tito; Albania, alone after breaking the China tie, perhaps waiting to return to the Soviet fold; Italy beset by economic and social crisis and the apparent inability of its traditional leadership to govern either with the Communists or without them; Portugal and Spain finding the road from dictatorship to democracy a rocky one; Morocco and Algeria close to war over the Western Sahara; Libya still stirring up trouble with its oil money, its Soviet arms, and its penchant for revolution; Lebanon, buffeted by civil war and outside intervention, unable to put itself together again as a functioning state; last but not least, the PLO with its unrequited quest for a Palestinian homeland.

As we have seen, an uncertain or chaotic situation may make a given country a Soviet target, and the foregoing list indicates that the new Soviet leaders will have a variety of choices. It can be safely predicted that Soviet influence will increase in a number of states. The most vulnerable, at first glance, might seem to be those where Communist movements have taken root: Yugoslavia and Albania, where the established Communist parties may confront crises of political succession; and the southern tier of West European states, where Communists will share in the politics and possibly in the governance of these societies.

While there may be a struggle for power in Yugoslavia, no pro-Moscow "Cominformist" groups seem likely to take over, but if there are factions based on

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

Boris Ponomarëv (right foreground), Candidate Member of the Politburo and head of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, listens attentively to the proceedings of the 23rd Congress of the French Communist Party in Paris in May 1979.

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

nationality differences or policy disputes, some may turn to Moscow for support. Not unless there is a real breakdown of the structure of Communist rule, however, is there likely to be a chance for the Soviets to establish their own chosen group in control, and then only by gross intervention. Everything in the Yugoslav experience goes against the acceptance of Soviet domination, whatever Yugoslavia's internal feuds and weaknesses. Hence, Moscow will continue to face the same choice: either respect Yugoslav independence or take all the risks that open use of force would entail.

Albania is, if anything, more difficult to fathom. A successor to Enver Hoxha might well make up with Moscow in order to get needed aid and to reopen the claim to Yugoslavia's Kosovo region, which is largely inhabited by persons of Albanian descent. That would offer the Kremlin a chance both to put some pressure on the Yugoslavs and to regain access to Albania's Adriatic ports. It would be a nasty situation for Yugoslavia and for the West, but they survived a similar situation in the 1950's.

More important in the Mediterranean's future are the Communist parties of Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy. Of these, the Portuguese CP is the only one fully loyal to Moscow. It had its chance to engineer a seizure of power in 1974–75 but failed, and the Kremlin's discreet help did not change the outcome. The other three parties are usually termed "Eurocommunist"—with its connotation of distance from Moscow's communism—although the PCF may not deserve the label. On the issue of independence of national Communist parties from Moscow's control, an informal Mediterranean grouping of the Spanish, Italian, Yugoslav, and Romanian parties came into being and worked effectively to defend that principle in the negotiations that led up to the meeting and joint declaration of European Communist parties at Berlin in June 1976, and in the subsequent polemics.[21]

21. William E. Griffith, *The Communist and Socialist Parties in Italy, Spain and France: "Eurocommunism," "Eurosocialism," and Soviet Policy,* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1977, pp. 9–11.

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At the same time there are ways in which the Eurocommunists, intentionally or not, effectively support Soviet international strategy. This function is perhaps most evident in the case of the PCF, which takes a nationalist French line similar to that of the Gaullists and tries to weaken France's connection with the US and NATO. Matters are less favorable to Soviet designs in Spain, where the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) asserts its acceptance of democracy for Spain and the party's independence from Moscow, which it openly criticizes. Yet, in advocating the abolition of both military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization) and in downgrading military cooperation with the United States, the PCE on balance can be said to serve Soviet interests.

The situation is perhaps most ambiguous in the case of the Italian party. While the PCI accepts the existence of NATO, it opposes those in Italy who really support the alliance and attacks American policies which would keep the alliance strong—a neutralist stance that some argue serves Soviet purposes now and would serve them even more if the PCI joined the government. The argument has elements of truth. The PCI, in its concentration on domestic matters, concerns itself hardly at all with a future Soviet threat in the Mediterranean, although it is very conscious of the importance to Italy and to itself of Yugoslavia's continued independence. Despite open differences with the USSR on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, on human rights, and on other issues, the PCI has not broken with Moscow, nor has Moscow broken with the PCI.[22]

Nevertheless, it would be a misunderstanding of the nature of Eurocommunism (Italian style), and a misreading of the whole history of the international Communist movement since 1948 and before, to expect the PCI to serve the strategic aims of the Soviet Union at the expense of Italy's security and independence. If the PCI should come to power, with real responsibility for national interests, it is a safe prediction that the break with the Soviet party thus far avoided would become inevitable. PCI strategy might be Communist—whatever that would mean beyond solidarity with Yugoslavia—and it might envisage a new role for Italy in the Mediterranean, but it would not be Soviet.

The list of opportunities for the Soviet Union will remain a long one, and by pursuing an active strategy, Moscow can doubtless cause the West enormous difficulties. However, the West, by maintaining the military balance, and the peoples of the Mediterranean, by persisting in their resolve to maintain their independence, will serve as major obstacles to Soviet exploitation of such opportunities. If both lose out, the responsibility will be their own.

22. On the international views of the PCI, see Giuseppe Are, *L'Italia e i mutamenti internazionali 1971–1976* (Italy and International Changes, 1971–1976), Florence, Vallecchi, 1977, pp. 85–105, 132–51; Rudolf L. Tökes, Ed., *Eurocommunism and Détente*, New York, NY, New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1978, especially Chapter 2 by Norman Kogan.

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Soviet and Chinese Roles in the Middle East

by Edward E. Azar

During the 1970's, and particularly during the latter part of the decade, the roles of the USSR and China in the Middle East have visibly diminished. Neither, for example, has played an active part in shaping the peace process between Egypt and Israel. At the same time, the ties of at least Beijing with the Palestine Liberation Organization are no longer as close as they used to be. Although the regimes in Iraq and Syria supposedly have pro-Soviet tendencies and share with Moscow a strong opposition to the new Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the USSR has seemed to be losing influence in the two countries. This state of affairs has been particularly pronounced in Iraq. Not only has Baghdad's economic dependence on the Soviet Union decreased dramatically since the early 1970's, but the dominant Ba'th Party has feuded with the local Communist Party over Communist efforts to organize within the army and civil service and over the regime's agrarian policy, although the Communist Party has continued to have representation in the ruling governmental coalition.[1] In Iran, which looked vulnerable to Soviet meddling and ripe for the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime upon the ouster of the Shah in January 1979, the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni has thus far turned out to be much less friendly toward the USSR than was the Shah's government. With respect to Saudi Arabia, there have been indications that the common opposition of Moscow and Riyadh to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty may provide the foundation for at least improved Soviet-Saudi trade relations, but this development has yet to occur. Indeed, the Saudi royal family remains highly hostile toward communism.[2] On balance, then, the USSR and China do not appear as important in Middle Eastern politics today as they did in the 1960's.

This situation raises a number of questions. What factors have brought about the decrease in the roles of the two Communist powers in the Middle East? Are these factors temporary, or more lasting? In light of them, what are the prospects for the roles of the USSR and China in Middle Eastern affairs in the years immediately ahead? It is to these issues that the present article will address itself.

In searching for explanations of the decline in Soviet and Chinese influence in the region, one can identify two basic causes. First, there have been substantial changes in global politics in the 1970's. These include such things as the détente between the USSR and the United States and the rapprochement between China and the US, the growing importance of oil-producing countries in world affairs, and increased competition among Western countries for resources and markets. Second, both the Soviets and Chinese have demonstrated a lack of ability and/or unwillingness to respond to the needs and dynamics of the Middle East. These deficiencies have been particularly manifest in connection with the two most serious problems of the area—namely, the Arab-Israeli con-

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1. See David Lynn Price, "Moscow and the Persian Gulf," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1979, pp. 7-8.
2. See ibid., pp. 11-12.

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

A June 1968 view of the hydroelectric power station at Aswan in Egypt. This station was built with the help of Soviet aid.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

flict and economic development of the region. Both of these general factors require examination in some detail.

Alterations in Global Politics

For purposes of analyzing the recent shifts in international politics, it is useful to distinguish three general periods in the post-World War II era. These are (a) 1945–62, the intense cold war period; (b) 1963–73, the cooling-off or transition period; (c) 1974–present, the détente and political economy period.

The first period was characterized by highly ideological conflict. While the major actors engaged in power-balancing calculations in conducting their foreign policies, these calculations did not follow *Realpolitik* lines. That is, ideological predispositions, more than "rational" criteria, guided them.[3] The explanation for this state of affairs is fairly simple. World War II had elevated two previously peripheral countries with vastly different ideological commitments—the United States and the USSR—to dominance of the new international system which replaced the prewar system. Under such circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the two powers would rely on their ideological outlooks in determining their political behavior in the global arena.

But the new international system was not entirely novel. Indeed, the most important characteristic of the early cold war years was the continuing preoccupation with Europe on the part of the two leading actors in the system. Both the US and the Soviet Union concentrated their attention on stabilizing their positions in the respective portions of Europe that they dominated, and the major strife between them was over the American presence in Berlin. With Europe being the

3. For further discussion, see Ole Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images," in James N. Rosenau, Ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York, NY, Free Press, 1969, pp. 543–50; Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, New York, NY, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971.

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

A display of Soviet-made missiles and launchers in Cairo in July 1964.

—***Daily Express*** **(London) from Pictorial Parade.**

chief cold war battlefield, the Middle Eastern countries remained of only marginal interest to the two powers.

By 1962, however, both the US and the USSR had in large measure recovered from the effects of World War II and were fairly confident of the stability of Europe, with the exception of Berlin. Moreover, the Berlin crisis of late 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 taught the two states an important lesson: *avoid direct conflict at almost any cost.* With their absorption of this principle, cold war interaction entered a new era.[4]

In this new era, each of the two countries, regardless of rhetoric, tended to accept the other as a legitimate superpower in the international system, and their interaction began to take on the features of power balancing in the classical *Realpolitik* sense. As the environment, rules, and structure of the revised global system clarified, the need for a recourse to anti-Communist or anti-capitalist notions as a guide to action receded. Indeed, personnel changes in both countries reflected this situation, for national security technocrats, who perceived the world in at least somewhat similar conceptual frameworks, increasingly replaced ideologists in key foreign policy spheres in the two states.[5] While conflict did not disappear, it was in general of a realist-political, as opposed to ideological-political, type. Furthermore, conflict tended to be indirect, i.e., carried out through proxies and clients.

The formal Sino-Soviet split in 1963 served to reinforce the trends that defined the new era. By placing the USSR and China at public loggerheads, it further eroded the coherence of ideological divisions as a basis for foreign policy calculations. Moreover, China quickly demonstrated an inclination to expand its struggle with the Soviet Union by competing for influence in other states—notably, in the Third World.

These changed relationships among the major powers transformed the Middle East from an arena of peripheral concern to them into part of the battlefield where they clashed. All three, and especially the US and the USSR, concentrated on winning the "hearts and minds" of the people and, perhaps more important, the governments in the region. To understand American, Soviet, and Chinese policies in the area, it is important to recognize that the logic of involvement during this period was predominantly political and not economic. Thus, programs of development and aid—while ostensibly "economic" in nature—were oriented more toward producing acquiescent governments than toward improving the economic conditions in the region or gaining access to raw materials or markets. In the latter regard, it is simply not credible to see the early American involvement in Israel and the early Soviet involvement in Egypt, for example, as the result of economic determinism—especially when the political logic is so clear.

Before the 1960's were out, however, the international system was once again standing on the threshold of significant alteration. The first hints came with the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968, but the real symbols of change were the inauguration of Soviet-American détente in 1972 and the oil embargo by the Arab oil-producing states in 1973. Especially as the need for imported raw materials increased in the Western industrial states and as the effective internal markets for at least some types of their products no longer sufficed to ensure expansion or, in certain cases, even maintenance of output levels, economic issues became more and more central to their decision-making with respect to international politics. In fact, political-economic competition among the Western industrial countries has emerged as perhaps as important a threat to the survival of the political orders in these countries as the politico-military threat from the Communist powers and especially the USSR.

This intensified competition for resources and markets has not thus far really extended to the Soviet

4. Douglas Nelson, "The Cold War System," unpublished Master's thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1978.

5. R.J. Barnet, *Roots of War,* New York, NY, Random House, 1972; David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest,* New York, NY, Random House, 1969; Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace,* Boston, MA, Hougton Mifflin, 1977.

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Union and China. While the Communist powers do not necessarily possess greater resource endowments in an absolute sense than do the Western states, rising internal demand in the USSR and China has by and large not yet reached the point where it dramatically exceeds the resources immediately available. Moreover, the domestic market for local output is still far from glutted, thus reducing the pressure to find foreign markets for this output.[6]

The new global situation has markedly affected the Middle East. As attention to economic considerations in the West has heightened, those nations in the Middle East which constitute key sources of raw materials and/or potential markets have gained the opportunity to function in the international system more as independent actors and less as pawns in the power game of the core actors. Furthermore, economics has become the primary factor in the dynamics of the political interaction of the Middle Eastern countries with outside powers.

In this general context, the relevance of the USSR and China to the area has inevitably declined. On the one hand, the low level of Soviet and Chinese concern with finding sources of raw materials and markets for products has run counter to the rising importance of economics in shaping the relations of Middle Eastern countries with the rest of the world. On the other hand, the enhanced capacity of at least some Middle Eastern states to pursue their ends in international affairs independently has lessened their need for political and military support from great powers such as the USSR and China.

Interactions in the Middle East

To gain a nuanced picture of the effect of these modifications in the global system on the relations of the USSR and China with the Middle East since World War II and especially in the 1970's, it is essential to look at the patterns of interaction of key Middle Eastern countries with the Soviet Union, China, and the United States over the years. Tables 1 and 2 present these patterns in statistical form. In the first table, the data cover behavior of the three major powers toward Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Iran; in the second table, they deal with the behavior of these five Middle Eastern countries toward the three major powers.

Perhaps a few words of explanation regarding the tables would be in order before we examine their implications. On the basis of the record of daily interactions between 135 countries from 1948 to the present that is maintained in the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, I have compiled average annual interactions of a conflictual sort and of a cooperative nature for each of the three broad periods discussed above. In addition, I have broken down these conflictual and cooperative interactions in terms of the general realms in which they took place—i.e., in the economic, political, military, and cultural-technological-scientific spheres.[7] Thus, the figures provide us with indices of the types as well as the intensity of interaction.

The data in the tables permit several broad generalizations about the interactions of the USSR and China with the countries of the Middle East since World War II. Only during the 1963–73 period have the Chinese played any visible role in the area, and even then that role was marginal. Although the Soviet role has been much more pronounced than the Chinese role, it has been characterized by ups and downs. In nearly all the region, neither China nor the USSR appears to have been as active or influential as the United States.

Furthermore, both the Soviet Union and China have tended to send only as many cooperative signals as they have received from the Middle Eastern states, while the United States has tended to send coopera-

6. Robert W. Campbell, *The Soviet-Type Economies: Performance and Evolution,* Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1974.

7. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) contains information on more than 350,000 individual events spanning the years from 1948 to 1979. This information constitutes the publicly available record of domestic and international actions of some 135 countries toward one another. It is drawn from over 50 international and regional sources such as newspapers, chronologies, government documents, historical accounts, etc. COPDAB's collection is the result of 12 years of work of numerous persons under the direction of Professor Edward E. Azar at the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Each domestic or international action identified from the sources has been coded on computer-stored records in terms of the following criteria: (1) the date (year, month, and day of the event); (2) the actor (who initiated the event); (3) the target (the object of the event); (4) the source (where the description of the event was found); (5) the activity (the verbal or physical act which an actor initiated); (6) the type of event (whether the event concerns political, military, economic, or other matters); (7) the intensity of the event (each event is assigned a value on a scale ranging from very high conflict to very high cooperation); and (8) the issue area (the substance of the event).

Details of the procedures of data collection and data management can be obtained from Professor Azar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Moreover, the *COPDAB Codebook and User's Manual* (1978) is available upon request. Numerous articles have been written describing the data collection and the types of quality controls employed by the COPDAB staff. These are also obtainable upon request. All the data are to be aggregated on yearly internation and intranation bases and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan within one year from June 1979.

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Table 1. Average Annual Interactions of the USSR, the PRC, and the US with Selected Middle East States, 1948–78

Actor \ Target	Egypt				Syria				Iraq				Israel				Iran			
	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.
The USSR																				
Conflictual interactions																				
1948–62	—	20	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	16	—	—	—	57	—	—	—	59	—	—
1963–73	—	18	8	—	—	5	3	—	—	40	—	—	—	196	7	4	—	4	4	—
1974–78	3	88	12	—	—	23	—	—	—	7	—	5	—	67	—	11	—	9	—	—
Cooperative interactions																				
1948–62	58	48	28	64	20	26	20	15	23	10	6	47	5	7	—	1	42	25	2	11
1963–73	55	123	80	88	30	49	50	49	40	27	12	34	5	16	—	4	35	19	—	31
1974–78	15	64	33	22	28	65	46	1	55	20	13	31	2	20	1	5	27	4	—	6
The PRC																				
Conflictual interactions																				
1948–62	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1963–73	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	96	3	—	—	—	—	—
1974–78	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cooperative interactions																				
1948–62	19	10	2	4	5	3	—	—	7	3	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—
1963–73	32	61	—	6	32	4	4	9	16	15	—	4	—	2	—	—	5	12	—	—
1974–78	31	7	6	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	5	7	—	1
The US																				
Conflictual interactions																				
1948–62	13	91	8	—	—	23	6	—	2	9	4	3	10	54	10	3	10	29	6	2
1963–73	16	122	3	8	3	44	—	2	3	15	3	—	5	75	4	3	—	3	—	—
1974–78	—	28	—	—	—	29	—	—	—	8	—	1	18	128	39	8	6	—	12	—
Cooperative interactions																				
1948–62	94	78	5	37	22	58	3	14	11	22	25	14	87	82	23	50	70	36	39	25
1963–73	41	74	6	36	3	10	4	7	26	8	3	18	61	122	105	38	34	20	42	20
1974–78	225	385	52	59	53	74	—	1	2	6	6	—	66	214	174	36	15	25	87	14

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: See the note at the conclusion of Table 2 below.

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Table 2. Average Annual Interactions of Selected Middle East States with the USSR, the PRC, and the US, 1948–78

Actor / Target	Egypt				Syria				Iraq				Israel				Iran			
	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.	Econ.	Polit.	Milit.	Cult.
The USSR																				
Conflictual interactions																				
1948–62	—	17	1	6	—	15	2	2	—	16	—	—	4	44	12	2	1	73	20	—
1963–73	—	23	23	—	—	5	—	—	—	28	—	8	7	100	47	1	—	6	2	—
1974–78	30	120	46	9	—	8	5	—	1	3	—	—	3	37	33	—	—	9	—	—
Cooperative interactions																				
1948–62	53	41	35	33	25	36	12	6	31	15	2	19	8	11	1	1	26	27	2	5
1963–73	63	89	52	48	83	36	22	11	43	35	9	9	6	14	4	1	50	13	4	9
1974–78	28	78	11	8	24	48	26	—	60	22	—	8	—	14	—	—	33	5	—	7
The PRC																				
Conflictual interactions																				
1948–62	2	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
1963–73	—	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	—	—
1974–78	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cooperative interactions																				
1948–62	21	13	—	2	5	5	—	—	5	6	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1963–73	31	29	—	3	11	21	1	10	20	13	—	4	—	2	—	—	4	10	—	1
1974–78	26	3	25	—	—	—	—	—	22	3	—	—	3	3	—	—	6	7	—	1
The US																				
Conflictual interactions																				
1948–62	15	100	8	4	3	97	12	4	2	43	1	3	—	82	7	—	7	38	6	—
1963–73	20	244	45	—	9	128	9	—	31	66	3	3	2	53	18	—	3	15	—	—
1974–78	—	41	7	—	6	50	31	—	1	43	—	—	2	131	30	5	8	46	9	—
Cooperative interactions																				
1948–62	61	60	6	21	10	18	3	3	12	22	9	6	66	94	22	13	50	29	30	2
1963–73	29	64	10	17	11	7	3	—	13	7	—	5	28	91	46	10	18	17	29	1
1974–78	75	186	24	26	18	67	—	2	2	4	—	—	33	136	35	25	49	14	25	6

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: Derived from data in Edward E. Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. The above quantities are yearly averages computed by the author according to a procedure which multiplies yearly frequencies of economic, political, military, and cultural-technological-scientific events times their respective intensities. These quantities provide the researcher with a yearly measure of how much conflict or cooperation within these categories one country directed at another.

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A poster in Luxor, United Arab Republic (Egypt), in May 1971 advocates Arab solidarity with the Soviet Union. The poster reads: "Three Weeks of Friendship of the Organization of Socialist Youth of the UAR and the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League of the USSR."

—Eastfoto.

tive signals even to those states which have directed conflictual ones at it. This difference would seem to have its roots in the advantages that the USSR and China have derived from not being subject to generalized anti-imperialist feelings on the part of Middle Eastern peoples. Both powers were relatively free of links to the old colonial order in the Middle East, have displayed at least verbal hostility toward Israel, and have joined with some Middle Eastern governments in anti-US and anti-Western campaigns. The situation of the United States, by contrast, has been much more complex. On the one hand, the United States has wanted to ensure the stability of pro-Western regimes and better its relations with neutral and anti-Western regimes. Even if it has not been able to improve its relations with anti-Western regimes, it has preferred stability to chaos in their countries. These purposes have prompted it to place great stress on cooperative messages and activities with respect to the Middle East. On the other hand, a number of Middle Eastern states have been inclined to perceive the US presence in the area within the framework of their long-standing battle with the advanced, industrialized, and imperialist West. Thus, they have displayed hostility toward the United States not only because it has pursued specific policies in the region, but also because they have seen its activities as the modern-day equivalent of the French and British imperialisms of earlier times.

It should be noted, however, that in recent years this advantage of the USSR and China has been diminishing, particularly in the case of the former. Since 1967 especially, the Soviet Union has become the target of a good deal of hostility from Middle Eastern quarters. This has appeared to stem from increasing opposition to communism, fears of Soviet imperialism, and even resentment of superpower dominance.

Finally, the role of the USSR in the Middle East over the years has depended heavily on interactions in the military realm. Specifically, it has been tied closely to Moscow's undertakings to meet the military needs of some key Arab states and political groups. This linkage, it should be underscored, has over the long haul had distinct drawbacks for the Soviet Union. Because much of the Soviet involvement in the region has been in the military sector and with a fairly small number of professionals, few people in the region even today have been exposed to Soviet technological competence—to say nothing of Soviet life, culture, history, politics, society, language, etc. Consequently, to most influential Middle Easterners the USSR conjures up images of poverty, clumsiness, excessive oppression, poor quality of life, low productivity, and unacceptable atheism. Furthermore, military hardware transfers, and trade more generally, have not done much to generate positive attitudes toward the Soviets in Middle Eastern societies. Many politically-aware people have regarded the resulting dependent relationships as manifestations of exploitation and neo-imperialism.

With regard to individual Middle Eastern countries, there have been some variations worthy of comment. As far as Egypt is concerned, the average yearly level of conflictual Soviet behavior in the political sphere has shot up fivefold in the period since 1973, while that of cooperative behavior has decreased by half. There have also been significant drops in the levels of cooperative Soviet behavior in the economic, military, and cultural-technological-scientific realms. In more or less asymmetrical fashion, conflictual Egyptian behavior toward the USSR in the political domain has risen sixfold, and that in the other spheres has gone

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up substantially, though not to the same degree as in the political sphere. Moreover, cooperative Egyptian behavior toward the USSR has declined in all realms.

Interaction between Egypt and China over the years has been far less extensive than that between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is worth underlining that cooperative interaction has decreased in the political domain and increased in the military domain in the post-1973 period, as compared with the 1963–73 period.

To put these data on Soviet and Chinese relations with Egypt in some perspective, it is essential to keep in mind the major alterations that have taken place in Egypt's relations with the United States. Indeed, the scope of these shifts might lead an observer to suggest that they mark the most important political development in the contemporary history of the Middle East. Conflictual interaction between the two countries has fallen to basically negligible levels in the period since 1973. At the same time, cooperative interaction has risen in a manner rarely known in Middle Eastern-superpower relations. The average yearly level of such US behavior toward Egypt has jumped fivefold or more in each of the economic, political, and military realms, while in the cultural-technological-scientific realm, it has increased by 100 percent. By the same token, the average annual level of cooperative Egyptian behavior toward the United States has gone up by about 200 percent in the first three domains and 100 percent in the fourth. There has been, in sum, an impressive relative and absolute growth of American-Egyptain cooperation over a wide range of basic issues of both a bilateral and regional nature.

Trends in Soviet interaction with Syria have been quite mixed during the post-1973 period. The USSR has maintained roughly constant levels of cooperation in the economic and military realms. In the political sphere, however, it has directed both more conflictual and more cooperative messages at Syria than it did during the 1963–73 period. Furthermore, Moscow has let its cooperative signals in the cultural-technological-scientific realm drop to negligible levels. Syria, in turn, has manifested about the same level of conflictual behavior toward the USSR in the political domain during the period since 1973 as it did during the previous decade, but its cooperative behavior in this domain has risen noticeably. The average annual level of cooperative Syrian behavior toward the USSR in the military realm has stayed fairly steady, but it has decreased in both the economic and cultural spheres.

China's interaction with Syria has dropped precipitately in the post-1973 period. In fact, it has been virtually nonexistent.

US-Syrian interactions, by way of comparison, have undergone more complex changes than China-Syrian interactions and less complex ones than USSR-Syrian interactions in the period since 1973. The United States has focused its attention on the political and (to a lesser extent) the economic domains in recent years. In both areas, it has reduced its conflictual behavior and increased its cooperative behavior during the post-1973 period. The latter trend has been particularly pronounced in the economic realm. Syria, for its part, has directed fewer conflictual messages and more cooperative messages toward the United States in the political sphere during the period since 1973 than it did during 1963–73. Although the level of its signals in the economic sphere has remained fairly low, the level of cooperative ones that it has sent to the United States has about doubled in the post-1973 years.

With respect to Iraq, the levels of interaction of both the Soviet Union and China have been relatively low during the period since 1973, except in the economic realm. In the economic sphere, however, they have been of some consequence, especially in the case of the USSR. Indeed, the levels of cooperative Soviet behavior toward Iraq and cooperative Iraqi behavior toward the USSR have risen appreciably.



A Soviet-supplied MIG jet of the Syrian air force in 1977.

—Andanson/Sygma.

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

Construction work on the separator block at the Ar Rumaylah oil field in Iraq in December 1971. The USSR provided Iraq with the economic and technical assistance required to get this field into production.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

US-Iraq interactions during the same period have been generally lower in magnitude than either USSR-Iraq or China-Iraq interactions. The political realm has provided the major exception. Iraq has sent a fairly high level of conflictual political messages toward the United States. It should be pointed out, nonetheless, that both conflictual and cooperative interactions between the two countries have tended to fall during the post-1973 years, as compared with the situation in the preceding decade.

In the case of Israel, the incidence of conflictual interactions with the USSR and China has dropped off in the period since 1973. Moreover, Moscow has even increased its cooperative signals slightly, although Israel has not responded in like fashion. By and large, both the conflictual and cooperative interactions have been confined to the political realm, but Israel has paid some attention to the military sphere as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. In general, Israel has been much more deeply involved with the USSR than with China.

As might be expected, the magnitude of Israel's interactions with the United States has vastly exceeded that of its interactions with either the USSR or China in the post-1973 period. However, the trends of interaction have had some features of interest in comparison with those related to the USSR in particular. There has been a sharp rise on all fronts in the conflictual behavior of the United States toward Israel and vice versa. At the same time, the level of cooperative behavior on the part of the United States has gone up significantly in both the political and military realms, and that on the part of Israel, in the political realm.

At least prior to the Shah's ouster in early 1979, the interactions of China with Iran remained at a negligible level during the period after 1973, and those of the USSR with Iran, though of substantially greater consequences than in the Chinese case, tended to decline. Only in the economic sphere did Soviet-Iranian interactions stay reasonably stable at a magnitude of some importance.

In contrast, US-Iranian interactions were fairly intensive but complex in nature during the post-1973

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years. The United States sent largely cooperative messages toward Iran, and these covered all four general realms of activity. However, there were variations in trends within the different spheres. While the average annual signals in the political and cultural domains after 1973, as compared with the signals for the 1963–73 period, remained more or less constant, those in the military sphere increased by 100 percent, and those in the economic realm fell by roughly 50 percent. As for Iran's behavior toward the United States, this embodied many more conflictual elements than it had earlier. These cropped up essentially in the political and military domains. The level of cooperative signals stayed roughly the same except in the economic sphere, where it jumped nearly threefold.

Soviet and Chinese Failures

To turn now to the second broad reason for the reduction of the Soviet and Chinese roles in the Middle East in recent years, it is quite clear that neither the USSR nor China has managed to demonstrate to the peoples of the Middle East that it is critically relevant to the region's needs. The situations with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and local development provide the most glaring illustrations, so let us look at each briefly.

The Arab-Israeli conflict. At the outset, it is essential to recognize that this conflict has many dimensions. On one level, it is an interstate conflict with regional, strategic, and global aspects. In regional terms, of course, it has involved the Arab countries and Israel. Because the Middle East has major strategic significance stemming from its oil, its geopolitical features, and its markets, the two superpowers have also become engaged in the conflict. This circumstance has had two consequences. On the one hand, rivalry between the United States and the USSR has seriously complicated both intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli relations. Not only did the Arabs split into opposing camps during the period of intense cold war between the superpowers—thereby producing increased intra-Arab suspicion and hostility—but the propaganda war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces entered the

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng holds talks in Beijing with Abu Jihad, a leading member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in June 1977.

—***China Pictorial*** **(Beijing), No. 9, 1977, p. 2.**

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Middle East and heightened the verbal warfare between the Arab states and Israel. On the other hand, the superpowers have supplied to their respective clients in the region sophisticated arms and moral and political support, and imbalances in the degree of concrete backing that the two sides have provided have at times precipitated warfare within the Middle East.[8] Aside from the superpowers, a variety of other countries have found themselves embroiled in the conflict in some way, for there has been a tendency for the conflict to spill over into the relations of Middle Eastern states with nations outside the region. This situation has added to the complexity of the conflict.[9]

The number of primary and secondary participants as well as the many incompatible goals and competing claims on the same material and human resources has tended to discourage creative involvement aimed at achieving a resolution of the conflict.[10] Thus, the conflict has exhibited an action-reaction character that has facilitated escalation and war and inhibited cooperation and stability.[11]

On a second level, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict among social groups competing for ideological and national primacy within a certain territory. While both sides have tended to label the conflict a quarrel over territory, over the land of Palestine, each has nevertheless admitted that the conflict is more fundamentally an ethnic and social clash. This attribute has many important implications with respect to the meaning and quality of coexistence and survival in the Middle East.[12]

Conflicts of the foregoing sort exhibit a number of common traits. They tend to extend over a long period of time. They are marked by fluctuations in the frequency and intensity of hostilities. They spill over into other interstate and intrastate (or intergroup and intragroup) activities. And they have no clear and distinct end. In light of these characteristics, such conflicts are best viewed as *protracted social conflicts*.[13]

Both the USSR and China, however, have approached the Arab-Israeli conflict fundamentally on the interstate level, paying little attention to its social and ethnic dimensions. This has been particularly true of the USSR, whose involvement in the conflict has consistently overshadowed that of China. In dealing with the conflict, for example, Moscow has in general tried to work toward a settlement acceptable essentially to its friends, rather than to all parties concerned. At the same time, it has sought to contain Arab and Israeli grievances and to prevent them from escalating into open warfare. Moreover, if hostilities have actually broken out, the USSR, desiring to avoid conflict with the United States, has by and large moved to consult with Washington on methods of

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, greets Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad in Moscow in October 1978. This visit came in the wake of the conclusion of the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel in September 1978.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

8. See W. R. Polk, *The United States and the Arab World*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1975; Fred Kouri et al., *Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 1975; Jon Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1975; Leo Heiman, "Moscow's Export Arsenal: The Soviet Bloc and the Middle East Arms Race," *East Europe* (New York, NY), May 1964; J.C. Hurewitz, *Changing Military Perspectives in the Middle East*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1970; Dale K. Tahtinen, *Arms in the Indian Ocean: Interests and Challenge*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1977.

9. See Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, New York, NY, Quadrangle Books, 1974; Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967*, New York, NY, Pegasus Press, 1969; Mohammed Sid-Ahmed, *After the Guns Fall Silent*, London, Groves Helm, 1970.

10. See Edward E. Azar et al., "Protracted Social Conflict in the Middle East," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Kuwait University), Autumn 1978, pp. 41–60; Barry Blechman, "The Impact of Arab-Israeli Reprisals on the Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Ann Arbor, MI), June 1972, pp. 155–82.

11. See P. Jureidini and William Hazen, *The Palestinian Movement in Politics*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976; Walter Laqueur, *Confrontation*, New York, NY, Bantam Books, 1974.

12. See Noam Chomsky, *Peace in the Middle East?* New York, NY, Vintage Books, 1972; Y. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes toward Israel*, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1971; Y. Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel*, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing House, 1974; S. Yassin, *Arab Personality: Arab vs. Israeli Perspectives*, Cairo, Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 1974.

13. Azar et al., loc. cit.

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deescalating regional strife. In short, Moscow has not attempted to address the root causes of the conflict but has seen regional tranquility as merely the absence of overt hostilities, something to be produced by mere diplomatic arrangements.

It is only in the post-1973 period, to be sure, that the United States has seriously begun to treat the Arab-Israeli conflict in a fashion different from the way that the USSR has handled it. But that shift in approach has already borne some significant fruits. This combination of factors, in turn, has helped to underscore the drawbacks of the Soviet approach and thus to reduce the Soviet role in the region.

Regional development. Here again, we need to proceed from a proper conceptual basis. Various writers have defined development in terms of economic growth, in terms of political participation, and in terms of transformation in the overall values of a society. But in the Middle Eastern context, it is useful to think of development in a somewhat different way. That is, development is the process whereby a community organizes itself to cope with change in the physical or social environment in a fashion of maximum benefit to that community. It is a process through which the physical and psychological quality of life of individuals and groups is improved through simultaneous encouragement of growth, reduction of inequality, and containment of conflict. It reduces the "structural victimization," or the condition of inequality and disequilibrium, that has emerged as a by-product of historical trends within a specific social system.[14]

This notion of development derives its particular relevance from the nature of the two most salient problems in the Middle East: (a) poverty and economic inequality and (b) social and ethnic "victimization." With regard to the dimensions of the first of these problems, it is sufficient to note that most of the countries in the region have national incomes per capita of less than US$1,000. Only in Cyprus, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia does the figure exceed that amount, and in Cyprus, Iran, and Iraq, it stands at less than $2,000.[15] Obviously, the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict, by diverting scarce resources into military investments, has proved a severe impediment to bettering this state of affairs. Indeed, the effects of the conflict have been so pervasive that it is well nigh impossible to measure their real economic costs and dislocations.

As for the second problem, it is important to remember that history has visited upon the Middle East a variety of cleavages and differences in outlook. These have brought on not only the Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggles against the economic dominance of the West in the region, but also competition among socioeconomic classes, conflicts between factions of the same broad religious group (notably Islam), clashes between major religious groups (such as the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon), battles among the many ethnic groups in the region, and conflicts stemming from political relations antedating even the Ottoman Empire.

To achieve development in the sense of coping with these problems is an enormously complex undertaking. In fact, it has become so complicated in recent years that it defies management by the local Middle Eastern regimes alone. Ethnicity and religious politics exert an increasingly powerful force in the daily life of the region and have been threatening the national consensuses and ideological clarity of earlier times. The economic issues of growth and distribution as well as the stresses produced by exponential population growth are beginning to assume overwhelming proportions. Terrorism and instability are far from new, but they have reached especially distressing levels of late. Advances in communication technology and other types of technology, indeed, have produced an astonishing spread and rise in the efficiency of industrial and political terrorism. Under such circumstances, the Middle Eastern countries have had a growing need of assistance from outside powers—despite the enhanced influence of the oil-producing states in the global arena.

Yet neither the USSR nor China has been particularly helpful to the local governments in ways that are relevant. For example, although Soviet and Chinese economic aid to the Middle East has never assumed massive proportions, it has looked quite skimpy alongside Western, and notably American, aid since the early 1970's. Some comparative statistics will illustrate the point. Over the period 1954–73, China extended US$421 million in credits to Middle Eastern states, while the USSR provided $3,816 million worth. During 1974–77, the figures were $25 million for China and $999 million for the Soviet Union. From 1953 through 1974, the United States furnished more than US$6,500 million in economic aid to Middle Eastern countries. And in 1975–77 alone, the total was over $4,100 million. The contrast in the

14. For further discussion of this conception of development, see J. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), Vol. 1, No. 1, 1964, pp. 95–119; idem, "Feudal Systems, Structural Violence and the Structural Theory of Revolution," *Proceedings of the Third Conference of the International Peace Research Association*, Oslo, Universitetforlaget, 1970.

15. United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1977*, New York, NY, 1978.

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amounts of Soviet and Western economic assistance has been especially striking in light of the high levels of Soviet military aid to Third World countries, many of them in the Middle East.[16]

Furthermore, the quality of the assistance that the USSR and China have offered has not infrequently left something to be desired. The Soviet Union, for instance, has been quite insensitive to the peculiarities of the Middle Eastern region. As long as it has merely been supplying large-scale physical infrastructure and technology which requires little adaptation to specific environments, it has been fairly effective in meeting Middle Eastern needs, but in projects that require some attention to the local milieu, and particularly those which require some weighing of social ramifications, it has proved highly unsuccessful.

These factors have produced a certain amount of disillusionment with the USSR and China in the Middle East. They have thus had an impact on the decline of the roles of the two Communist powers in the region.

Prospects

What implications, then, does the preceding analysis have for the future? To begin with, it would plainly be an error to think that one can automatically project the current situation into the period immediately ahead. As we have seen, the decline in Soviet and Chinese roles in the Middle East has resulted from transformations in the international political system and in failures on the part of Moscow and Beijing, and one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of further changes in the global political system or modifications in Soviet and Chinese attitudes which would eliminate some of the problems that they have encountered in the region.

Nevertheless, the likelihood of such alterations in the present state of affairs over the next five or ten years seems fairly low. The chief catalyst for a change in the world political system would probably be a sharp deterioration of US-Soviet relations, and while that is by no means unthinkable, it appears a fairly remote possibility at the moment. As for shifts in Soviet and Chinese attitudes, these would entail major revisions in goals, interests, and policies with respect to the region. Such revisions are conceivable, but not likely.

All in all, it would appear probable that the influence of the USSR and China in the Middle East will not grow significantly in the foreseeable future. Indeed, their roles in the region may even diminish further.

16. Compiled from Carol H. Fogarty, "China's Economic Relations with the Third World," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 372; Orah Cooper, "Soviet Aid to the Third World," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 195; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977*, ER-10478U, Washington, DC, November 1978; US Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 1977*, Washington, DC, n.d.

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The Eurocommunists and the West

by Heinz Timmermann

Not long ago, the Communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain—the so-called "Eurocommunists"—seemed to be making an irresistible advance toward participation in their respective national governments, a situation to which wide circles in the European Community (EC)[1] reacted with acute alarm. In France, the French Communist Party (PCF) was believed to have a good chance to assume power together with François Mitterrand's Socialist Party (PS) via the parliamentary elections of March 1978. In the same month, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was included in the governmental majority of the Italian parliament and thereby took another step toward its goal of *direct* government participation. Finally, in Spain, where the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) had won only a disappointing 9.2 percent of the vote in the Cortes elections of June 1977, the Communists' foothold in society, and especially in the trade unions,[2] had become so strong that Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez thought it useful to have the PCE take part in the negotiations on measures for consolidating democracy and stabilizing the economy which culminated in the Moncloa agreement of October 1977.[3] The concern of many Western European political leaders regarding these developments was further heightened by the fact that the Eurocommunist summit meeting of March 1977 in Madrid had seemed to signal an evolving formation by the three major Western European Communist parties of a dynamic unified bloc aimed at strengthening Communist influence on the policies of the European Community, and possibly at undermining the community over time.

But since the spring of 1978, this alarmist mood has given way to more sanguine views of Eurocommunism within the EC. One reason, no doubt, was that the Eurocommunist breakthroughs to direct governmental responsibility which had seemed hardly avoidable in 1977 failed to materialize. Instead, by relinquishing their comfortable positions in permanent opposition and engaging themselves more and more in the existing societal and institutional frameworks of their countries—i.e., by exposing themselves to what former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt has called the "venture of democracy"—the Eurocommunists opened the way to factional tensions within party ranks. Such tensions developed independently of whether the Eurocommunists followed a consistent course of constructive cooperation with other "progressive" political forces, as in Italy and Spain, or eventually shrank from responsibility and deliberately

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1. The European Community, officially known as the European Communities, is the collective designation of the nine-state European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. Its common institutions are the Council of Ministers and Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice. The member states of the community as of June 1, 1979, are Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. See Arthur S. Banks, Ed., *Political Handbook of the World: 1978*, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1978, pp. 528–32.

2. In the elections to workers' councils in the spring of 1978, the *Comisiones Obreras*, closely connected with the PCE, won 35–40 percent of the vote.

3. On the Moncloa agreement, see Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Eurocommunism 1978: The PCE in Spanish Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1978, p. 27.

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Table 1. Communist Party Voting Strength and Membership in Selected European Countries

Party[a] (Country)	Percent of vote in last national parliamentary election (date in parentheses)	Membership (1978)
EC Members		
PCI (Italy)	30.4 (1979)	1,814,000
PCF (France)	20.5 (1978)	702,154
PCL (Luxembourg)	10.4 (1974)	600
DKP (Denmark)	3.7 (1977)	11,000
PCB (Belgium)	2.0 (1978)	15,000
CPN (Netherlands)	1.7 (1977)	27,500
DKP (Federal Republic of Germany)	0.3 (1976)	46,480
CPGB (Great Britain)	0.1 (1974)	25,295
CPI (Ireland)	0.0 (1977)[b]	500
Southern Europe		
PCP (Portugal)	14.6 (1976)	150,000
KKE-Exterior (Greece)	9.4 (1977)	50,000
KKE-Interior (Greece)	— (1977)[c]	15,000
PCE (Spain)	9.2 (1977)	200,000

[a] The acronyms used stand for the following parties: PCI—Italian Communist Party; PCF—French Communist Party; PCL—Communist Party of Luxembourg; DKP—Communist Party of Denmark; PCB—Communist Party of Belgium; CPN—Communist Party of the Netherlands; DKP—German Communist Party; CPGB—Communist Party of Great Britain; CPI—Communist Party of Ireland; PCP—Portuguese Communist Party; KKE-Exterior—Communist Party of Greece (Exterior); KKE-Interior—Communist Party of Greece (Interior); PCE—Communist Party of Spain.

[b] The CPI comprises the Communists of the Republic of Ireland as well as those of Northern Ireland. The vote received by the party in the Republic of Ireland parliamentary elections of 1977 was infinitesimal.

[c] The KKE-Interior ran as part of an electoral coalition and did not run its own list of candidates in 1977.

SOURCE: ***L'Unità*** **(Rome), Nov. 11, 1978;** ***l'Humanité*** **(Paris), Jan. 9, 1979;** ***Unsere Zeit*** **(Dusseldorf), Oct. 27, 1978;** ***Horizont*** **(East Berlin), No. 24, 1978;** ***Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus*** **(Prague), No. 9, 1973;** ***De Waarheid*** **(Amsterdam), Aug. 24, 1978;** ***Neues Deutschland*** **(East Berlin), Nov. 27, 1978;** ***Mundo Obrero*** **(Madrid), Apr. 23, 1978; Richard F. Staar, Ed.,** ***Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1978,*** **Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978; author's estimates for strength of PCL; personal information from a high-ranking functionary of the KKE-Interior for the strength of the Greek parties.**

sabotaged a possible—perhaps probable—victory of the Left, as in France. As a result, some parties, like the Italian and the French, have even suffered some serious electoral setbacks.

A second factor which contributed to bringing the Eurocommunist phenomenon into proper perspective was the realization that historical and national differences among the parties could not be overlooked. It was shortsighted to attribute the influence of the parties to lingering pro-Soviet nostalgia or to evaluate their policies primarily on the basis of their relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Rather, as former British Foreign Minister David Owen asserted, the diverse parties had to be viewed first of all in terms of their respective national footholds,[4] and the strength of each party had to be seen as largely an expression of *national* political, economic, and social problems.

Finally, and related to the previous point, it became clear that the Eurocommunists did not form as homogeneous and dynamic a bloc as many observers had believed in the wake of the Madrid summit. In contrast to the conservative, liberal, and social-democratic/socialist parties of the EC, the Communists were not even able to agree on a minimum common platform for the first popular elections to the European Parliament scheduled for June 1979. The PCI stood more or less alone among the nine Communist parties of the EC in favoring a pro-European, integrationist position. (There were only individual sympathizers of this position in other parties.) The PCF staunchly opposed integration, and the Communists of the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) took more or less the same line. The Communists of Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark advocated the *withdrawal* of their countries from the EC.

Despite all of these factors, the prospect of imminent elections to the European Parliament once again enlivened the debate on the character of the Eurocommunist parties and their political conceptions—to the point where these issues became a central focus of the election campaign itself. This renewed concern within the EC, however, was no longer attributable to suspicion regarding the Eurocommunists' ties to Moscow. Nor could the members of the community have feared that they would be giving the Communists a first chance to make their voices heard in a multilateral Western organization or that the European Parliament would offer the Communists special opportunities to achieve their goals. For the Italian and French Communists had been represented in the indirectly elected EC parliament (as well as in the Council of Europe and the Western European Union) for many years, and whatever gains the Communists might make in the June elections, the parliament itself was unlikely to see its modest rights of control or initiative on major issues substantially expanded in the foreseeable future. Moreover, most commentators felt that the Communist parliamentary group was likely to remain numerically weak in the new body, as it has been in the old. On the basis of the most recent national election results in the individual EC member states, only 19-20 million

4. "Communism, Socialism, and Democracy," *The Washington Review* (Washington, DC), April 1978, p. 14.

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Table 2. Parties Winning Seats in Elections to the European Parliament, June 7–10, 1979

Country/ Party	Percent of national vote	Seats at Strasbourg (Seats before elections)
Belgium—24 seats		
Social Christian	37.6	10 (7)
Socialist	23.3	7 (5)
Liberal	16.2	4 (2)
Francophone Front	7.6	2 (0)
People's Union (Flemish)	5.9	1 (0)
Denmark—16 seats		
Social Democratic	21.9	3 (4)
Liberal (Venstre)	14.5	3 (1)
Conservative	14.0	2 (2)
Democratic Center	6.2	1 (1)
Progress	5.8	1 (1)
Socialist People's	4.7	1 (1)
Anti-EC Movement	21.0	4 (0)
Siumut of Greenland	na[a]	1 (0)
Others	na	0 (1)
Federal Republic of Germany—81 Seats[b]		
Christian Democratic/ Christian Social Union	49.2	42 (18)
Social Democratic	40.8	35 (15)
Free Democratic	6.0	4 (3)
West Berlin	na	3 (0)
France—81 seats		
Union for French Democracy[c]	27.5	25 (12)
Socialist	23.5	22 (10)
Communist	20.5	19 (5)
Rally for the Republic (Gaullist)	16.2	15 (9)
Great Britain—81 seats[d]		
Conservative	50.6	60 (16)
Labor	33.0	17 (18)
Scottish National	1.9	1 (0)
Northern Ireland	na	3 (0)
Liberal	na	0 (1)
Others	na	0 (1)
Ireland—15 seats		
Fianna Fail	34.7	5 (6)
Fine Gael	33.0	4 (3)
Labor	14.5	4 (1)
Independent lists	14.1	2 (0)
Italy—81 seats		
Christian Democracy	36.5	29 (15)
Communist	29.6	24 (12)
Socialist	11.0	9 (5)
Social Democratic	4.3	4 (0)
Italian Social Movement (Neofascist)	5.4	4 (0)
Radical	3.7	3 (0)
Liberal	3.6	3 (2)
Republican	2.6	2 (0)
South Tyrol People's	0.6	1 (0)
Democratic of Proletarian Unity	1.1	1 (0)
Proletarian Democracy	0.7	1 (0)
Others	na	0 (2)
Luxembourg—6 seats		
Christian Social	36.1	3 (2)
Democratic (Liberals)	28.2	2 (2)
Socialist Worker's	21.7	1 (2)
Netherlands—25 seats		
Christian Democratic Appeal	35.6	10 (5)
Labor	30.4	9 (6)
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	16.4	4 (3)
Democrats 1966	9.0	2 (0)

[a] Elected by direct ballot in Greenland only.

[b] Includes three deputies from West Berlin elected by the West Berlin legislature.

[c] An electoral coalition including the Republican Party (Giscard d'Estaing), the Social Democratic Center, and the Radical Party.

[d] Elections in Great Britain were run on the basis of constituent districts, not of proportional representation, except in Northern Ireland, which constituted a single constituency and elected three deputies.

SOURCE: Europäisches Parlament, Generaldirektion Information und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Abteilung Veröffentlichungen, *Direktwahl '79, 7–10 June, Ergebnisse und gewählte Mitglieder in den neun Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Gemeinschaft* (Direct Elections '79, 7–10 June, Results and Elected Members in the Nine Member States of the European Community), Strasbourg, 1979.

voters, or about 11 percent of the total electorate, were expected to vote Communist (see Table 1). PCI supporters were expected to provide 7 of these 11 percent; PCF supporters, 3.2 percent; and supporters of the parties of the other seven EC states, less than 1 percent altogether.

As it turned out, these estimates were quite close to the reality. When the votes cast on June 7–10 were tallied, the results were as shown in Tables 2 and 3. Out of the 410 seats in the directly elected European Parliament, socialists won the greatest number (112), followed by the Christian democrats (105), the con-

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Table 3. Party Groupings in the European Parliament Before and After the June 1979 Elections

Group	Seats before	%	Seats after	%
Socialists	66	33.3	112	27.3
Christian Democrats	53	26.7	105	25.6
Conservatives	18	9.1	63	15.3
Communists	18	9.1	44	10.7
Liberals	23	11.6	41	10.0
Group for Democratic Progress	17	8.6	21	5.1
Others	3	1.5	24	5.9
TOTAL	198	99.9*	410	99.9*

* Result of rounding of individual percents.

SOURCE: For preelection representation in the parliament, see *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), June 11, 1979; for the postelection situation, see Europäisches Parlament, Generaldirektion Information und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Abteilung Veröffentlichungen, *Direktwahl '79, 7–10 June, Ergebnisse und gewählte Mitglieder in den neun Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Gemeinschaft* (Direct Elections '79, 7–10 June, Results and Elected Members in the Nine Member States of the European Community), Strasbourg, 1979.

servatives (63), and only then the Communists (44). Next came the liberals (41), members of the Group for Democratic Progress made up of Gaullists and their allies (21), and various others (24). The 44-member Communist group in the parliament will consist of 24 members of the PCI, 19 members of the PCF, and 1 member of the Socialist People's Party of Denmark (and possibly also a Danish Communist elected on a separate anti-EC list)—a configuration hardly likely to pose any great threat to the community, given what has already been said about the policies of the various parties.

But why, then, was there so much concern about the Communists before the elections? The answer lies far beyond mere numbers of votes and deputies and has to do with safeguarding the fundamental potential benefits to the EC which the elections offered. In essence, it was expected within the community that the elections would provide new psychological and political impulses toward greater Western integration, but it was feared that Communist gains might lessen this effect.

To understand these fears, it is necessary to understand the attitudes of the major European Communist parties—those of Italy and France within the EC, and those of Greece, Spain, and Portugal among the states now considering entry—toward the "philosophy" and values of the Western community. These attitudes depend to a degree on the ideological and domestic-policy concepts of the Eurocommunists. In the present article, we will look briefly at the ideological and domestic orientations of the three key parties—the PCF, PCI, and PCE—and then discuss their foreign policy perspectives and their attitudes toward Western integration. Finally, based on this presentation of positions, we will address the question of the effect the Communists will have on the Western community and its institutions in the aftermath of the European Parliament elections held in June. Will the Eurocommunists be able to form a common parliamentary group in Strasbourg to work out common positions and maximize their influence? Or will the dynamics of European integration break apart the Eurocommunist trio of Madrid 1977? These are the major questions facing Eurocommunists and Europeans today.

Varieties of Eurocommunism

The major Eurocommunist parties are rightly considered to have taken a decisive step toward accepting values central to European political culture when they ceased to regard traditional Western political democracy as useful only tactically as a means of acquiring power, and began to view it rather as of basic value, to be preserved in the socialist society of the future. In this respect, all of the parties take a position—at least as stated in their programs—that differs radically from important tenets of Leninism as well as from the theory and practice of the Soviet system. But if one understands by "Eurocommunist" an orientation which, while aimed at radical structural reforms, seeks to realize these only gradually, within the framework of existing institutions and in cooperation with non-Communist parties on the basis of equality, then just the PCI and the PCE may be labeled Eurocommunist. The PCF would have to be regarded as "anti-Eurocommunist" on this count, because, in the opinion of the present author, its adaptation to conditions in the developed Western industrial societies actually came to a dead stop before the process seriously got under way.[5] The orientation of much of the PCF's political activity has remained strongly Leninist, a ten-

5. On the evolution of the PCF, see Georges Marchais, *Parlons franchement* (Speaking Frankly), Paris, Grasset, 1977; *Programme commun de gouvernement actualisé* (Common Program of Actual Government), with an introduction by Georges Marchais, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1978; and the proceedings of the 23rd Congress of the PCF, as reported and commented on in *l'Humanité* (Paris) and *Le Monde* (Paris), May 10, 1979, and thereafter. For critical comments, see Roger Garaudy, "The PCF—A Bunker in the Maginot Line," an interview with *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), June 12, 1978, pp. 162–67; Andre P. Donneur, "Outlook for French Politics After the Defeat of the Left," *International Perspectives* (Ottawa), September–October 1978, pp. 19–23; and the articles by Franz Marek, Fernando Claudin, and Krysztof Pomian in *Le Monde*, May 20–21, 1979.

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dency reinforced by a pronounced centralist tendency in France itself. In internal party organization and decision-making, the leadership of the PCF continues to adhere to "democratic centralism" in its most rigorous form. The type of socialism it advocates also stresses strong central authority, with the Communist Party determining the dynamics and direction of the revolutionary process from a position of ideological-political leadership and control which expands rather than contracts as the transition toward socialism progresses.

As far as the transformation of society itself is concerned, the PCF proceeds on the assumption that the system of "state monopoly capitalism" cannot be unhinged by partial reforms. A quick and complete break is considered necessary—a break which must include a specified minimum number of industrial nationalizations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the PCF rejects national and international agreements to fight inflation and unemployment or to impose a policy of economic austerity. All strategies limited in scope to the establishment of a general governmental framework for the use of stimuli such as credits, subsidies, and the like, while keeping structural changes to a minimum, represent for the PCF but variations of capitalism, intended, in the end, only to prolong the hegemony of the bourgeoisie at the expense of the working class. Taken in this context, constructive cooperation within the existing institutional framework or the assumption of government responsibility would make sense to the French Communists only if they could control the transformation process and force their own ideas on their political partners. To the PCF, therefore, the acquisition of power remains mainly a tactical problem. When the party realized in October 1977—or perhaps even earlier—that it could not gain acceptance of its views in the Union of the Left, it preferred to back away from the chance to form a government together with the Socialist Party rather than run the risk of doing so from a position where it would be obliged, among other things, to share responsibility for the imposition of austerity measures.

The transformation plans of the PCF, especially the package of economic and social policy measures it proposed (nationalization of key industries, the banking and credit systems, and the big insurance companies, together with a huge increase in mass consumption and all that this entailed), would probably, if launched, have thrown France into a serious economic and political crisis. High inflation rates, an increased flight of capital from the country, and growing balance-of-payment deficits would have been unavoidable. The rigorous foreign trade and foreign exchange controls which the PCF would in all likelihood have introduced in response at the national level would certainly have had a negative effect also on the economic structures of the European Community as a whole.

At the outset of the March 2, 1977, Madrid meeting of the leaders of the three major Eurocommunist parties: in the center is Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party; at the left, Georges Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party; and at the right, Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party.

—Spengler/SYGMA.

Without going into greater detail here, it is important for our purposes to recognize, first, that the PCF continues to base its strategy on the conviction that proletarian revolutionary legitimacy gives it a claim to power, thereby raising doubts about its professed adherence to basic Western values such as pluralism and political democracy; and second, that some elements of the economic transformation desired by the PCF, being of a strongly *protectionist* and *nationalist* nature, would tend to aggravate crises at the national and the overall Western European levels and would run counter to any prospect for a more intensive engagement of France in the various organizations of the Western community. As will be demonstrated below, similar tendencies exist in the European- and security-policy concepts of the party as well.

The situation in Italy is different. There, no isolationist nationalism of the Left like that found in

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France has ever existed. Moreover, the PCI (the PCE is similar in this respect) has rejected certain elements of Leninism deemed unsuitable for the accomplishment of radical structural reforms in the developed industrial countries of the West. Insofar as decision-making inside the party is concerned, divergent tendencies are tolerated and receive a sort of "minority protection" as long as they are not used to organize distinct factions. The PCI does not (nor does the PCE) lay claim to any specific proletarian legitimacy which would *automatically* grant the Communists a leading role in the transformation of society. Rather, the Italian (and Spanish) Communists see themselves as an organized part of the working classes, competing with other parties in a democratic contest for popular support. Their transformation strategy follows Marx rather than Lenin to the extent that they reject voluntaristic party tactics and seek to make changes in society only on the basis of broad majority consensus. Changes are not to be abrupt, by revolutionary leap, but step-by-step, because "the need for socialism no longer grows—as it did in the twenties and thirties—solely out of a mythical concept of total change, but out of the necessity of giving modern answers to concrete questions."[6]

The economic order which the PCI (and in the long run possibly the PCE also) envisages seems to be a *mixed system*. In this system, the state, by means of flexible economic programs, works out goal projections for the most important branches of the national economy. At the same time, according to PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer, "the market and the corporations will continue to function, not only by way of a tactical concession but also in order to preserve to the largest possible extent the criteria of the entrepreneur mentality and of profitability." Berlinguer added later that "only a kind of programming which leaves room for market-oriented enterprises corresponds to our vision of a pluralistic society and to the character of our foreign-trade-oriented economy."[7]

Berlinguer's last remark is particularly important. It reflects the attempt which the PCI has been making for some time—in sharp contrast to the PCF—to reconcile its concept of socioeconomic transformation not only with its professed belief in pluralism, but also with the framework of international relations in which Italy is already embedded. Moreover, when the Italian (and Spanish) Communists declare their readiness to participate in common EC austerity programs—something rejected outright by the PCF—and to support fundamental reforms aimed, for example, at an increase in the productivity of labor, greater mobility of the work force, and lower consumption in favor of investment, they indicate a desire to cooperate constructively even under difficult conditions to defend democracy and overcome economic difficulties.

This kind of policy, intended to combine deflationary economics with long-term measures to restructure the economy, is in harmony with the policy guidelines of all the forces in Western Europe whose primary concern is to preserve the gains made by workers up to the present and to create the political preconditions for positive "crisis management"—in the sense that current difficulties are understood as offering a chance for radical socioeconomic reforms (e.g., improved social services, a more humane work environment, shorter work hours). These are objectives shared not only by social democrats and socialists (i.e., the "democratic socialists") but also by those bourgeois formations which out of socioliberal or Christian-social motives favor reforms benefiting the workers.

Even these summary observations on the basic ideological and political attitudes of the Eurocommunists and on the effects they have had on the various parties' foreign-policy concepts show the great divergences which have developed within what many once feared would become a homogeneous bloc. The differences among the parties show up in even more pronounced fashion when their concepts regarding Western European integration and security policy are examined. As will become clear in the discussion which follows, differences in national conditions and national traditions have come to play an increasingly important role in the foreign policy perspectives of the Eurocommunists. The Communist parties of the 1920's and 1930's were rendered ideologically, politically, and organizationally alike (i.e., were bolshevized) by their submission to Moscow via the Comintern. Now, conversely the *breaking away* from dependence on Moscow has contributed to an accentuation of the individual character of parties and of interdependence between the traditional foreign policy lines of a given country and the foreign policy concept of its respective Communist party.

6. "The Communists as a Liberal Force," an interview with Sergio Segre in *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Nov. 14, 1975. Segre is a member of the PCI's Central Committee and head of its International Department.

7. *L'Unità* (Milan), Oct. 19, 1976. See also theses 10, 55, and 56 of the "Draft Theses for the 15th National Congress of the PCI," ibid., Dec. 10, 1978. Cf. theses 10, 56, and 57 of the "Theses Approved by the 15th National Congress of the PCI," in *La politica e l'organizzazione dei comunisti italiani* (The Politics and Organization of the Italian Communists), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1979, pp. 12 f. and 77 ff.

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In France, for instance, there have always been strong tendencies, in nearly all classes, societal strata, and political parties, critical of the United States and opposed to European integration—at least to integration aiming beyond a tariff union at a political, or even a military, union, with the surrender of national sovereign rights which this would entail. In Italy, on the other hand, a basically pro-American tendency has been the dominant trend, at first among liberals and conservatives, but since the 1960's also among socialists; and European integration has been favored by *all* relevant political forces of the country. The Italian Constitution of 1948 expressly provides in Article 11 that the country "on the condition of equality with other states" will accept such "limitations of sovereignty as are necessary for creating an order that guarantees peace and justice among nations," and the PCI repeatedly emphasizes that it too voted in favor of this document.

However, important as *national* particularities may be, the individual Western European Communist parties' analyses of the *international* situation remain a more decisive determinant of the parties' foreign policy lines. In this respect also, differences between the French Communists on the one hand and the Italian and Spanish Communists on the other have recently become greater.

The PCF Alternative to Integration

In analyzing the international situation, the PCF proceeds now as before from the thesis that in the last resort world policy is shaped by the irreconcilable conflict of two camps: the imperialist camp led by the United States (with its main European ally, the FRG) and the Soviet-led camp, representing peace, progress, and socialism. The PCF therefore vigorously opposes any measure tending to increase French involvement in Western multilateral organizations, and it hopes that this stance will direct the national and social protest of French voters into Communist channels, thereby allowing the PCF to regain ground lost to the PS and to present itself as the main force of the Left and of the future "union of the French people."[8]

The attitude of the PCF can be seen most clearly in its position regarding the European Community. As it did 20 years ago, when the EC was founded, the PCF continues to view the community as an instrument of American monopoly capital, with the sole difference that today it maintains that the giant corporations of West Germany working in close cooperation with the American monopolies have assumed the dominant role in Western Europe. The goal of the monopolies and of the governments closely linked with them, according to the PCF, is to make the economies of the other EC countries subservient to them and to shift the burden of austerity measures onto the working classes—a policy which the monopolists intend to extend to all of Southern Europe by admitting Greece, Spain, and Portugal into the EC. The European Parliament, strengthened with important decision-making powers, is to be assigned the task of reducing the power of the national member parliaments in order to secure against political challenge the socioeconomic strategy of multinationally organized capital.

In contrast to the majority of the Left in Western Europe (including the PCI and PCE), the PCF does not believe in the feasibility of step-by-step reforms at the transnational level—i.e., reforms aimed at changing the EC *from the inside* in a democratic-socialist direction. This aversion to step-by-step methods, which holds for the PCF at the level of national politics as well, is reinforced by a Comintern-like belief that the social democratic and socialist parties in the EC (and mainly the German Social Democratic Party) talk about reforms but in reality do the bidding of the German- and American-dominated big bourgeoisie. Although in the Common Program of the French Left drafted in June 1972, the PCF agreed to participate in "the further development of the EEC [European Economic Community] and its institutions," the party in fact meant only the further development of existing economic links, and PCF Secretary-General Georges Marchais in his speech before the Central Committee of the party in support of the Common Program—a speech which was not immediately made public—stressed the essentially *formal* character of all concessions which had been made concerning the EEC.[9] Fundamentally, the PCF rejects both political and economic integration as a matter of principle.

On the *political* plane, the French Communists therefore opposed all proposals for the expansion of EC institutions, as expressed, for example, in the Tindemans Report of 1975.[10] Only the PCF had refused to receive Belgian Prime Minister Léo Tinde-

8. On the concept of the union of the French people, see Frank L. Wilson, "Eurocommunism 1978: The French CP's Dilemma," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1978, pp. 12-13.

9. The speech is printed in Etienne Fajon, *L'Union est un combat* (The Union Is a Struggle), Paris, Editions Sociales, 1975, pp. 75-127.

10. This report recommended that the EC draw even closer together economically and politically and "act jointly in all significant areas of our foreign relations—foreign policy, security policy, economic relations and cooperation." See "The Tindemans Report on the European Union," *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn), Feb. 10, 1976, pp. D/53-84.

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Secretary-General Georges Marchais addresses the 23rd Congress of the French Communist Party in Paris in May 1979. The slogan on the billboard behind Marchais reads: "Social Progress, Democracy, Self-Management, National Independence, Socialism! The Struggle of the French Communist Party!"

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

mans when he was sent to France by the EC Council to explore the ground for such an expansion. In addition, the party initially called the planned direct elections to the European Parliament a "crime against France and her people."[11] It agreed to take part in the elections only after the French government had expressly declared that it was not in favor of granting new powers to the new parliament. To make sure that the government line would not change, the PCF tried to create further safeguards by introducing a bill in the French parliament according to which ministers would have to report to the competent commission of the National Assembly before and after each session of the EC Council of Ministers and the government would have to present its European policy for approval or disapproval in each National Assembly session.[12]

In the opinion of the PCF leadership, the only way to avert the integration of France into a supranational Western Europe dependent on the United States—a danger fostered by the bourgeoisie and the reformists—was to defend by all means possible the national independence and sovereignty of the country. The maintenance of "national independence in the France of today" could thus be interpreted as "an important aspect of the class struggle."[13] Moreover, the decisive issue became having the courage to say "No," as the party had in 1938 to the Munich agreement and in 1954 to the project for a European Defense Community. In both of the latter cases, experience in the end had vindicated the party's stand.[14]

On the *economic* plane, the main goal of the PCF leadership has been to prevent the EC from evolving

11. "Ten Responses of Georges Marchais to the Questions of France Inter," *l'Humanité*, Jan. 20, 1976.

12. See Michel Strulovici, "To Guarantee France's Choices," ibid., Dec. 11, 1978.

13. Francis Wurtz, "Supranationalism or Independence: A Different Destiny for France," *France Nouvelle* (Paris), Aug. 14, 1978, p. 14.

14. "For an Independent France—A Democratic Europe," a resolution of the Central Committee of the PCF published in *l'Humanité*, 14, 1978.

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beyond a loose tariff and trade association into a genuine economic community with supranational powers and areas of competence. This explains the party's energetic opposition to plans for the sort of industrial reorganization and restructuring proposed by EC Commissioner Etienne Vicomte Davignon for the steel industry, which suffers from overcapacity at the community-wide level. The PCF sees in Davignon's proposals nothing but the abandonment of valuable national resources and capacities in favor of the interests of multinational corporations. For similar reasons, the party is resistant to the European Currency System (ECS), which it sees as ultimately only a means to immunize the national economic policies of EC member states against socialism, to enforce austerity measures, and to orient community policies according to the desires of the economically strongest country in the community, i.e., according to the "Model Germany" of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) led by Helmut Schmidt.[15]

The PCF leadership proposes as an alternative to supranational organization the subjection of France's trade relations to stronger national government control. According to the party, however, the only way such control can be ensured is if a government of the Left effectively nationalizes key areas of industry and finance and introduces "democratic" planning in foreign as well as in domestic economic affairs.

In the foreign economic realm, which is of greater import here, the PCF pursues the *politicizing of trade*, a concept which includes enhanced bilateralization and has two main goals. First, it is designed to further development of France's raw materials production and to better protect French industry against foreign competition—a policy containing strongly *protectionist* (if not autarkic) elements and tantamount to the reduction of French participation in the international division of labor. Second, it is intended to produce a greater *diversification* of French trade, which the PCF considers to be one-sidedly oriented toward the EC, and especially toward the FRG.

Diversification would mean first of all a realignment of trade within the EC. In the joint commission which the PCF formed with the PCI in 1977, the PCF seems to have pressed hard for closer cooperation between France and Italy as a means "to correct the present imbalance in favor of the FRG."[16] But the main aim of the PCF ultimately is to reduce the influence of multinational organizations like the EC and greatly expand French trade with the Soviet Union and with Third World countries like Algeria, Libya, and Iraq. This, it is believed, could prevent the threatened loss of sovereignty implicit in increased EC integration and continued dependence on multinational corporations, and do so without cutting France off from raw material sources or forcing the abandonment of exchanges of highly developed technology.

The bilateralization and diversification of trade flows by means of radical politicization may seem logical goals when viewed alone—especially given the economic program of the PCF, which provides for extensive nationalization and does not preclude the introduction of protectionist measures. But these concepts have little in common with the realities of the world economy. For, on the one hand, even PCF economists now admit that the Soviet economy is in no position to export great quantities of goods, aside from raw materials, that are capable of satisfying Western standards of quality or technological sophistication.[17] And, on the other hand, politicization would isolate France within the EC and subject the community to a test of its durability—a development which could aggravate France's economic difficulties and sharpen domestic political tensions, thereby negatively affecting the fortunes of the PCF itself.

Moreover, the economic program of the PCF is not politically feasible. The Communists would find support for it only in the "CERES wing" of the Socialist Party, which represents only about 15 percent of total PS membership.[18] A national majority would never back it. And even if the Left came to power in France, the PCF would not be able to fully enforce its will as long as the PS remained the left coalition's senior partner (as it would be today) and therefore in a position to block from the start all attempts to launch the radical economic transformation envisioned by the Communists. In addition, the Marchais leadership would hardly be interested in losing its chance to effect domestic change from the outset, by plunging the country into risky foreign adventures.

The real importance of the PCF's stance in this context lies not in the party's ability to impose its line, but in its ability to impede or even block the process of

15. See, for example, Alain Rouy and Claude Montagny, "Toward a German Europe Under American Tutelage," *Cahiers du communisme* (Paris), November 1978, pp. 72-83. To the PCF, the German model of class collaboration consists of the political and social "domestication" of the workers in favor of the interests of the major forces of capitalism.

16. Interview with Marchais in the article by Giovanni Russo entitled "Eurocommunism Wants to Break the German-French Axis," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), May 1, 1977.

17. See Eric Izard, "Socialist Countries: Contrasting Economic Situation," *France Nouvelle*, Dec. 4, 1978, p. 13.

18. The CERES group is at the left margin of the PS spectrum. Its views have grown out of the Paris movement of May 1968 and favor a break with capitalism and the establishment of self-governing socialism.

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

Harilaos Florakis (left), leader of the Greek Communist Party-Exterior, who is opposed to Greek entry into the European Community; and Andreas Papandreou (right), leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), who has stated that Greek entry would not solve the country's economic problems.

—Keystone.

European integration—from the opposition or even as part of a government of the Left—by forming a "veto group"[19] with other "neutral" forces or forces oriented toward national particularism. On the *national* level, there is already evident an increasing number of common views and/or contacts between Communists and Gaullists, in a sort of negative "historic compromise" *à la française*. In December 1978, for instance, Communists and Gaullists both voted openly for the first time against government bills related to important EC policy decisions—specifically, the equalization of value-added tax rates in member countries and the financing of European Parliament election campaigns with EC funds to raise the "Europe-consciousness" of voters—and party chief Marchais was already envisaging a common movement of Communists and Gaullists "against the policy of national self-abandonment." Marchais stressed that this would not be the first time in French history that the two currents converged "when the fundamental interests of France were in jeopardy."[20]

On the *transnational* level, the PCF, in light of its disagreements with the PCI and the PCE on European integration and other issues, is likely to try to strengthen its position by cooperating more closely with other anti-integration forces of the European Left, especially the Moscow-oriented Communist Party of Greece-Exterior (KKE-Exterior), which won 9.3 percent of the Greek vote in national elections in 1977, and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which gained 14.6 percent of the vote in Portugal the year before. Greece was admitted to the EC in May 1979 and as of this writing is awaiting entry; Portugal for the moment remains outside the community but is a candidate for membership. Support for the PCF position may also be forthcoming from Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), a nationalist, populist, and economically isolationist party, not a member of the Socialist International, which outpolled the KKE-Exterior by winning 25.3 percent of the Greek vote in 1977. During a visit to Athens in January 1979, PCF Secretary-General Marchais signed a joint communiqué with the KKE-Exterior and PASOK which came out clearly against Greek entry into the EC.[21]

PCF Security Policy

Like the policy on European integration just outlined, the security policy of the PCF has long been designed entirely to defend and maintain unimpaired the national independence and sovereignty of France, as a precondition for shielding the country's way to

19. See Richard Lowenthal, "Eurocommunism 1978: Moscow and the Eurocommunists," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1978, p. 40.

20. See his interview with Radio Europe 1, Dec. 14, 1978.

21. The communiqué was printed in *l'Humanité*, Jan. 22, 1979.

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socialism.[22] Characteristically, this aim ranked before all others—e.g., peace, coexistence, disarmament—in the party's government program of 1971. Thus, while the PCF agreed in the Common Program of the Left in 1972 not to challenge France's present treaty obligations before a gradual process of liquidating the Eastern and Western blocs in Europe had been set in motion—a position the party still holds today—Marchais in his speech to the Central Committee on the Common Program nevertheless made a special point of the fact that this agreement was coupled with the intention "to lead the country on the way to independence from *any* politico-military blocs."[23] Six years later, Politburo member Jean Kanapa confirmed that this had in reality been a "basically new policy." France, said Kanapa, had to "act on all issues and under all circumstances as a sovereign nation, in full independence and free of any alignment with any bloc or any foreign power."[24]

This underlying principle has had important consequences for the PCF's defense doctrine. First, it has meant Communist rejection of French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's military-strategic concept of extending the French area of defense beyond France's borders *(sanctuarisation élargie).* This concept is based on the assumption that in the case of military conflict in Europe France's nuclear strike force, or *force de frappe,* would not be sufficient by itself to protect French territory and that therefore neighboring territories, e.g., in the FRG, would also have to be included in the area to be protected in order to assure French survival.[25] The PCF, to the contrary, supports former President Charles de Gaulle's concept of limiting the area to be protected by the *force de frappe* to French territory *(sanctuarisation totale)* in order to guarantee fully independent decision-making even in a crisis.

At the same time, the adoption of a new security policy has led the Communists to revise their former rejection of the French nuclear strike force as "just worth its scrap value." Indeed, in May 1977, the party expressly embraced maintenance of the *force de frappe,* including its nuclear submarines, and of late the PCF has even come out strongly in support of increasing their total number from five to six.[26] The *force de frappe* is seen by the Communists as a modern military instrument well suited to shield national independence and thereby the socialist transformation of French society against, for example, the FRG, should the latter attempt to misuse its growing economic power and superior conventional armaments to exercise political influence in France.[27]



France's fourth nuclear submarine, L'Indomptable, is launched at Cherbourg on September 18, 1974. Since 1977, the French Communist Party has supported maintenance of the French force de frappe.

—Gerard/SYGMA

Many aspects of Communist thinking in this area recall Gaullist ideas on the task of the *force de frappe,* especially the notion of developing a national all-direction defense capacity *(défense tous azimuts).* But this impression is misleading. General de Gaulle thought that a purely national defense was highly un-

22. On this point, see Louis Baillot, "European and Atlantic Integration or True National Defense," *Cahiers du communisme,* November 1978, pp. 40–48. Baillot is a member of the PCF Central Committee and head of the party's Defense Commission.

23. Etienne Fajon, op. cit., p. 96.

24. "Out of All Alignments," *La Nouvelle Critique* (Paris), February–March 1978, p. 55.

25. See Guy Méry, "Why and How to Make an Army," *Défense Nationale* (Paris), June 1976, pp. 11–34. Méry is Chief of the French General Staff of the Armies.

26. According to International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 1978–1979,* London, 1978, p. 22, France as of July 1978 had four nuclear submarines in service and one under construction.

27. See the key speeches of Marchais and Kanapa to the Central Committee in May 1977 in *l'Humanité,* May 12, 1977.

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realistic and never left any doubt that France, if forced to choose, would side with the United States in major crises (e.g., during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and in the various crises over West Berlin). The Communists, however, because they rely heavily on calculations of class as well as national interest in their military thinking, can be expected to do everything they can to prevent "French foreign and military policy from remaining subjugated to the class interests of the imperialist world system and from continuing to move in the orbit of the global strategy of imperialism."[28] They have been pressing, for example, to free France from reliance on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) information regarding enemy movements in the air (NADGE) by building national early-warning systems. The PCF apparently sees such information links as incompatible with true independence.

At this point it is possible to see why during the negotiations in 1977 on updating the Common Program, security policy was one of the main points of contention between Socialists and Communists. PS leader François Mitterrand rightly pointed out in his criticism of the concept of *défense tous azimuts* that, as interpreted by the PCF, it had "a controversial political meaning which might include neutralism or the rupture of existing alliances."[29] Indeed, what the PCF leadership seems to have in mind for France is a course—somewhat like that of Yugoslavia—that would permit a government of the Left to build socialism free of Western (and Eastern) influences and to play an independent and active role between East and West.

But here too, the PCF, because of its minority position within the Left, has little chance of imposing its views. In the main, the Socialists hold positions on defense policy that are close to those of Giscard d'Estaing. As in the foreign policy realm, however, the Communists together with the CERES wing of the PS and some Gaullists could form a powerful "veto group" opposing any intensification of military cooperation and coordination with France's NATO partners. If it gained more adherents, the Communists' reinterpretation of *défense tous azimuts*—a reinterpretation which no longer distinguishes between the Soviet Union on the one hand and France's American and German allies on the other—would radically change, at least from the point of view of political psychology, the character of France's ties to NATO.

If in a position to impose their will, the French Communists—unlike the Italian Communists or the French Socialists—would, for example, presumably give higher priority to the Common Program goal of "liquidation of the politico-military blocs" than it would to the goal of maintenance of the strategic balance between the European military pact systems. This would create a special problem for the FRG, which in the view of the PCF already constitutes the greatest threat to a France governed by the Left. Reacting to the changes in French defense policy which have thus far taken place, the FRG has intensified its bilateral logistic cooperation with France. If this cooperation were ended and if the use of French airspace were denied to NATO, the entire NATO system of delivering supplies to the European allies from across the Atlantic would be jeopardized. It is very doubtful if a "rump NATO without a military and logistic 'hinterland,' i.e., without France," could survive.[30]

This leads us to the final point which needs to be made regarding the security policy of the PCF. Not only does it disregard the realities of political geography, as the case just cited demonstrates; it is also full of internal inconsistencies. On the one hand, the PCF considers the *force de frappe* a last means of defense against a conventional aggressor; on the other hand, it supports the Eastern proposal that NATO and the Warsaw Pact should both renounce first use of nuclear weapons. It limits the task of the *force de frappe* (and of conventional forces as well) to defense of French territory; but it expresses the desire to remain faithful to NATO. In the view of the PCF, a further shift in the balance of power in favor of the socialist community of states is a prerequisite for a deepening of détente; at the same time, the party accuses the leading power of that community, the Soviet Union, of preventing social change in the West by the policy of détente itself.

These inconsistencies reflect the profound identity crisis which the PCF is experiencing in its international relations as it moves from the position of a loyal-to-Moscow party of opposition and agitation toward a stand as an autonomous socialist revolutionary party seeking a share of governmental power. It was hardly avoidable under the circumstances that the PCF's leftist nationalism—an attempt to combine Gaullist ideas with social-revolutionary goals—would in the end put the party on the defensive. However much it tried to create an impression to the contrary by emphasizing its close relations with Vietnam, Cuba, and Yugoslavia, the PCF on the eve of the direct elections to the European Parliament was actually isolated

28. Etienne Fajon, op. cit., p. 95.

29. Interview with Mitterrand entitled "Paris Is Not Godesberg," *Der Stern* (Hamburg), Sept. 8, 1977, p. 232.

30. Dieter S. Lutz, "Eurocommunism and the Future of NATO," *Der Bürger im Staat* (Stuttgart), June 1978, p. 139.

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in Europe. Even now, it is unlikely that it can be counted upon at any time in the foreseeable future to subscribe to a constructive policy of closer cooperation with the main currents of the European Left.

"New Westpolitik" for PCI and PCE

The Italian and the Spanish Communists, to cite but these two major parties to illustrate the point, differ fundamentally from the PCF in international outlook. Their analysis of the international situation tends to overcome the traditional concept of a world divided into two camps and takes a more unbiased attitude toward the policies of the two superpowers. Sergio Segre, a leading figure in the PCI, made explicit reference to his party's changed perspective when he asserted in early 1978 that the fundamental problems of our time can no longer be solved by a "Manichean division of the world," but only by looking at international reality and the forces tending toward a new international order in a "less dogmatic, less biased, and less ideological way." This requires, Segre continued, "an internationalism which is not understood as proletarian," but is rather pluralistic, championing and embracing all those forces which, despite their many differences in ideological background, share a belief in the "necessity of peace, in modern interdependence, and in the oneness [*unicità*] of this world."[31] Even earlier, PCE Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo had said along the same lines that it could not be the task of the Western Communists "to enhance the power of the military bloc in the East." He espoused the view that "traditional internationalism is a relic of the past and as such is doomed to wither away." Greater attention, he concluded, is due the West.[32]

A number of questions persist, to be sure, regarding the "new Westpolitik" reflected in these statements and others like them made by PCI and PCE representatives. The new policy still does not enjoy total support within the two parties, as is shown, for instance, by the praise which PCI Chairman Luigi Longo in late 1977 bestowed on "the great economic, political, military, and ideological power of the Soviet Union."[33] And its credibility continues to be tempered by the fact that both the PCI and the PCE still uphold many tenets of Moscow's foreign policy (e.g., with respect to arms control and to policy in the Third World). Moreover, there can be no denying the fact that the PCI and the PCE have failed to develop a coherent "international philosophy"—in marked contrast, for example, to the Socialist parties of Italy, France, and Spain, which, notwithstanding their critical attitudes toward some aspects of US foreign policy, are firmly anchored in the West. The unwillingness of the PCI to commit itself and its policies of staying on good terms with everybody if at all possible and of maintaining a certain equidistance between the superpowers are positions unlikely to gain the confidence of the West, since they do not answer the essential question of which side the PCI will favor in case of serious East-West conflict.

Nonetheless, there does seem to be a tendency among Italian and Spanish Communists no longer to view their foreign policies solely through the prism of Soviet interests. With regard to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the future of Yugoslavia, China's post-Mao path, Romania's tilt toward autonomy, and certain aspects of Soviet policy in Africa, both the PCI and the PCE have taken independent positions, some of them highly critical of the USSR.

Most important, both parties have begun to focus their foreign policies increasingly on Western Europe—especially on the EC—and to draw closer to the logic of Western "philosophy." In this regard Car-

Enrico Berlinguer (left), Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and Luigi Longo, PCI President, at an April 1976 meeting of the party's Central Committee in Rome.

—Keler/SYGMA.

31. "The Need for a New Internationalism," *Rinascita* (Rome), Apr. 7, 1978, p. 35.

32. See Santiago Carrillo, *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* (Eurocommunism and the State), Barcelona, Editorial Grijalbo, 1977, p. 214, and Carrillo's interview in *La Stampa* (Turin), Dec. 14, 1975.

33. Interview with *Corriere della Sera*, Dec. 30, 1977.

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

The new home of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

rillo several years ago contemplated "a transformation of internationalism which would coordinate our action with that of the rest of the European workers' movements."[34] In Italy, meanwhile, the program agreement of the parties of the "constitutional arc"—including the PCI—was extended in the fall of 1977 to cover the foreign ties of the peninsula. The PCI supported this step, which drew Italy "closer to the industrial democracies, where national alignment is subject to national consensus."[35]

To fully gauge how much the Westpolitik of the Italian and Spanish Communists has affected their attitudes toward European integration and Western defense policy, however, significantly more detail than has been presented thus far is necessary. In the following sections, an attempt will be made to fill in the gaps before we proceed to some final considerations regarding the future of Eurocommunism and the West.

PCI and PCE Perspective on the EC

Both the Italian and the Spanish Communists share a positive assessment of the EC which springs from their conviction that the economic and political interrelationships of Western Europe are irreversible and that any attempt to reduce or—worse still—do away with them would not serve the interests of anyone concerned, least of all the workers' movement. The PCE sees Western Europe as "the only region of some importance where a new political and economic unit can be established which by its dimensions could compare with the Soviet Union and the United States,"[36] while the PCI recognizes that the European Community has contributed very substantially to increasing the prosperity of the region. In his introductory speech to the PCI Central Committee plenary session devoted to the upcoming European elections, Giorgio Amendola pointed out that the rise in production and the increase in productivity attained within the framework of the EC were "the highest ever in European economic history."[37]

34. *La Stampa*, Dec. 14, 1975.

35. Cesare Merlini in his preface to Istituto Affari Internazionali, *L'Italia nella politica internazionale, 1976–1977* (Italy in International Politics, 1976–1977), Rome, Edizioni di Comunità, 1978, p. xiv.

36. Ramon Tamames, "Spain–European Communities," *Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), Sept. 29, 1977, p. 5. Tamames is a member of the PCE's Executive Committee.

37. The speech is printed in *l'Unità*, Dec. 5, 1978. Amendola is a member of the Directorate of the PCI and since 1969 has been president of the Communist group in the European Parliament.

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Neither party, of course, sought "to establish a supranational state with the attributes of the traditional centralist national states." But in view of "the problems posed by the currencies, the capital flow, industrial restructuring, energy, agriculture, the ecology, [and] scientific research," both recognized that the various countries of Europe could continue to play an active role only if they transferred important areas of their national sovereignty to an entity and power of "plurinational" character. The European Parliament would have to be given the "necessary powers to initiate legislation, formulate a political course, and control the executive organs."[38] Amendola said in November 1978 that the Strasbourg parliament had to be considered a kind of "European constituent or pre-constituent assembly," since to deny the parliament any increase in power even for the future would mean to play down the importance of the elections before they even took place. Why elect an organ, he asked, "which continues to be denied the possibility of functioning?"[39] PCI support for Amendola's view stemmed not least from its belief—radically different from that of the PCF—in the possibility of influencing and changing the EC from the inside in the direction of more economic programming, greater social justice, and a stronger foreign policy role.

Concerning economic integration, both the PCI and the PCE favor it. Despite their vote against the proposed European Currency System in the Italian parliament in December 1978, the Italian Communists made it clear during the debate that their negative vote was not directed against plans for a currency union per se, but against the specific stipulations of the plan being considered. Above all, the PCI criticized the absence of measures to be passed along with the ECS to improve the economic structure of Italy, an omission which in the long run would result in heaping unbearable burdens on the country and make it even more dependent on the "German-French combination." The party's argument that Italy should wait before joining the ECS until the three-year plan for stabilizing the Italian economy (the Pandolfi Plan) had taken hold was not without merit from an economic point of view and in fact is in accordance with the opinion of recognized economists, including Italian National Bank President Paulo Baffi. To defend its point of view, the PCI has pointed to the great gap between the inflation rates of Italy and the FRG and argues that under the present ECS plan international speculation would unleash a disastrous decline in the value of the Italian lira.

Furthermore, as early as in its 1976 election platform, the CPI unambiguously rejected "any temptation to shut off Italian economic policy from the rest of the world and return to protectionist and autarkic conceptions." It pleaded instead for an " 'open market' system, that is, for a system of free competition on the international level" and for a "harmonious development of economic and trade relations among the countries of the European Economic Community and for the establishment of a new system of worldwide economic cooperation."[40]

Unlike its French counterpart, the PCI accepts the idea that Italy should participate in the existing international division of labor, and if the PCI supports expansion of trade with less developed countries and with the Soviet Union, it does so with the understanding that such expansion can take place only on the basis of existing economic structures, and not because it has illusions about the efficiency of the Eastern economies or their potential in the field of foreign trade.[41]

As a corollary of their acceptance of worldwide economic cooperation, the PCI and PCE have abandoned their former moralizing and demonizing accusations against the multinational corporations and have come to the conclusion that the multinationals can indeed contribute to economic development and provide jobs. One has to be aware of this change of attitude in order to understand why in November 1977 the leadership of the PCI, together with that of the Communist-connected Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and other relevant political and social forces in the country, attempted to convince the top management of these firms, whose parent companies generally are located in the United States, of the value of long-term investments in Italy. Through such investments, of course, the multinationals were not to attempt to make Italy technologically dependent or to look at the country only as a market for their mass consumer products. Rather, they would have to carry out research work inside the country and establish facilities which were technologically very advanced and at the same time—especially in the south—labor-intensive. Furthermore, they would be obliged, after first having consulted with the political authorities, to

38. See theses 30 and 36 of the "Draft Theses for the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit. Cf. theses 36 and 37 of the "Theses Approved by the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit., pp. 42 ff.

39. Amendola's interview with *Corriere della Sera*, Nov. 10, 1978.

40. *L'Unità*, May 16, 1976.

41. See thesis 26 of the "Draft Theses for the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit. Cf. thesis 26 of the "Theses Approved by the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit., pp. 31 f.

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coordinate their activities with national economic goals and to accept suitable control relationships.[42]

It is in this last area that, in the view of the Italian and the Spanish Communists, important tasks will accrue to the EC. The community's democratically legitimated organs could play a positive role by controlling the activities of multinationally organized capital, as recommended by the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the European Federation of Trade Unions. National bodies, according to the PCE and PCI, are less and less able to fulfill this task.

The constructive character of the attitudes of the PCI and PCE toward European integration and the international division of labor contrasts dramatically with the ideologically schematized postulates of the PCF. The difference of basic approach becomes even more striking when the issue of the admission to the EC of the three Southern European countries—Greece, Spain, and Portugal—is addressed.[43] The PCF has strictly opposed the entry of these countries, in part for nationalist-protectionist motives, that is, out of concern over the competitiveness of French fruit and vinicultural products. But, of course, such concrete economic concerns exist for Italy and the PCI as well. More fundamentally, the PCF has opposed extension of the EC toward the south—as have the KKE-Exterior and the PCP in Greece and Portugal—because it would mean admitting the strong Socialist parties of Spain and Portugal into community institutions. In the French Communist view, this would make the EC more dependent on international social democracy led by the SPD, i.e., a social democracy which does the bidding of international capitalism and not only does not want socialist changes but, on the contrary, jeopardizes the democratic rights and liberties which have just been won by the Spanish and Portuguese working classes.

42. See the chapter on "The PCI and the Multinationals," in Giacomo Luciani, *Il PCI e il capitalismo occidentale* (The PCI and Western Capitalism), Milan, Longanesi, 1977, pp. 55–69.

43. Greece was formally admitted to the EC on May 28, 1979. Its de facto full membership is scheduled to begin, however, on January 1, 1981.

Leaders of 12 European socialist parties gather in Lille, France, on November 8–9, 1978, to map out their campaign for the European Parliament elections of June 1979. Pictured here are Johannes M. den Uyl, leader of the Labor Party of the Netherlands; Willy Brandt, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of West Germany; François Mitterrand, First Secretary of the French Socialist Party and chairman of the Lille meeting; Melina Mercouri, a prominent figure in Greece's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK); and Mario Soares, Secretary General of the Portuguese Socialist Party.

—Diego Goldberg/SYGMA.

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The Italian and the Spanish Communists have taken a diametrically opposite position. They consider tying Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the Northern European democracies the best means of protecting them against sliding back into dictatorship. They feel, moreover, that it would be all to the good if by the accession of the three states the southern flank of the EC were strengthened vis-à-vis the Northern European member nations. The community would then practically be forced to pursue "an active and dynamic policy of restructuring its own inner balance." Finally, in their view it would be advantageous for the social democrats and socialists now in the EC to be reinforced by the entry of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP), since this would strengthen the influence of the Left as a whole inside the community.[44]

What would be the consequences of such increased influence? If the PCI were able to win greater influence over Italian foreign policy, it would surely press (as would the PCE) for certain modifications in the EC. It would advocate raising the economic standard of living of the southern members up to that of the member countries of Northern and Central Europe—by making the EC reorganize its agricultural policy, which allegedly discriminates against the southern countries, and by arranging for the transfer of more resources from the rich to the poor countries of the community. Amendola signaled the intentions of the PCI in this regard when he energetically defended a resolution of the European Parliament—vigorously opposed by the French government and the PCF—to increase the regional fund of the EC, whence such transfers would come.[45] Furthermore, the PCI would probably try to get the FRG to abandon its policy of monetary stability, which limits the benefits of German prosperity that accrue to other EC states and which is felt to be particularist by the poorer EC members, and to stress instead the necessity of "harmonizing" the policies of all EC member countries. This, in fact, is the line which the Italian government—without the Communists—has already adopted.

With regard to the foreign relations of the community, both the PCI and the PCE favor the development of a common foreign policy. They can be expected to press for a stronger EC commitment to détente, in order to preserve that policy in case of a worsening of relations between the two superpowers. They can also be expected to champion a further opening of the

Giorgio Amendola, member of the Directorate of the Italian Communist Party's Central Committee and from 1969 to 1979 president of the Communist group in the European Parliament, pictured in July 1978.

—Fabian/SYGMA.

community toward the Third World (especially Africa[46]) and an intensification of EC relations with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and its member countries. The states of the EC are highly esteemed in the world, according to the PCI leadership, and the Italian Communists, at least, feel that their combined prestige could be more effectively utilized if the community took a common approach to major international issues.

Far from contradicting the logic of development controlling the EC today, most of these ideas are in accord with ideas already being propounded in the community by influential non-Communist groups like the social democrats and by significant fractions of forces of Christian-social and social-liberal inspiration. More than a few observers have expressed the opinion

44. Interview with Manuel Azcárate entitled "Spain, Europe, Eurocommunism," *Rinascita*, Nov. 24, 1978, p. 35. Azcárate is a member of the PCE's Executive Committee.

45. "European Democracy," *l'Unità*, Dec. 17, 1978.

46. See, for example, Berlinguer's interview entitled "Africa and the European Workers' Movement," ibid., Nov. 24, 1978.

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that the EC would be strengthened by the cooperation of the PCI—specifically, by the party's willingness to contribute to an eventual economic stabilization of Italy, which would enable the country to again participate in a more active manner in the process of community integration.

PCE and PCI Security Policy

While the posture of the PCI and the PCE on the internal development and geographical expansion of the EC is constructive, questions remain as to the conceptions of the two parties regarding the *international alignment* of the community, especially in the area of security policy. The questions apply particularly to the Spanish Communists, who—using the current situation of their own country as a point of departure—are in favor of an active armed neutrality according to the Yugoslav or Swedish model. They have stated that they will allow American military bases to remain in Spain at least until measures for the liquidation of the military blocs in the whole of Europe have been launched.[47] But in the last analysis the security policy of the PCE is directed at detaching Western Europe from the US and having it assume an independent role as a kind of "Third Force" between the two superpowers.

The military concepts which are corollary to this policy still seem to be very imprecise. But one thing is certain. From the perspective of those circles which seek to establish a closer military-political bond between Madrid and NATO, increased PCE influence on Spanish foreign policy would have negative effects. Not only does the party oppose Spain's entry into NATO (although it would apparently acquiesce to this step if the majority of Spain's population wanted it). It is also demanding—by way of anti-nuclear-weaponry clauses—the withdrawal of the last four US Polaris submarines from the Atlantic Ocean base at Rota, Spain, and is generally pressing for the creation of more effective means for Spanish authorities to control the American non-NATO military bases in the country. Were the position of NATO in other Mediterranean countries weakened to the point where the alliance felt it necessary to try to transfer part of its operations to Spain, the opposition of the PCE could create problems, especially since the PSOE holds views similar to those of the Communists.

47. On the security policy of the PCE, see thesis 13 of the 9th PCE Congress in *9 Congreso del Partido Comunista de España, 19–23 Abril, Resoluciones* (9th Congress of the Communist Party of Spain, 19–23 April, Resolutions), Madrid, 1978.

At the beginning of the 1970's the PCI also seemed to be developing views of Western European autonomy which had overtones clearly critical of the U.S. In a speech in January 1974, for instance, Berlinguer spoke of the "worldwide role to be played by a democratic, independent, and peaceful Western Europe which is neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American, but establishes relations of friendship and cooperation with these and other countries."[48] Top leadership cadres like Amendola also recognized at that time—as the PCE does today—that the establishment of a common Western European defense policy would be necessary to the extent the EC sought "to secure its independence vis-à-vis the United States."[49]

By the mid-1970's, however, it seems that the Italian Communist leadership had come to consider any such independent Western European defense policy—i.e., a policy excluding US participation—unrealistic, not least because of the opposition of the PCF to all multilateral defense arrangements. Since 1974, the Italian party has voiced approval of Italy's present international alignment and has stressed repeatedly—most recently at the 15th National Party Congress in March-April 1979—that the foreign policy of the country has to be conducted "within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and EC commitments."[50] This certainly does not mean that the PCI has become a convinced proponent of NATO. It could probably only do so if it were willing to conduct a more thoroughgoing and unprejudiced analysis of Soviet foreign policy than it has up to now and to recognize that Soviet policy is by no means free of expansionist tendencies in the West. Still, for the time being at least, the PCI defines NATO primarily as a factor in the strategic balance between the blocs—a balance which is necessary for the maintenance of détente and which the PCI therefore is vitally interested in preserving. "By holding each other in check, the two powers [the US and the USSR] form that 'protective shield' behind which Eurocommunist experiments have a chance to develop in relative security from the kind of catastrophes that overtook Salvador Allende in Chile or Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia,"[51] and in this respect the PCI sees Soviet power as just as essential as American power.

48. See Berlinguer's speech on the Brussels conference of Western European Communist parties, *l'Unità*, Jan. 27, 1974.

49. Amendola, "Europe in a Cyclone," *Rinascita*, Nov. 30, 1973.

50. Thesis 38 of the "Draft Theses for the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit. Cf. thesis 38 of the "Theses Approved by the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit., p. 45.

51. Hansjakob Stehle, "Mongrel on an Obscure Path: The PCI Wants Both the Soviets and the Americans as Friends," *Die Zeit*, Feb. 3, 1978. The phrase "protective shield" is drawn from Berlinguer.

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It must be added that the pro-NATO posture of the PCI, as Pierre Hassner rightly stresses, does not as yet necessarily refer to hard military-political choices. In an attempt to keep all its options open, the party advocates a kind of "pacifist Atlanticism," in which the EC's role is that of a *consumer* rather than a *producer* of security.[52] By evading the question of its attitude in the case of a major East-West conflict, the PCI to this day remains a not fully calculable quantity.

On the other hand, the PCI has in recent years voted in favor of the Italian defense budget—including the funds earmarked for modernizing the armed forces—and has also supported proposals for the standardization of models and the functional compatibility of NATO weaponry. In both the Italian parliament and the Western European Union, in whose deliberations Italian Communists actively participate, the party in 1977 gave as the reason for its positive attitude not only the reduction of costs and the better parliamentary control over weapons purchases which would result, but also the necessity of enabling NATO to maintain the international balance of power.[53]

No matter how the PCI eventually comes down on hard military choices, however, the analyst must bear in mind that what will be decisive for NATO is not going to be the extent of Italy's active contribution to its own defense. Financially, the share for defense spending in Italy's total budget dropped between 1966 and 1976 from 16.5 percent to 8.9 percent, and Italy occupies 12th place in defense spending among the 14 members of the integrated NATO defense organization. In regard to military mission, Italy's role is limited in practical terms to defending its own borders with Austria and Yugoslavia. Italy's real importance for the West lies in the country's service as the base and the strategic hinterland for operations in the Mediterranean area.[54] NATO headquarters for Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) are located in Naples, and the non-NATO-integrated US 6th Fleet has its home port in Gaeta to the north of Naples. Out of a total of 199 US military bases in the Mediterranean area, 58 are located in Italy alone. Especially important among them are the island of La Maddalena near Sardinia, which serves as a base for nuclear submarines, and Sigonella in Sicily, which is a base for marine reconnaissance planes of US Task Force 67.

What would the security policy dispositions of the PCI look like in this area if the party gained greater influence in government decision-making? There is no easy answer to this question. Much would depend on the concrete situation at the time.[55] The party leadership does not seem to have any consistent position as yet, a situation due in part to a lack of independent expertise and information. To remedy these shortcomings, a special working group for security problems has been established in the newly founded PCI Study Center for International Policy,[56] but its existence thus far has not altered the basic ambiguity of PCI pronouncements.

If there is something which can be said with certainty here, it is that the Communists will continue to do everything in their power to maintain the defensive and geographically limited character of NATO. In so doing they will insist above all on a clarification of the status and the range of action of the US 6th Fleet, and this may create problems. Since the question of whether the protective perimeter of NATO encompasses only Italian territorial waters or extends beyond them—to say nothing of the question of how the Mediterranean area of operations could be functionally partitioned[57]—remains unresolved, the outbreak of another non-European conflict in the Mediterranean (e.g., in the Middle East) could leave the Western alliance in critical disarray.

52. Pierre Hassner, "The International Dimension," in Heinz Timmermann, *Die Kommunistichen Parteien Südeuropas* (The Communist Parties of Southern Europe), Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, forthcoming.

53. See Segre's report to the Western European Union in *Da Helsinki a Belgrado* (From Helsinki to Belgrade), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1977; and Ciro Zoppo, "The Military Policies of the Italian Communist Party," *Survival* (London), March-April 1978, pp. 63-72.

54. See Antonio Gambino, "NATO and the PCI," *l'Espresso* (Rome), May 23, 1976.

55. In the Italian parliamentary elections of June 1979, the strength of the PCI declined for the first time at the national level under Berlinguer's leadership. The party won only 30.4 percent of the vote and 201 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, in contrast to 34.4 percent and 228 seats in the Chamber elected in June 1976. Still, the elections do not seem to have changed the Italian situation very much, and the future responsibilities of the PCI in Italian politics remain for the moment as uncertain as they were before the elections. For the results of the 1979 elections, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC), June 5, 1979, p. L/1. On the fortunes of the PCI after the 1976 elections, see Giacomo Sani, "The PCI on the Threshold," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1976, pp. 27-51, and Stephen Hellman, "The Italian CP: Stumbling on the Threshold?" ibid., November-December 1978, pp. 31-48.

56. The PCI Study Center for International Policy was founded in January 1978 and is directed by Central Committee member Romano Ledda. It is divided into five sections, covering disarmament, international economic policy and North-South conflict, the Left in Western Europe, Euro-American relations, and Communist countries. It is intended that the Study Center provide well-founded information and analysis to the PCI leadership and also serve as a forum for discussion with non-Communists. See Barbara Spinelli, "Berlinguer's Diplomacy in Search of New Horizons," *La Repubblica* (Rome), Feb. 5-6, 1978.

57. See Stefano Silvestri, "The Security System, NATO, and the Italian Situation," in Natalino Ronzitti, Ed., *La politica estera italiana* (Italian Foreign Policy), Rome, Edizioni di Comunità, 1977, pp. 247-84.

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Furthermore, the PCI will oppose any expansion in number or function of American bases on Italian territory. If, for example, NATO decided to station neutron weapons in Italy, it would have to expect resolute opposition from the PCI. This in turn might reopen the debate on the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in the country. Since these weapons are under tight American control, with even the Italian parliament uninformed about the details of their deployment, such a debate would probably center on the possible necessity of stronger controls by Italian authorities. This is something which up to now none of the relevant authorities has asked for, but many of the views of the PCI are already shared by the Socialists and by some Christian Democrats.

Still, in Italy a great number of military-strategic decisions have always been made without the participation of parliament, or at times even of the cabinet, and the PCI has indicated that it is not really very interested in taking over sensitive ministries like the Ministry of Defense. There are no indications at the present time that the PCI intends to press for a *status quo minus* on issues of security policy or intends to reduce the present operative capabilities of the Western forces. The adoption of such policies would in a sense contradict historical experience, i.e., the fact that the Communist leadership, even after 1945, respected the postwar East-West spheres of influence and rejected—against strong pressure from its guerrilla wing—any "Greek perspective" aimed at altering the status quo. It would also contradict the party's avowed interest in the maintenance of the strategic balance. Finally, it would be counterproductive in light of the party's belief that any weakening of NATO would automatically undermine the position of Yugoslavia, whose nonaligned status the PCI is directly interested in maintaining. On several occasions, the party has hinted that it supports the Treaty of Osimo, which settled the Trieste territorial issue between Italy and Yugoslavia and for which the party voted in 1977, not least because of the chance it gives Yugoslavia to concentrate its attention and defense in the East. Because of all these factors, it is difficult to know with any precision what the intentions of the PCI are in the security policy realm.

To be sure, the possible political and psychological consequences for NATO which would ensue if the PCI received a greater share of government responsibility in Italy must not be underestimated. In crisis situations they could be far-reaching. It can still not be completely excluded, after all, that economic emergencies (caused, for instance, by long-lasting mass unemployment or by an oil embargo) or international conflicts and significant shifts in the balance of power (e.g., the abandonment of nonalignment by Yugoslavia) could give rise to momentous personnel and policy changes.[58] Under normal circumstances, however, the effects of the assumption of greater government responsibility by the PCI would appear to be less problematic, particularly since the PCI itself is undergoing very considerable changes under the influence of its national and Western European regional environment.

Finally, if one considers Western security not only in the traditional terms of East-West relations but also in its broad economic, social, and political aspects, an even more positive assessment is possible. At the end of November 1978, Italy's Christian Democrat Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, expressed the opinion that without the active cooperation of *all* parties of the constitutional arc—at that time including the PCI—it would not have been possible for the government to avoid national financial catastrophe or to defy terrorism.[59] When national disaster threatened, in other words, the Communists acted in their country's best interests.

No Homogeneous Bloc

Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, one can assume that there will be no homogeneous, effective Communist formation within the framework of existing Western European institutions. While the conservative, liberal, and social democratic parties all held summit conferences on the eve of the elections to the European Parliament and were able to agree at least on a minimum joint platform, Western Communists have not gathered together since the Brussels conference of January 1974. There was no preelection summit, and now there are many indications that the dynamics of European integration will cause the Eurocommunist trio of major parties to drift even further apart.

Cooperation inside the Strasbourg "Group of Communists and Leftist Independents"[60]—especially between the Italian and French Communists—began to

58. For this and the following discussion, see Pierre Hassner, "Eurocommunism and Détente," *Survival*, November-December 1977, pp. 251–54; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Bonn Thoughts," *Trialogue* (New York, NY), No. 5, 1977, p. 12.

59. See Andreotti's interview with *Corriere della Sera*, Nov. 30, 1978.

60. The group formerly consisted of nine members of the PCI, five members of the PCF, one member of the (left-wing) Socialist People's Party of Denmark, and three independent leftists proposed by the PCI (among them former EC official Altiero Spinelli).

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deteriorate some time ago. In late 1978, PCI deputy Nilde Jotti even complained publicly that since the entry of PCF representatives into the European Parliament in 1973 the work of the group has become so difficult that on several occasions it had been forced to interrupt its sessions to allow "time for reflection." On the whole, the group had "lost prestige and influence," since the members often assumed "divergent attitudes" and were prone "to advocate the positions of their own party."[61]

This assessment is confirmed by examination of the actual conduct of the Communist parliamentary group and its members at Strasbourg.[62] Normally, the views of a parliamentary group are presented by one spokesman. After 1976, however, two members frequently divided the time allotted the Communist group so that representatives of the PCI and the PCF could present differing and at times even completely contradictory views. This happened during the Strasbourg debate on the unemployment problem in April 1976. The PCF saw the multinational corporations as the principal villains and proposed action against them. The PCI, in contrast, recommended greater use of the EC Social Fund to combat the problem and expected that the employment of such supranational instruments would be effective. Similarly, in the 1977 debate on the crisis of the iron and steel industry, the PCF advocated national intervention—especially nationalization—while the PCI expressed doubts about the effectiveness of purely national measures and pleaded for intervention by the EC. Finally, in the debate on the extension of the EC toward the south in October 1977, the Italian and the French Communists openly vented the opposing positions discussed earlier in this article.

Before the elections to the European Parliament, these antagonisms intensified further. The PCI, as is its wont, refrained from public statements and on the eve of the elections even agreed, under pressure from the French Communists, to undertake joint initiatives with the PCF in the form of two mass meetings with Berlinguer and Marchais in Marseilles on May 19, 1979, and in Turin two days later. The PCE, however, made no secret of its displeasure over the intransigent attitude of the PCF with regard to EC expansion toward the south. It accused the PCF of being guided by nationalist and opportunist considerations in giving priority, for electoral reasons, to the interests of French agriculture over those of the Western European labor movement. This policy would not only tend to make a "club of privileged countries" out of the EC, but would also stir up "reactionary demons which tomorrow might turn against the French Left itself." In the process of European integration, said the PCE, there are, no doubt, objectively contradictory interests. These ought, however, to be "approached seriously and concretely with a view to finding a solution imbued with progressive dynamism."[63]

These differences over the issue of European integration represent only one aspect of the process of differentiation which has been taking place among the Eurocommunists. Fundamental differences of opinion are also becoming apparent in other key areas of ideology and policy—symbolized mainly by the fact that the PCI and the PCE want to follow a "third course" between social democracy and Soviet communism, while the PCF flatly denies that such a course can be viable, since, according to the party, social democracy is only a variant of capitalism whereas socialism is being built in the Soviet Union.

In fact, differences over societal transformation strategy have become so great that the PCI and the PCE have at times openly criticized basic positions of their French sister party. This happened especially after the electoral defeat of the French Left in March 1978—a defeat which both the Italian and the Spanish parties ascribed in large measure to the behavior of the PCF and "the survival in its ranks of traditional patterns of analysis inherited from the Third International."[64] According to Sergio Segre, the PCF had been unable "to reach by means of an appropriate political and economic program those broad sections of the middle class which have shown an interest in the renewal of French society."[65] Spanish CP spokesman Manuel Azcárate, who shared Segre's opinion, concluded that the PCF had thereby disregarded the basic principles of Eurocommunism.[66]

Prospects

In all probability, the Communists will form a common parliamentary group in the directly elected European Parliament at Strasbourg. If the representative of the Moscow-oriented Communist Party of Denmark

61. Nilde Jotti, "The Communists in the European Parliament," *l'Unità*, Nov. 9, 1978. Jotti is a member of the Directorate of the PCI and has been a member of the European Parliament.

62. On the following discussion, see Rudolf Hrbek, "Eurocommunism and the EC," *Der Bürger im Staat*, June 1978, pp. 129–36.

63. See Manuel Azcárate's statement in *Le Monde*, Aug. 2, 1978.

64. Leonardo Paggi, "France: Crisis and Change," *Rinascita*, May 19, 1978, p. 18.

65. *L'Unità*, Mar. 21, 1978.

66. "The Spanish CP: We Will Not Act Like Our French Comrades," *Le Monde*, Mar. 23, 1978.

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joins those of the PCI and the PCF, the group could control 45 of the 410 seats in the parliament. But because of fundamental differences between individual parties, it is not very probable that the group will be able to agree on a common policy and thereby acquire power and influence. It is more likely—assuming that the leadership of the PCF succeeds in the long run in holding down protest in its own party ranks and reestablishing a more traditionalist line—that the Communist parliamentary group will remain ineffective. This could lead to a rapprochement between the PCI (and eventually perhaps the PCE) on the one hand and social democracy on the other, and to increasing isolation for the PCF.

The PCF leadership, after all, sees the Socialist International as in reality an arm of imperialism. Since the leading circles of the bourgeoisie, according to the PCF, can no longer cope with the crisis of capitalism at the national or the international level by traditional means, they are now trying to do so with the help of moderate reformist forces, which are represented in Europe by social democracy. These forces have been assigned the task of securing social consensus for the goals of imperialism through a policy of class collaboration on the national and Western European levels. Through the promotion of dialogue with the developing countries of the Third World, they are also to work to maintain, even under new conditions, old international relationships based on domination and exploitation.[67] In this French Communist scenario, the strongest and most influential party of international social democracy, the SPD, has assumed a leading role. It has allegedly been assigned the task of committing its European sister parties to the German line and ensuring the emergence of "an integrated Europe under American tutelage."[68]

According to Italian Communists, the PCF, by pinpointing social democracy as its real antagonist, has reverted to the Comintern pattern of international analysis. It has thereby isolated itself not only from the *democratic socialists,* but in the end also from the Italian and Spanish *Communists*. Thus, on the Western European level the PCF cannot do much more than attempt to form a "veto group" in the EC Parliament together with other nationalist forces, the orthodox Communist parties of Denmark and the Benelux countries (and of Greece), and later perhaps with the Portuguese Communist Party, to try to block further Western European or Atlantic cooperation. Whether such a veto group can be formed, only time will tell. For the moment, what is certain is that among the Communist parties, as PCF dissident Jean Elleinstein remarked, the PCF will associate mainly with those that "are thoroughly Stalinist and incontestably tied to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."[69]

The Italian Communist leadership, on the other hand, is eager for dialogue with the democratic socialists of Western Europe not only because, like the PCF, it wants to avoid becoming isolated, but for reasons of principle. It admittedly still distinguishes between Southern European socialists and Northern European social democrats, maintaining that the former want radical reforms of the economy and social structure while the latter often have no clear vision of the future and confine themselves to modernizing existing society and providing the status quo with a social base. But on the whole, the PCI leadership at present holds a positive view of international social democracy and its historic achievements—including those of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, so strongly condemned by the PCF.[70] PCI spokesmen stress that neither the Communists nor the democratic socialists could, or should, disown their history or their historical identity. Rather, they should respect each other, learn from each other, and "by critically comparing their positions initiate a process aimed at overcoming historical differences and restoring the unity of the labor movement in Western Europe."[71]

Moreover, the PCI for years has maintained contacts with the influential social democratic parties of Western Europe—official contacts with the British Labor Party and the Scandinavian social democrats, and unofficial contacts with the SPD. It attaches special importance to the SPD—despite the informal ties—as the ruling party of the economically strongest member country of the EC. In the words of foreign policy spokesman Segre, it is very much in the interest of the PCI "that the Federal Republic exert its great influence to promote peace, social and civic progress, and the development of democracy. In this Europe of the Community all of us really are sitting in the same boat. It is our view that in this context the tasks of a

67. See, for example, Nadine Boudin, "Some Aspects of the Socialist International Today," *France Nouvelle,* Oct. 16, 1978, pp. 25–28.

68. Alain Rouy, "The Supranational Parties in the Service of German Europe," ibid., Nov. 20, 1978, p. 13. Thierry Pfister, however, in "The Debate on Social Democracy," *Le Monde,* Oct. 22–23, 1978, underlined that not all members of the PCF agree with this analysis.

69. "M. Elleinstein Is Concerned About the Orientation of the Leadership of the PCF," *Le Monde,* Aug. 18, 1978.

70. See Gerardo Chiaromonte, "We and the SPD," *Rinascita,* Jan. 5, 1979, p. 5. Chiaromonte is a member of the PCI Directorate and Secretariat and is a Senator of the Italian Republic.

71. Thesis 44 of the "Draft Theses for the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit. Cf. thesis 44 of the "Theses Approved by the 15th National Congress of the PCI," loc. cit., p. 54.

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At left, members of West Germany's Christian Socialist Union (CSU) hear party leader Franz-Jozef Strauss at a spring 1979 rally in Passau. The banner to the rear, bearing the initials of the CSU and the symbol and name of the European People's Party, asserts: "Europe '79. Yes to Freedom. No to Socialism"; at the right, a poster of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) during the spring of 1979 European Parliament election campaign proclaims "Germans, Say Yes to Europe."

—Katherine Young.

large party like the SPD are of primary importance."[72]

Still, the PCI is realistic enough to understand that for the time being no *organic* tie to the democratic socialists—in the form of a common parliamentary group, for instance—is possible at the European level. It believes, however, that the European Parliament offers Communists and social democrats a chance to compare each other's positions and seek out possible points of convergence on practical issues. In this sense at least, the PCI has indicated that it is prepared for meaningful discussion, and it may expect that in the long run closer, more permanent ties among Communists, social democrats, and socialists will result from this approach.

Cooperation with the social democrats on individual issues in the European Parliament does not appear to the PCI to present problems for either side, for the simple reason that the Parliament is not concerned with forming government coalitions or with controlling an executive dependent on a parliamentary majority. In fact, because of the leeway the Strasbourg forum affords in this respect, the PCI would like to see cooperation there with parties of a Christian-social and liberal stamp as well—a desire derived perhaps from the party's domestic policy line of *compromesso storico* (historic compromise). While it can safely be assumed that the social democrats and socialists will accept convergence with the PCI in voting on concrete issues, as they have already with Christian-democratic parties, they will nevertheless remain skeptical about more organic ties, because of their historical experiences in dealing with Communists. They have made it clear that they will not form a common parliamentary group with the Communists in Strasbourg, and this attitude is not likely to change at least until the Communists themselves reach basic accord on the path to—and the purpose of—social transformation.

Nevertheless, the democratic socialists are agreed that "*all* relevant political forces that are capable and willing, including Eurocommunist parties, must be made to share in the basic consensus on the building and unification of Europe."[73] In part their attitude is

72. See the interview in Heinz Timmermann, Ed., *Eurokommunismus: Fakten, Analysen, Interview* (Eurocommunism: Facts, Analyses, Interviews), Frankfurt, Fischer Verlag, 1978, p. 187.

73. Horst Ehmke in his preface to ibid., p. 12. Ehmke is a member of the Directorate of the SPD and Vice President of the party's parliamentary group in Bonn.

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determined by the conviction that it would be disastrous for the West as a whole if Western Europe were to split into a more conservative North on the one hand and a "Latin-socialist" oriented South on the other. Such a development would certainly undermine European and Atlantic cooperation and might ultimately lead to the growth of a separate organic relationship between Germany and the United States.

Thus, there is considerable feeling that the advantages of allowing the PCI a greater share of responsibility for the democratic stabilization and economic recovery of Italy and for the strengthening of the EC outweigh the risks of the party exerting some additional influence on Italian foreign policy. In addition, there are three ways in which such risks could be further minimized. First, the democratic socialists could, through formal contacts, press for even more radical change within the PCI and at the same time warn non-Communist forces against overly alarmist reactions. Second, the government of the FRG could play a mediating and moderating role among the divergent interests and forces in the West, with the aim of preventing both overreaction by the West and possible attempts by the Communists to use basic consensus on political democracy to oppose Western European integration and Atlantic cooperation. Finally, the European Community, as it closes its ranks, could proceed with strong enough nerves and sufficient self-confidence to accept, where possible, constructive cooperation from Eurocommunists of changing attitudes, as has been done already on the trade-union level. After all, the Communist-Socialist CGIL, Italy's largest political trade union, has been cooperating constructively in the activities of the European Federation of Trade Unions since 1974.

Whether the Eurocommunist parties will continue, in the wake of the European elections of June 1979, to regard European integration and security matters as they have in the past is, of course, an open question. It should be clear from the analysis which has been presented here, however, that changes in the positions of the major Communist parties will be difficult and slow in coming, if they come at all. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps up to the non-Communists of Europe whether the potential which they saw in the June elections and the new parliament at Strasbourg will be fulfilled.

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Books

Yugoslavia's Uneasy Transformation

by Milorad M. Drachkovitch

SHARON ZUKIN. *Beyond Marx and Tito. Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism.* London and New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

GARY K. BERTSCH. *Values and Community in Multinational Yugoslavia.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1976.

ANDREI SIMIC. *The Peasant Urbanites. A Study of Rural-Urban Mobility in Serbia.* New York, NY, and London, Seminar Press, 1973.

DUSKO DODER. *The Yugoslavs.* New York, NY, Random House, 1978.

BRANKO HORVAT. *The Yugoslav Economic System.* White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976.

DENNISON RUSINOW. *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

BOGDAN DENNIS DENITCH. *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1976.

CARL GUSTAF STRÖHM. *Ohne Tito. Kann Jugoslawien überleben?* (Without Tito. Can Yugoslavia Survive?). Graz, Verlag Styria, 1976.

ROBERT K. FURTAK. *Jugoslawien: Politik-Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft* (Yugoslavia: Politics-Society-Economy). Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe, 1975.

AN INDISPUTABLE FACT of Yugoslavia's history since 1941 is that its Communist party has been the focus of the country's most important mutations, the versatility and paradoxes of which are unmatched in the wartime and postwar histories of other East European countries. This is true despite the fact that the party came to power in 1944 with an extraordinarily sparse cadre of trained members (and these had primarily political and military rather than other types of skills). The 3,000 or so fanatical and hardened party stalwarts (out of 12,000 party members in 1941) who survived the war feverishly endeavored to implant, to use Czeslaw Milosz's metaphor, a New Faith in a country that (from the Marxist viewpoint) was basically pagan.[1] True, thousands upon thousands of new members joined the victorious Communist bandwagon, but these neophytes had undergone only the briefest ideological and political training when the earthquake of the Stalin-Tito conflict shattered the orthodoxy of the New Faith.

Stalin's clumsy and ill-advised anti-Tito campaign forced Yugoslavia's Communists—before 1948 more Stalinist than Stalin—to abandon Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideological justifications for their rule and to devise their own brand of communism. They dragged the country—responsive out of fear of a return of the Soviet Red Army—along what Sharon Zukin in *Beyond Marx and Tito* terms the "confusing [paths] of constant reorganization" (p. 251). What evolved, Gary Bertsch observes in his study, *Values and Community in Multinational Yugoslavia,* was "Titoism," which ultimately forged as its central legitimizing tenet the concept of "workers' self-management," buttressed with the four "D's"—decentralization, deétatization, depoliticization, and democratization (p. 6). Simultaneously, the leadership pursued a modernization that changed the socioeconomic contours of the country beyond

1. ***La pensée captive*** **(Captive Thought), Paris, Gallimard, 1953, p. 18. In his war memoirs, Milovan Djilas states that "when we got into Belgrade [in October 1944], we encountered not one—literally not one—member of the party."** ***Wartime,*** **New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, p. 419.**

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recognition. The party changed too, with one fundamental exception: its central leadership refused to relinquish its monopoly of political power.

Today, after some 35 years, Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia faces a number of fundamental problems. These fall into three general clusters relating to the dislocations caused by massive socioeconomic change, to the viability of the regime's legitimizing ideology, and to the future shape and role of the party—especially in a post-Tito setting. The diverse collection of studies reviewed here provides insight into many aspects of these three central issue areas.

WITH REGARD to the first, one finds that "Titoism" destroyed the traditional social order and initiated a fundamental restructuring of Yugoslav society. This process triggered three successive waves of migration, each with profound social consequences.

The first such wave, emerging immediately after the war, may be described as the "eighth offensive" (an allusion to the seven wartime offensives extolled in Yugoslav Partisan mythology).[2] This development, while highly political in background, had virtually nothing to do with the creation of a puritanical and egalitarian new society and the new man about which true believers of the Milovan Djilas type had dreamed in the 1930's. Rather it consisted of the migration of the triumphant Partisans from rural settings into the cities, above all to Belgrade. With the party elite occupying the controlling heights of political power, these rural elements moved to fill the various echelons of the new state administration (the bureaucracy, the army, the secret police and militia, and the apparatus of the "command economy") to put into practice a socialism that was based on the Soviet blueprint of political and economic governance, the only Communist model then available. The acquisitive style of these rulers transformed them into the morally reprehensible "new class" described by Djilas and a series of Yugoslav novelists. The economic reforms of the 1950's and 1960's forced many of these initial beneficiaries of the "eighth offensive" from their positions, as technical and managerial expertise became the prerequisites of social advancement.

The second migratory wave—also rural-urban in direction—started somewhat later but lasted much longer. It was determined by the regime's policies of enforced industrialization. This migration effected a revolutionary alteration in the life styles of the masses of new urbanites. Still, as Andrei Simic observes in his study, *The Peasant Urbanites,* the new city-dwellers did not lose all ties with their rural birthplaces. Simic stresses the resulting "vitality of traditional values and institutions" and "the positive role played by kinship and its associated ideology in the Yugoslav urbanization process," and he argues that this "continuing rural-urban reciprocity . . . acts as a positive mechanism, reducing feelings of isolation and alienation

2. *Osma ofanziva* (The Eighth Offensive) is the title of a novel, published in 1964 by one of the most prominent Yugoslav writers, Branko Copic. The novel describes the social and psychological metamorphoses of a group of Partisan fighters from Western Bosnia, who after the war's end began new lives and careers in Belgrade.

Reviewers in This Issue

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among migrants to the city" (p. 125).

Nevertheless, new values came to the fore that were associated neither with traditional rural attitudes nor with the short-lived ethic of egalitarianism and austerity preached in the early years of Communist rule. Prominent among these new attitudes was the "rampant consumerism" described by Dusko Doder in his graphic account of life in present-day Yugoslavia.

In the 1960's, a third and somewhat unusual migration began, when the exodus from the farms could not be absorbed in the overpopulated urban industrial centers and found an outlet abroad. West European industrial worksites became "Yugoslavia's new frontier," populated with staggering numbers of Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter*. By the mid-1970's, Doder tells us, there were one million workers abroad, amounting to roughly 5 percent of Yugoslavia's total population and 20 percent of its labor force (p. 80). As a social safety valve and a source of large sums of hard currency sent home as savings, the *Gastarbeiter* phenomenon — Doder reminds us—was a definite plus. Yet the testimony it gave to the inability of the Yugoslav Marxist regime to guarantee employment for large numbers of its citizens and the fact that the latter were driven to sell their labor to the "capitalist class enemy," especially one that was foreign and, above all, primarily German, was a source of embarrassment. Moreover, the working situation of these temporary expatriates was precarious, contingent on economic fluctuations in the West; with the economic downturn of the mid-1970's in the West, they streamed home by the thousands. The Yugoslav economy, already suffering from high unemployment was in no position to comfortably reabsorb the *Gastarbeiter;* the living standard of their families at home—accustomed to hard-currency remittances—suffered; and finally, there was the problem of the "corrupting" (from the regime's perspective) influence that life in genuinely democratic societies might have had on such returnees.

Accompanying and, to a degree, determining these social mutations were a number of changes in the country's economic system. As Yugoslav economist Branko Horvat explains in his brief but useful book, his country's system of economic management has passed through three distinct phases—from a centralized planned economy, through decentralization, to a so-called self-governing socialism. A variety of reforms have been tried, especially those of 1965, which introduced something of a "laissez-faire socialism" by giving profit-oriented enterprises the possibility of competing in the market, without however eliminating the mechanisms of a "command economy." The result is a hybrid economic system, the precise nature of which is the subject of debate among American, West European, and Yugoslav economists and political scientists. More important is the possibility raised by Dennison Rusinow in his otherwise sympathetic study on *The Yugoslav Experiment* that this system "may be inherently unstable and eventually untenable" (p. 345).

Two elements should be added as illustrations of problems that remain unresolved, official assertions notwithstanding. One is the pursuit of that perennial goal of the Yugoslav economy: stabilization—verbally, the most conjured concept, and practically, the most elusive. Stabilization aims at a number of goals, prominent among which are reduction of Yugoslavia's highly unfavorable foreign trade balance, its serious domestic inflation, and its unemployment. The other issue is a simmering of ethnic rivalries and centrifugal local nationalisms behind the façade of *bratstvo-jedinstvo* (fraternity-unity)—the proudest catchword of the Partisan struggle, proclaimed later as the highest achievement of Titoist rule. Their disruptive potential became particularly conspicuous in two instances of Croatian frustration: in the outburst of nationalist passions in 1971, and in the militancy of the Croatian emigration. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this latter, a specifically political "migration," is the fact that the young Croats who joined the anti-Titoist cause abroad had lived all their lives under the Communist regime and are willing to use the most radical means in their struggle against the Yugoslav state for the establishment of an independent Croatian state.

In sum, modernization of Yugoslav society offers a fundamentally blurred picture. Yugoslavia has certainly entered the modern world, often frenetically and uncritically embracing most of the Western cultural currents of the second part of our century. It is a country and a society on the move in many directions, but it is precisely here that the fundamental question arises: "What price modernization?" The destruction of the old social order, the fanatical espousal of the Soviet model, the "burning of what one has adored," followed by the "Yugoslav Way to Socialism," with its shifts, zig-zags, and uncertainties, have left people confused and vulnerable and their political manipulators bewildered and cynical. Doder's book is particularly illuminating on the contradictions underlying "social mobilization" and "modernization" in the Yugoslav context. As he

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demonstrates time and again, such cold analytical terms fail to reflect the human costs—in terms of arbitrariness, tensions and hatreds, spiritual chaos, and moral void—which result when a country, within a brief period of time, is pulled in various directions—the most dynamic societal forces in Yugoslavia's case pulling toward the West, but the controlling political force refusing to go in that direction.

IN VIEW of these considerations, one may well ask what holds Yugoslavia's society together and lends legitimacy to Communist rule? Bogdan Denitch attempts to answer these questions in his work, *The Legitimation of a Revolution*. Denitch, who is an American of Yugoslav origin and is identified on the jacket of his book as "an undogmatic Marxist" political sociologist, does not seem bothered by the problems noted above. Rather, he gives the Yugoslav system high marks for inventiveness and achievement. Specifically, he argues that both the legitimacy and durability of the Titoist system stem from "the new social relations and institutions based on self-management" which have entered "into the normative nexus of the new political culture of the country" (p. 199). For him, the development of self-management has become "the unifying social myth of the society, analogous to such broad terms in Western polities as 'democracy' " (p. 192).[3]

Yet Denitch's assertions are contradicted by some very high-placed officials in the Titoist system, whose perceptions regarding the self-management system lead one to question both whether it actually works as claimed and whether it is really effective as a legitimizing myth. For example, in a resounding speech in Zagreb on November 11, 1977, to the republican conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Croatia, the late Edvard Kardelj (who is credited with being, together with Milovan Djilas, a founding father of the self-management system) denounced three tendencies—"liberalistic," "ultraleftist," and "technocratic"—which he viewed as harmful to the regime. Of particular interest was his denunciation of the ultraleftist tendency, which by "stressing primarily decision-making by meetings of workers, gatherings of citizens, etc.," adopts "an almost hostile attitude toward the role of subjective factors of socialism in the entire system, and in particular toward the social role of the League of Communists."[4] It is striking that Kardelj would criticize such advocacy of "decision-making by meetings of workers," which, after all, is a key part of the self-management system on which the regime bases its legitimacy. And it is also significant that in the same speech, Kardelj emphatically endorsed Lenin's criticism of the spontaneous activity of the working class—criticism clearly implying that decisions made in the name of the working class should not result from their meetings but should originate at higher political levels.

That the idea of workers' councils actually making enterprise decisions in Yugoslavia is indeed a myth is confirmed in the following description of enterprise decision-making provided by Neca Jovanov, a former worker who obtained a Ph.D. degree with a dissertation on workers' strikes in Yugoslavia and who is now a high Yugoslav trade-union functionary:

There gather together five, six leading officials of the enterprise: the director with his aides, the chairman of the workers' council, the secretary of the League of Communists, the chairman of the trade union, and the chairman of the youth organization, who is usually a supernumerary. There, mainly under the pressure of the managerial structure, a political position is formulated, which in fact is a decision. At that meeting of activists, the chairman of the workers' council is assigned the duty of formally pushing through the position (decision) at the meeting of the workers' council; the secretary of the LC gets the duty of securing political support for the decision of the workers' council; the chairman of the trade union does the same at the trade-union meeting, and the chairman of the youth organization [is told to do] what he can . . . .

In this way the entire self-governing and political structure is mobilized formally to support the decision of a group, which from a sociological standpoint is nonformal and from the viewpoint of the law is illegal, but in which there is concentrated a vast amount of power.[5]

Sharon Zukin draws a similar picture of the discrepancy between theory and practice in Yugoslav socialism. In her words, "the apathy of a large part of the population, and the monopoly that their leaders hold over effective political action, comprise a vicious circle in which Yugoslav self-managers are trapped" (p. 247). Efforts by the regime to base its legitimacy on the principle of self-management will lack validity and persuasiveness as

3. In a less categorical way, Gary Bertsch shares Denitch's arguments in this respect. Bertsch sees in the self-management system a Yugoslav strategy for realizing "participatory democracy" (p. 128).

4. *Borba* (Zagreb), Nov. 12, 1977.

5. From an interview published in *NIN* (Belgrade), Aug. 20, 1978.

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long as the self-managers remain in this trap, lacking the freedom to make the decisions themselves.

UNTIL OR UNLESS this situation changes, it will be the Communist apparatus that continues to rule Yugoslavia, and—as long as he is able to hold the reins—this means first and foremost Tito. It is truly one of the basic paradoxes of our time that while the deterministic and impersonal doctrine of Marxism has no place in its schemes for "event-making" individuals, in the Communist regimes established in the name of Marxism individual personalities—Vladimir Lenin, Yosif Stalin, Tito, Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro—have played major, often decisive roles. Paradoxical or not, however, it has long been recognized that Tito has been an essential factor in the establishment, functioning, and metamorphoses of Yugoslav communism. An encomium written by Milovan Djilas shortly after the Communists had seized Belgrade stated that "everything we have created and are creating may be expressed by a single word—Tito,"[6] while an editorial in the July 9, 1978, issue of the Belgrade weekly *NIN* allegorically described Tito's life work as "larger than a mountain." Indeed, Tito was instrumental in both stalinizing and destalinizing Yugoslavia, in crushing Djilas in 1954, in eliminating Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966, and in purging Croatian Communist "nationalists" in 1971 and Serbian "liberals" a year later. He gave (after initial hesitation) his stamp of approval to the system of self-management and then in the 1970's put the brakes on its genuine implementation. His own extraordinary propensity for luxurious living may explain his tolerance for the Yugoslav public's consumerist strivings, but his tough political training, as well as personal instincts (vanity and no doubt deep convictions), make him a genuine Leninist for whom experimentation is permissible in everything except the commanding role of the party.

And yet, despite Tito's prestige and authority, which—like Mao's at the end of the Chairman's rule—are quite independent of his actual performance, Yugoslavia's internal contradictions are not going away. Ethnic rivalries are by no means extinguished, the economy persistently fails to achieve the aim of stabilization, and there remains the incompatibility of the principle of self-government and the party's dedication to centralized controls (renewed at its 10th Congress in May 1974).

Moreover, the party leadership is conspicuous for its lack of new faces, with the same Tito henchmen occupying the top positions in both the party and the state. Tito's uneasy confrontation with the leadership of the League of Communists of Serbia in October 1972, during which the majority of the republic's top party activists supported their own leaders against Tito—an event Rusinow finds "unprecedented in the history of Yugoslavia" (p. 324)—showed clearly that Lenin's old dictum *"kto kogo"* (who will get whom) remains a valid warning of what may come when the supreme arbiter leaves the scene.[7]

Indeed, Tito's demise will necessarily bring "a new ball game." As Carl Gustaf Ströhm argues in his book *Ohne Tito,* no successor will be able to adopt Tito's style of using power or enjoy his prestige as leader and arbiter (p. 283). Moreover, it seems certain that the "stagnation" (to use Doder's characterization) of the last few years of Tito's reign cannot be tolerated for long by any succeeding individual or team leadership.

What modified forms Communist rule will take in a post-Tito Yugoslavia will depend on numerous domestic and foreign imponderables, not the least of which will be the attitude of the Soviet Union. Within Yugoslavia, a look at the ranks of "Tito's party" below the topmost levels reveals an organization that is radically different in size, social composition, and ideological zeal from the 3,000 Stalinist firebrands and tens of thousands of neophytes who first seized power. The party now numbers more than 1,700,000 members, and as Robert Furtak documents in his highly informative volume, cadres with technical training and occupying administrative posts now dominate the party rolls in contrast to the preponderance of rural Partisan militants in 1944. It is not farfetched to assume that these younger and abler cadres look at problems differently than their elders. Beyond the party lies the mass of Yugoslav society itself, with its own large number of skilled and educated citizens. Despite the political passivity imposed upon them by Titoism, their frame of mind is far from the mentality of the party leaders. Whether directly or indirectly, this public will also have its say in the future course the country takes. Where that will lead remains anybody's guess. Perhaps even, to borrow Sharon Zukin's title, beyond Marx and Tito.

6. *Borba* (Belgrade), Nov. 20, 1944.

7. A recent Yugoslav book gives important insight into strife within the LCY and Tito's settlement of accounts with various opposing groups, including the leadership of the Serbian LC. See Dragan Markovic and Savo Krzavac, *Liberalizam od Djilasa do danas* (Liberalism from Djilas to the Present Day), Vol. 2, Belgrade, Sloboda, 1978. It is striking that in speeches delivered during the 1972 Serbian crisis, Tito and Serbian party leader Marko Nikezic (later purged) both explicitly used the expression *"kto kogo"* (Markovic and Krzavac, pp. 275 and 306).

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East European Studies at a Crossroads

by Vojtech Mastny

LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN. *Current Research in Comparative Communism: An Analysis and Bibliographic Guide to the Soviet System*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

JAN F. TRISKA and PAUL M. COCKS, Eds. *Political Development in Eastern Europe*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

JANE P. SHAPIRO and PETER J. POTICHNYJ, Eds. *Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

ANDREW C. JANOS, Ed. *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe: Uniformity and Diversity in One-Party States*. Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1976.

MARTIN McCAULEY, Ed. *Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949*. New York, NY, Barnes and Noble, 1977.

ROBERT R. KING and JAMES F. BROWN, Eds. *Eastern Europe's Uncertain Future: A Selection of Radio Free Europe Research Reports*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

SINCE THE ADVENT of Western scholarship on Eastern Europe, trends in analyzing the region have mirrored closely prevalent conditions there at particular times. So long as ethnic rivalries set the tone, "nationalism" was the magic word invoked to comprehend the baffling dynamism of East European societies and politics. Then, the imposition of Stalinism inaugurated the vogue of the "totalitarian model," which was a fitting device to grasp those appalling simplicities that distinguished this extraordinary system. The subsequent rise of more ordinary, civilized, and diversified patterns of political behavior rendered equally appropriate the use of conceptual tools developed for the analysis of more "normal" polities.

Initially, the notion of modernization offered an especially healthy corrective to the rigidity of the totalitarian paradigm with its misleading preconceptions about absolute power. More recently, however, the modernization model has seemed destined to go the way of its predecessors—but with no substitutes in sight. The model's implicit assumption of growing convergence between Communist and non-Communist systems no longer holds much water, if it ever did. Both political liberalization and rapid economic growth—two hallmarks of the otherwise disturbingly vague modernization model—may have run their course in Eastern Europe. And a propensity to reduce the vital specifics of communism to the lifeless generics of "sociopolitical development" has led to bizarre, oversimplified conclusions.

We have been told that "Communist phenomena are not distinguished from non-Communist ones by any particular characteristics."[1] To be sure, a school may not be distinguished from a prison by any particular characteristics either; still, the future of education would be rather bleak if one were guided by this sort of judgment. Is the future of East European studies similarly bleak—a prospect perhaps again reflecting the condition of the region itself? Has a critical crossroads been reached in both region and scholarship? A look at a representative selection of six recent books should enable us to tell.

OF THE SIX VOLUMES listed above, the first two strive, albeit in different ways, to take stock of the present state of scholarship on comparative communism. Lawrence Whetten surveys in sweeping fashion the state of communism as well, outlining yet another research design based on the assumption that "socialism is fundamentally progressive or change-prone" (p. 3). It is one of those all-inclusive designs concerned with so many different topics that its thrust remains far from clear, despite many a penetrating observation

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1. John Kautsky, quoted in Triska-Cocks, p. 4.

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along the way. The appended bibliographic guide is truly a bibliographer's nightmare. It is chaotic and error-ridden, and glaring omissions go unexplained. All these are, alas, deficiencies symptomatic of much of the precipitously rising output in the East European field.

Fortunately, as the collection of articles edited by Jan Triska and Paul Cocks proves, they are not the standard fare. In his thoughtful introductory essay to *Political Development in Eastern Europe,* Andrzej Korbonski makes no apologies for the recent rapid growth of the East European "sub-discipline." But neither does he leave any doubt that its accomplishments still fall notably short of the standards attained in Soviet studies. He blames the once prevalent misconception that the resemblance of the Moscow-imposed systems of Eastern Europe to the Soviet model makes their examination redundant. Although that fallacy has been discarded, the progress of scholarship has indeed been uneven.

Among topics of prime importance, the triumphant reassertion of nationalism has, surprisingly, failed to elicit the scholarly interest it deserves—a subconscious reaction perhaps to earlier generations' excessive preoccupation with the phenomenon. Moreover, despite the region's endemic authoritarianism, adequate political biographies of its individual protagonists, including such colorful characters as Janos Kadar of Hungary and Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, are lacking. While this neglect may be suggestive of too many political scientists' infatuation with abstract models and behavioral patterns, neither has the study of structures and institutions—a prime topic for scholars with a comparative bent—advanced as far as it should. Finally, despite much excellent research on the economies of Eastern Europe, the amassed quantitative data still await commensurate conclusions in terms of political economy.

In trying to remedy some of these shortcomings, Triska and Cocks have produced a worthy sequel to *The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe* edited by Charles Gati.[2] The wider range of the contributions to the later volume indicates how much the avenues of inquiry shifted within the brief span of three years. As Paul Johnson puts it in his contribution to the Triska-Cocks volume, "we cannot explain political change in post-Stalin East Europe by invoking 'the theory of modernization' or 'the theory of political development' " (p. 37). It is rather description and explanation of politics that matter; instead of more research designs, we need more empirical analysis making good use of the many excellent designs already at hand.

While the diverse conclusions that emerge from the contributions to this volume are difficult to sum up, at least some merit specific mention. One is the finding that the East European regimes have so far responded to the "technological revolution" by mere organizational and administrative adaptation to promote efficiency, but have eschewed fundamental change (Paul Cocks, Kenneth Jowitt). However, it is not so much this response as their failure to forge viable institutional links between rulers and ruled that has continued to be the Achilles' heel of those regimes, as the 1970 events in Poland most vividly demonstrated (Zvi Gitelman). The public's political participation remains rudimentary, though it is not entirely meaningless (Triska), not even in such a citadel of authoritarianism as Ceausescu's Romania (Mary Ellen Fisher). As exemplified by the most pluralistic of the systems, that of Yugoslavia, substantive expansion of such participation to assure continuity of power is as imperative as it is risky (Lenard Cohen).

Most scholars, though not necessarily the public at large, now accept the proposition that the policies of the East European states are determined overwhelmingly by domestic exigencies, Moscow's persisting supremacy notwithstanding. But the ensuing pluralism need not hamper Soviet control and may in fact serve to enhance it by providing new openings for interference—either by supporting competing internal factions or by manipulating factional coalitions across national boundaries (Kent Brown). Still, the limits of Russian tolerance have been flexible rather than rigid, and non-Soviet influences also have been ascendant in countless ways, abetted by the particular political cultures of the individual countries (Sarah Terry).

Significantly, the record has been one of underestimated Western opportunities and overestimated Soviet determination. According to Gati, more vigorous Western diplomatic engagement and ideological confrontation should supplement the innocuous building of economic ties and promotion of cultural "Westernization," both of which even the most oppressive regimes of the area have proved quite capable of containing. Given the West's recent economic disarray, the closer economic ties tend to increase the East Europeans' dependence on Soviet aid. They also reduce the degree to which the region represents an economic liability to the Russians (Paul Marer). Only Yugoslavia, that perennial maverick,

2. New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

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seems to have managed to weather the impact of Western recession without sacrificing either its extensive Western connections or its liberal economic practices, particularly that of fostering labor migration to Western Europe (William Zimmerman).

NOT ALL THE ARTICLES in the Triska-Cocks volume are easy to read, but the translation from the esoteric dialect of social science into normal English that is sometimes necessary is almost always rewarding. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the set of papers from the 1974 International Slavic Conference (Banff, Alberta, Canada) edited by Jane Shapiro and Peter Potichnyj. The exceptions are three articles concerned with the analysis of values: Joseph Held on the revival of old class attitudes in Communist Hungary, Alexander Matejko on the residue of "feudal" ethics in today's battered Polish society, and Galia Golan on Czechoslovakia's incipient revolution of 1968. But in reading the rest, one cannot help being reminded of Korbonski's lament in his essay already cited about "superficially elaborate frameworks and schemes [that] . . . produce trivial and inconsequential results" (pp. 22–23). Such are the pitfalls of mammoth conferences, which often sacrifice quality to quantity—a shortcoming which even competent editors can only mitigate, not cure.

In contrast, the fruits of the colloquium on *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe* organized by Andrew Janos at Berkeley in 1973 prove the virtues of small professional gatherings devoted to a single topic. In dissecting the varieties of Communist authoritarianism, the participants shared the sentiment that "Communist political systems should not be treated as sui generis, but should rather be approached in terms of the general categories of social science" (p. v). This much said, they proceeded with a sharp eye for the all-important specifics of the phenomenon. The editor's own essay, lucid and erudite, sets the tone by applying his innovative matrix to four basic stages of development: revolutionary-millenarian, revolutionary-managerial, bureaucratic-millenarian, bureaucratic-managerial. At the last stage, the deftly depoliticized East German system, taken apart at the expert hands of Melvin Croan, surely deserves a place of distinction for its wholesale cooptation of potential dissenters in the name of efficiency and "progress." Nevertheless, in Croan's opinion "the GDR's experience appears to be unique and not susceptible to being replicated elsewhere" (p. 172) — perhaps a dispiriting conclusion in terms of the conferees' hopes "to develop a potential for comparisons and for explanations by analogy" (p. v).

The symposium yielded no overriding conclusions other than the cautious consensus that the growth within the Communist polities of "private spheres" immune from the regimes' interference does not amount to a significant step toward legitimized political diversity. Even so, the contributions—the others are by Zygmunt Bauman, Thomas Baylis, J.F. Brown, T.H. Rigby, and Paul Shoup—are models of meticulous analysis of the Communist regimes' troubled liaison with the essentially non-Communist societies under their rule.

IN THEIR OWN WAYS, all four books discussed so far highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the social science approach, which is sometimes juxtaposed to the presumably less scientific "historicism." Historicism has been defined by one of its critics as a proclivity to produce studies that are "non-cumulative, non-comparable, and [prone] to explain change in terms of voluntary responses to events."[3] But quite apart from the ill-becoming methodological exclusiveness of such utterances, there is something make-believe about a criticism that political scientists customarily level at each other's work; for the studies in question seldom bear the distinguishing marks of what historians recognize as the tools of their trade. Admittedly, the application of those tools to the analysis of recent events has been slack; even so, its best results are indispensable to complement the best of the social science variety. Certainly the two approaches are in no way incompatible.

Martin McCauley's distinguished series of essays, *Communist Power in Europe, 1944–1949,* provides a good case in point. In preparing the University of London symposium which sponsored the essays, the organizers invited participants to examine Communist policies during the early years of the cold war to see if conclusions were possible regarding Eurocommunist advances toward power in our own time. Proceeding country by country, the authors indeed used "non-cumulative and non-comparable" data quite freely, explaining policies "in terms of voluntary responses to events," namely, in terms of policy choices. They nevertheless arrived at conclusions of considerable weight.

Several of the essays document the far from negligible scope in which the Communists' drive to power after World War II was preconditioned, if not encouraged, by

3. David Finley, quoted in Triska-Cocks, p. 366.

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the attitudes and actions of their international and domestic adversaries. Ignorance and aloofness on the part of Britain and the United States made a difference in both 1945 Romania (Bela Vago) and 1946 Hungary (George Schöpflin), as did the clumsiness and timidity of non-Communist politicians in 1948 Czechoslovakia (Vladimir Kusin). Conversely, at least two countries where the local Communists and their Soviet patrons either failed or did not even try to seize power—Greece (Richard Clogg) and Finland (Anthony Upton)—offer instructive examples both of Western resolve and of tactical skill exercised by the Communists' domestic competitors. Other factors certainly entered the picture, too, but those singled out here lend good support to Gati's thesis about underestimated Western opportunities and overestimated Soviet determination in Eastern Europe.

After the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, estimates of Soviet determination again ran high, particularly against the contemporary perception of a less than determined United States in Vietnam. The Kremlin's surgical strike in Eastern Europe impressed even critics as an effective way to secure stability for many years to come. One can trace an underlying respect for the feat—along with skepticism about the prospects for change—in nearly all the writings reviewed here.

The notable exception is the most recent book of the lot, a selection of Radio Free Europe (RFE) research reports. Drawing on the superb documentation for which the Munich institution is justly famous, the reports edited by Robert King and J.F. Brown exude that special air of authenticity which comes from constant and intimate contact with primary sources. The authors maintain that Eastern Europe reached a watershed in the mid-1970's, as the cumulative effect of two new developments transformed the scene. First, the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) unexpectedly prompted a resurgence of dissent. Second, the repercussions of worldwide economic disturbances at last made their impact, as the skyrocketing costs of raw materials and energy brought the modest prosperity the region enjoyed for a number of years to a halt. In Poland, the two developments merged to trigger cataclysmic price riots which compelled a divided and uncertain leadership to bow before the force of popular will. Elsewhere, too, according to the RFE analysts, the unwillingness—or inability—of aging leaderships to tackle decisively the mounting problems of East European societies presages dislocation rather than stability.

The Radio Free Europe authors appropriately devote a great deal of attention to the inceasingly diversified foreign policies of the East European states—potentially the most consequential of the neglected topics of inquiry. There has been an unmistakable tendency in the region to define and pursue separate national interests, which do not always coincide with Soviet preferences even though they need not necessarily collide with Soviet desires either. Does this trend herald a return to the old perils of "Balkanization"? Or is it a harbinger of a more stable, as well as more pluralistic, international order in the area? At the present stage of research, we are unable to tell.

WHAT NEW DIRECTIONS does Eastern Europe's uncertain future demand from scholarship? Certainly the magnitude and multitude of the problems warrant an apposite effort to confront them. More than a decade ago, Robert C. Tucker called for "methodological pluralism"[4] as the most germane approach to the notoriously heterogeneous East European area. His call has never been more topical. But to answer it, the further proliferation of mere articles, no matter how excellent they may be, will scarcely do. We need more substantive monographs to prepare for eventual syntheses.

The advance in turn presupposes overcoming the narrow professionalism that all too often restricts the impact of valuable work to a readership sufficiently perseverant—or resigned—to tolerate poor writing. One sometimes wonders whether that "gray fraternity of political technicians"[5] now running Eastern Europe may not have found a congenial counterpart in a similarly uninspiring fraternity of scholarly technicians who write about it. Surely there is a message that deserves to be heard beyond the obscurity to which products undistinguished in form are inevitably consigned.

The time has also come for rededication to the study and appreciation of values, without which any attempt at understanding Eastern Europe is flawed. This should not lead to a relapse into the shallow self-righteousness that often marred writing in the heyday of the cold war. But neither can we afford to lose sight of those fundamental differences which, aside from the less fundamental similarities, set the variously dismal Communist systems apart from the Western tradition. As Soviet spokesmen never cease to remind us, détente means no abatement of ideological

4. Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), January 1967, p. 246.
5. Zygmunt Bauman in Janos, p. 84.

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competition. Sober recognition of this fact of life can spare us much disillusionment not only with détente, but also with the impressive accomplishments of a scholarship of unprecedented promise.

Communist Environmentalism

by Theodore Shabad

IVAN VOLGYES, Ed. *Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

FRED SINGLETON, Ed. *Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

WHEN PROBLEMS of environmental protection and resource conservation began to receive wide attention in both East and West in the early 1960's, it was frequently asked which political and economic system was likely to be better equipped to protect the environment. Was it the Western democracies, with their economies built on private enterprise and their democratic institutions of checks and balances? Or was it the Communist countries, with their government-run, centrally planned economies and their pervasive institutions of social control?

Some argued that the Soviet Union and other authoritarian political systems might be expected to be more successful in insuring optimal natural resource management and conservation, assuming, of course, that the ruling group was firmly committed to such a policy. At the same time, it was recognized that the traditional emphasis such systems placed on production, often to the detriment of nonproductive activities, was likely to undermine measures of environmental protection, which were likely to add to costs without bringing early economic benefits. Moreover, the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe appeared to lack a key ingredient that had been instrumental in raising environmental consciousness in the West—namely, the presence of an effective citizens' lobby and a conservation-minded public opinion.

In light of these latter factors, it is not surprising that early Western studies of environmental policy and practice in the Soviet Union suggested that the Soviet approach, despite the seemingly effective machinery of social control, provided "no panaceas for the universally encountered problems relating to natural resource development and conservation."[1] Although the Soviet government showed evidence of commitment and certainly did not lack the means to resolve these problems, its environmental protection efforts appeared to suffer from many of the same inadequacies observed in Western societies.

THE BOOKS reviewed here pick up where the earlier works left off in assessing the environmental problems and approaches of the USSR and, to a lesser extent of Eastern Europe. Both are collections of conference papers, with the volume edited by Ivan Volgyes coming from a congress of the Society of Engineering Science held in Tel Aviv in 1972 and the collection edited by Fred Singleton, from the 1974 international Slavic conference in Banff, Canada. Each compendium enriches our knowledge of environmental issues in the USSR, and—as their titles suggest—both arrive at similarly bleak conclusions about the prospects for the Soviet environment. For example, as Keith Bush concludes in his chapter in the Volgyes volume, "no case has arisen that would unambivalently identify [the Soviet leadership's] true priorities in this respect."

1. Philip R. Pryde, *Conservation in the Soviet Union,* Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 178. See also Marshall I. Goldman, *The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union,* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1972.

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The Bush piece is a particularly useful overview, ranging widely over the many forms of environmental disruption in the USSR, questions of economics and legislation, and public attitudes and media treatment. Other contributions to these collections highlight particular types of environmental misuse in the USSR. For example, Victor Mote's chapters in both of the two books analyze Soviet air pollution by regions, based on the distribution of polluting industries.

Several pieces in the two volumes look at problems connected with water supply and quality in the USSR. The Lake Baikal controversy, discussed by Craig ZumBrunnen in the Volgyes volume, revolved around the discharge of unpurified waste from lakeside pulp mills. It was one of the most publicized environmental issues in the USSR, and—as ZumBrunnen notes—may have been a real turning point in Soviet environmental consciousness in the1960's. As a postcript to the episode, this reviewer would note that one of the controversial woodpulp and paperboard mills, at Selenginsk in the Buryat Autonomous Republic, is still not operating at full capacity, after 20 years of construction, because of the new requirement that waste-treatment facilities must first be properly functioning.[2] Problems in the Black Sea/Sea of Azov basin stemming from runoff of pollutants from Donets Basin industries and depletion of water resources because of upstream irrigation operations are examined by ZumBrunnen in the Singleton collection. This set of problems remains one of the great environmental issues in the Soviet Union today, of continuing concern to planners and scientists alike.[3] A third issue—the falling of the Caspian Sea water level—is dealt with by Philip Micklin in the Volgyes volume. Since Micklin wrote, the water level of the Caspian appears to have stabilized, with Soviet attention shifting in the 1970's to the problem of the Aral Sea, which is becoming depleted by withdrawals for irrigation in Central Asia.[4]

Another group of problems discussed in these volumes relates to the land in the USSR. In the Singleton volume, for example, Philip Pryde looks at the issue of restoring Soviet surface-mined land. While a matter of primary concern in the United States, this problem tends to command Soviet attention only in those settings where surface mining for iron ore (in the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly of Central Russia) and for manganese (in the Dnieper Bend of the Ukraine) infringes on chernozem and other fertile soils in densely populated regions.[5] It continues to be largely ignored in the wide open and sparsely inhabited eastern spaces of the Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk basins of northeast Kazakhstan and southern Siberia, where ambitious lignite strip-mining projects are getting under way. In the Volgyes volume, Ihor Stebelsky addresses a matter of perhaps greater general concern to the Soviet leadership—soil erosion, particularly gullying in the fertile chernozem soils of the European portions of the USSR. Recent Soviet writings, it should be underscored, show continued concern about gullying in these areas and also warn that the problem may spread to Asian regions of the USSR with increased human activity there.[6]

OBVIOUSLY, in both East and West millions of gallons of waste water—processed and unprocessed—continue to flow into rivers, and plumes of industrial emissions still pollute the air, even while there is increased public commitment on both sides of the ideological fence to coping with such problems. The question is whether the last decade has provided any basis for reassessing the relative ability of the Soviet system to deliver on its commitments.

In approaching this issue, one is reminded of the suggestion by American economists Robert J. McIntyre and James R. Thornton

2. The plant was designed to produce 280,000 metric tons of containerboard annually. When it finally went into initial operation in 1975, output was 25,000 tons, and in 1977 output was still only 73,900 tons. On the controversy, see *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Dec. 4, 1974. The production data are from *Narodnoye khozyaystvo RSFSR v 1977 godu* (The National Economy of the RSFSR in 1977), Moscow, Statistika, 1978, p. 69.

3. On this issue, see Victor L. Mote and Craig ZumBrunnen, "Anthropogenic environmental alteration of the Sea of Azov," *Soviet Geography* (Washington, DC), December 1977, pp. 744-59; and A. I. Pecherin, "On the inadvisability of the projected dam across Kerch' Strait," ibid., pp. 760-63.

4. See Ye. N. Mikhayeva and N. T. Kuznetsov, "Changes in the structure of evaporation in the Aral Sea basin," ibid., pp. 769-78.

There appears to be some evidence that changes in the levels of the Caspian and Aral seas are out of phase at least over the short term, with stability in one corresponding to sharp drops in the other, and vice versa. See S. A. Mayeva et al., "On the connection between level fluctuations in the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea," ibid., April 1975, pp. 231-39. See also ibid., December 1978, which is devoted almost entirely to the Aral Sea issue.

5. For an example of Soviet concern, see T. B. Kirillova and V. A. Ovchinnikova, "Predicting the reclamation of land after surface mining in the Central Chernozem region," ibid., June 1975, pp. 381-89.

6. See Ye. F. Zorina et al., "The role of the human factor in the development of gullying in the steppe and the wooded steppe of the European USSR," ibid., January 1977, pp. 49-55; and B. F. Kosov, et al., "The gullying hazard in the Midland region of the USSR in conjunction with economic development," ibid., March 1977, pp. 172-78.

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that a centrally planned mechanism should—other things being equal—be able to generate better information about sources of pollution and hence lead to adoption of better strategies to abate them.[7] To what degree has this hypothesis been borne out by Soviet practice?

In informational terms, the Soviet Union continues to lack an aroused and vocal public opinion. Instead, it is the USSR's controlled press that has kept environmental issues alive. Even a cursory scanning of Soviet periodicals taken at random indicates that both shortcomings and achievements receive considerable official attention.

This literature suggests that the overall record of environmental protection in the Soviet Union remains mixed. Agencies engaged in the planning, designing, and operating of industrial and other facilities often ignore the growing accumulation of directives and legislation dealing with environmental issues. In May 1978, for example, the Environmental Protection Committees of both houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet met jointly to complain about continuing violations by the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification of environmental provisions that had already in 1974 become an integral part of both annual and five-year economic plans. The committees noted that, despite allocation during the current five-year plan (1976–80) of 650 million rubles to the ministry for pollution control devices, its plants continued to draw more than half of all the water used by industry and municipal agencies in the USSR because of excessive use of straight-through cooling systems instead of systems that recycle water in cooling ponds or cooling towers. Moreover, the ministry's fossil-fuel-fired generating plants were said to account for one fourth of all industrial emissions into the atmosphere. Indeed, development and installation of "scrubbers" to remove fly ash from flue gases were held to lag behind the state of the art.[8]

This failure to design and install modern, effective waste-treatment equipment is not an isolated phenomenon. For example, a 6-million-ton oil refinery completed in 1978 at Pavlodar in Kazakhstan to process West Siberian crude oil was reportedly equipped with the latest production technology and equipment, while its water-pollution control devices were based on outdated designs lacking recycling features.[9] Similarly, municipal authorities in Yerevan were taken to task by the Presidium of Armenia's Supreme Soviet for failing to install catalytic mufflers on municipal trucks and taxis.[10]

At the same time, Soviet efforts at pollution control have sometimes taken an unexpected form—the shutting down of operating factories and of construction projects at least partly on the ground that they pose a threat to the environment. One would not have predicted this approach, given Moscow's traditional emphasis on industrial expansion and operation of industrial capacity at maximum levels. Yet, even as early as 1967, there was the isolated case of the closing of an old superphosphate plant within the city of Riga admittedly because of air pollution problems.[11] To be sure, the plant was 75 years old, probably contained outdated equipment, and accounted for only 0.4 percent of national production. Nevertheless, the reference to pollution as a factor in the closing was significant.

More recently, Soviet projects of far greater magnitude have also been either abandoned or relocated at least in part because of environmental considerations. Thus, in 1977, a special joint decree of the Communist Party's Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers canceled the Razdan alumina project in Armenia even though 110 million of a scheduled 180 million rubles had already been spent since the beginning of construction in 1960. Figuring in the decision was the fact that the process of making alumina (an intermediate product in the aluminum refining process) was associated with the making of cement in rotary kilns, which would have been a major pollutant.[12]

In yet another instance, a one-billion-ruble petrochemical complex under construction at Tomsk in Siberia was relocated from a site west of the city to the northern outskirts of the city when geologists announced that operations at the original site would potentially pollute a large supply of potable groundwater discovered there. This relocation, which took place in 1974–75, meant the loss of an entire year of groundbreaking and preparatory construction work.[13]

WHAT SORT of a balance sheet can one draw on this diverse evidence? It is clear from the ac-

7. McIntyre and Thornton, "On the Environmental Efficiency of Economic Systems," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1978, pp. 173–92.

8. *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 13, 1978.

9. *Narodnoye khozyaystvo Kazakhstana* (Alma-Ata), No. 2, 1978, p. 47.

10. *Kommunist* (Yerevan), May 11, 1978.

11. *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), Mar. 22, 1968; and *Soviet Geography*, April 1978, p. 335.

12. Technological problems associated with the use of low-grade nephelite-syenite raw material also played a part in the decision to abandon the project. *Kommunist* (Yerevan), Dec. 22, 1977; *Soviet Geography*, March 1978, pp. 218–19; and Theodore Shabad, "Raw material problems of the Soviet aluminum industry," *Resources Policy* (London), December 1976, p. 226.

13. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), June 20, 1974; *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 24, 1975; and *Izvestiya*, Apr. 29, 1978.

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counts in the reviewed volumes and from a reading of the literature in the USSR that there is a broad Soviet interest in curbing deterioration of the environment. Moreover, the Soviet leadership has published a growing body of environmental directives and legislation. Yet the carry-through on these measures has been spotty.

What really remains in question is the Soviet leadership's ability and will to establish an effective administrative machinery for enforcing the environmental regulations and for giving this machinery the clout to be effective. The decision of the Soviet government in 1978 to upgrade and rename the USSR's principal agency for environmental protection from Main Administration of the Hydrometeorological Service to a full-fledged State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control may be a step in that direction.[14] It is too early to tell whether this instrumentality will be more effective than its predecessor in counteracting in the Soviet context the many pressures that spur producers everywhere to ignore the environmental consequences of their actions.

14. See *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1978.

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Social Policy in Communist States

by Joyce K. Kallgren

VICENTE NAVARRO. *Social Security and Medicine in the USSR: A Marxist Critique.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1977.

WILFRED BURCHETT with REWI ALLEY. *China: The Quality of Life.* London, Penguin Books, 1976.

SHAHID AKHTAR. *Health Care in the People's Republic of China: A Bibliography with Abstracts.* With an introduction by J. Wendell MacLeod. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 1975.

MICHAEL KASER. *Health Care in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

E. RICHARD WEINERMAN with SHIRLEY B. WEINERMAN. *Social Medicine in Eastern Europe: The Organization of Health Services and the Education of Medical Personnel in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1969.

ROBERT J. OSBORN. *Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality and Community.* Homewood, IL, Dorsey Press, 1970.

CHARLES HOFFMANN. *The Chinese Worker.* Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1974.

SOCIAL POLICY in Communist states constitutes one of the most interesting, if also one of the most problematic, areas of research for Western scholars. Inherently broad in scope, social policy includes governmental policies and programs designed to improve the material and psychological conditions—or "quality of life"—of a country's people.

In part, the difficulties associated with research in this area grow out of the origins and extent of the concern in the West, among scholars and citizens alike, about what these countries do. Thus, some observers are motivated by a basic sympathy for the ideology of revolution, together with a hope for the success of revolutionary social goals. Others are driven by hostility toward Communist leaderships and the stability of Communist states. Still others are attracted to the study of one of these states through a preoccupation with that country's history and culture, and are inclined to view what they encounter through a prism that is historically and culturally defined.

In addition, those who to some degree base their evaluations on personal experiences often have different standards and expectations for individual countries. For example, the Soviet Union is an industrialized state which has been involved in nation-building for more than 60 years. Substantial portions of the country's wealth and work force are engaged in the provision of education, health care, urban amenities, and other services that contribute to the overall quality of life there. Western visitors, whether ordinary tourists or scholars, on leaving the Soviet Union frequently will acknowledge Soviet medical, educational, or other achievements, but then will emphasize the decay of Soviet cities, the frustrations of urban life, and the shortages of consumer goods. For these observers, the Soviet Union is an industrialized society whose achievements are to be measured against those of Western Europe and the United States.

The situation in the case of China is almost the reverse. China tends to be viewed as a developing country. Visitors returning from the PRC may remark on shortages of goods or services, certain political restrictions, or the narrow range of career choices facing Chinese youth. But many of the same people will then wax eloquent about the nation's achievements since 1949.

Indeed, as one humorous observer has noted, students of the Soviet Union often appear to hate the Soviet Union; while students of China appear to love China. Although something of an overstatement, this judgment does remind us that studies of these two countries seem especially susceptible to an investigator's prior biases and expectations. And such explicit or

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implicit values do permeate much of the writing on social policy in Communist systems.

At the same time, research on social policy in Communist countries is also complicated by more objective problems connected with the scarcity of basic data. Frequently, a scholar must develop alternative methodological strategies and data sources when preferred strategies and specific data are unavailable. Moreover, he must carefully weigh the potential bias that indirect or incomplete evidence can produce in a scholar's image of a policy area. Finally, it is almost always the case that social research, regardless of the setting, profits from on-site observations and discussions obtainable from field research; unfortunately, scholarly experience in Communist states, as well as access to primary data, continues to be restricted and too often manipulated by authorities in the host countries.

THE SEVEN STUDIES on social policy under review here span a decade of work. They encompass diverse sets of data and analytic methods, and they reflect varying degrees of success in achieving their analytic goals. In terms of our discussion thus far, these books may be arrayed along two dimensions: one measuring the prominence of the author's political values, the other based on the directness and comprehensiveness of the empirical data employed in the analysis.

Three of these volumes contain explicit and rather strong political judgments. Vicente Navarro, for example, offers an analysis of politics and economics in Soviet society that, he then argues, is reflected on a small scale in the development of public health care and social security in the Soviet Union. In essence, he faults the Soviets for excessive centralization and for absence of democracy and decentralized autonomy in the delivery of social services. It is also worthwhile noting that his final appraisal of Soviet social security and health care policies focuses mainly on the class and distributional implications of these programs and demonstrates little interest in program cost or efficiency or standards of clinical care—factors which, nevertheless, may be important for understanding the nature of program developments in the policy areas Navarro examines.

Wilfred Burchett and Rewi Alley, who are writing for an audience that is relatively uninformed about China, deliver what amounts to a hymn of praise. They treat selected aspects of life in China, focusing on those which "measure the changes that have occurred in recent years" (p. 11). In doing so, they reject gross national product as a good criterion for assessing socioeconomic change. Instead, they offer a kind of "best case" analysis by relying on glowing official descriptions of "model units"—i.e., worker or peasant collectives that have especially distinguished themselves in economic or social construction. In essense, Burchett and Alley prefer to appraise "social change" in terms of what individuals or groups in China can *potentially* achieve rather than in terms of the progress made by the average individual or group. From this reviewer's perspective, the authors would not have detracted from the considerable Chinese achievements had they addressed the problems of that society in a more balanced fashion.

In his introduction to the bibliography compiled by Shahid Akhtar, J. Wendell MacLeod initially pleads for a suspension of cultural bias on the part of his readers, but this plea is subsequently submerged by a simple and undocumented assertion that China's performance in the health sector is much more positive than most other appraisals suggest. MacLeod also argues, without evidence, that health care policy in China has served redistributive ends through a spread of financial responsibility. The remaining pages of this work are devoted to annotated items on Chinese policies which the compiler views as "possibly transferable" to other socioeconomic settings.

In contrast, the books by Michael Kaser and E. Richard Weinerman appear largely free of underlying political or normative predispositions. The former is basically a survey of medical care in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while the latter looks at medical care in three selected East European states. To be sure, both authors make explicit assumptions about the proper way to measure health care performance; and both include some discussion of comparative health care policy, considering alternative paths in health care development which are open to different countries. Still, each work is content to assess the competence of medical personnel or the comprehensiveness of a country's health care system in its own terms and refrains from offering more general judgments on the nature of a country's whole social policy or the distribution of public resources on the basis of analysis of the health care sector alone.

The studies by Robert J. Osborn and Charles Hoffmann probably ought to be located somewhere in the middle of our dimension measuring the prominence of an author's political values. While both Osborn and Hoffmann deal with broader topics than Kaser and Weinerman treat, they try to establish some normative "distance"

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from their subjects. Each attempts to present the assumptions and perspectives of a particular national leadership in a given area of social policy, then looks at the elements of the specific policy in terms of domestic political goals, and finally offers an appraisal from the standpoint of an outside observer. Moreover, the depth of the data base and the rigor and care of the analysis in their books are much greater than one finds in the Navarro, Burchett and Alley, or Akhtar and MacLeod volumes. In the course of his work, for example, Osborn does draw comparisons between the provision of health care, pensions, and related services in the Soviet Union and in other industrialized states, but he takes into account problems associated with inclusion of the "social wage"—namely, "forms of income which Soviet citizens receive in addition to money earning . . . the benefits which make no claim on their [i.e., citizens'] income" (p. 31). He likewise endeavors to consider the degree of choice that the Soviet citizen enjoys with respect to public services. In his study of Chinese worker welfare, Hoffmann, too, seeks to factor the provision of public services into his assessments; however, he deals only peripherally with the social cost (i.e., value) of such services.

DIFFERENCES IN the depth and quality of the empirical foundations of the works reviewed seem more a function of which country's social policies are being studied. Thus, all four books on the Soviet Union or East European countries tend to be sounder methodologically and better grounded empirically than the three works on China. Of the latter, the study by Burchett and Alley and Akhtar's bibliography reflect the relative sparseness of Chinese data very clearly. Hoffmann, in contrast, displays resourcefulness and imagination in his use of indirect and piecemeal data in an effort to construct a more systematic picture of worker welfare.

From the late 1920's until the early 1950's, Soviet leaders were reluctant to allow publication or public discussion of social research. At the beginning of the 1950's, however, internal pressures growing out of problems ranging from health planning and capital construction to worker motivation prompted increased interest by Soviet politicans in the social research of Soviet scholars. To facilitate an expansion of academic involvement in such policy questions, political support was brought to bear for the collection of basic bata and then for their publication and discussion in Soviet journals. Consequently, there now exists a substantial body of statistical data on various aspects of the "quality of life" in the Soviet Union. These data can be found in United Nations reports, the publications of regional organizations (e.g., the Standing Commission on Health of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—see Kaser, p. 3), and in indigenous statistical sources, including encyclopedias, statistical handbooks, and scholarly journals. Official data constitute the empirical foundation of the studies by Kaser, Weinerman, Navarro, and Osborn.

Of course, gaps exist in the data. While there is information on the number of physicians, paramedical personnel, feldshers, and nurses for the 1960's and 1970's, "there is still no systematic comprehensive series on mortality or morbidity [except for] scattered statistics which begin to be apparent at the start of the seventies" (Kaser, p. 48). Most of the available data are of a sort which makes comparisons with non-Soviet materials difficult. In commenting on the theory of the convergence of Soviet and Western societies, for example, Osborn notes that assessing its validity is well nigh impossible in light of the dissimilarites in data at hand. Still, Kaser organizes his book so as to take account of West European health care experience, and Weinerman had hoped eventually to carry his work further with the express purpose of making comparative observations.

It should be added that not only published data, but also the results of Soviet scholarship can be an important source for Western researchers. Navarro, for example, makes good use of Soviet scholarship as represented in a paper that M.D. Piradova presented on the subject of "The Role of Women in the Public Health Care System in the USSR" at an International Conference of Women in Health, held in Washington, DC, at the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in June 1975.

In the case of China, data are still exceedingly sparse. Those macro-level data which do exist on the Chinese economy and society generally end with the year 1958.[1] It is not clear whether the lack of published data after 1958 reflects a conscious policy not to collect such data or simply a decision not to publish it. But one might reasonably argue that more data are available for the years before 1949 than for those after 1958.

In the 1970's, when Western scholars tried to develop measures for assessing post-1949 Chinese developments, they found themselves limited to information in local radio broadcasts and to

1. For the political conflicts and choices which resulted in the destruction of the State Statistical Bureau in 1958, see Li Choh-ming, *The Statistical System of Communist China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1962.

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local-level data made available to Western vistors in the course of routine briefings. The book by Burchett and Alley, which aims to illustrate social change and which is strongly supportive of Chinese social and welfare policies, contains virtually no national data at all. Hoffmann's study of various aspects of the Chinese worker's standard of living, including medical care, labor protection, and social security, lacks post–1958 statistical support. Akhtar's bibliography likewise reflects the sparseness of Chinese data. In this work, supposedly designed to provide information for authorities in other developing countries possibly interested in the adoption of Chinese health care programs, the compiler evidently included literally everything he discovered, including some items which are difficult to justify either from a scholarly or programmatic perspective.[2] Moreover, the selection of items seems to have been notably unaffected by considerations of either relative cost or likely program effectiveness, surely factors of prime concern to potential program adopters.

Because of the lack of data, or limitations on those available, most of the authors employ other research strategies. Perhaps the most traditional is that relied on by Burchett and Alley. They frequently cite certain well-documented observations about life in China before 1949 and then compare these with achievement in selected contemporary "model units." For information on the latter, Burchett and Alley turn to interviews with selected Chinese citizens. Some of these interviews are exceedingly interesting and useful—for example, that with Doctor George Hatem, a principal architect of Chinese efforts to eradicate venereal disease and the use of opium. Other interviews, however, with individual commune members or factory workers, tend to follow a standard format with which most previous Westerners who have recently visited China are probably familiar. These, of course, are much less informative and useful.

Although unsystematically drawn examples, especially historical ones, can be a worthwhile means of illustrating a problem, they do not substitute for systematically adduced evidence unless an exceptionally large number of them, all of which point in the same direction and confirm judgments derived from other sources, can be assembled. In the volume by Burchett and Alley, however, achievements of Dajing, the Harbin Straw factory, and the Beijing automobile factory are described in language virtually identical to that reported to this author on her various trips to China. This kind of stylized response is notoriously unreliable because it fluctuates with the changing winds of political fortune.

A different strategy, largely successful, is employed by Charles Hoffmann. He estimates price schedules for certain goods, using scattered local data that were collected by Western visitors and made available through circulated "trip reports."[3] He then compares these prices with published salary scales and in this way is able to come up with a crude picture of the likely living standard of several classes of Chinese workers—admittedly, only a small portion of the total Chinese population. There are flaws in this approach, which Hoffmann himself undoubtedly would concede. For example, the author takes no account of the allocation of ration permits, which certainly alters to some degree the distributional consequences of money wages alone. Still, Hoffmann's "method" does provide at least suggestive indicators of the level of and, over time, the degree of change in a Chinese worker's material "quality of life."

As much as possible, the authors of the works reviewed here use observations drawn from visits to the countries in question in order to bolster their arguments. Kaser, Osborn, and Weinerman, for example, spent varying periods in the Soviet Union and/or Eastern Europe. Weinerman's book is based largely on a three-month trip in 1967, during which the author received generous cooperation from national public health officers, local doctors, etc. Osborn's volume makes use of impressions he gained during an extended stay in the Soviet Union in 1963–64. It also benefits from knowledge that he developed through professional ties with Soviet specialists and other sources, as the result of repeated trips to the Soviet Union. Kaser, too, reports evidence gathered on numerous visits to the Soviet Union

2. A substantial number of bibliographic items are drawn from *China Reconstructs*, a glossy, general-audience magazine published by Beijing. Of these, "US Imperialist Cultural Aggression Disguised as Friendship" (November 1968, pp. 44–48), for example, is of limited value. While the piece may serve appropriate Chinese political goals, it is difficult to see its usefulness or transferability to other societies seeking new medical models.

3. For American scholars, access to China has been made available mainly under the auspices of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC). This body is attached to the National Academy of Sciences but is also expected to represent the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. Until recently, most of the scholarly exchanges arranged by the CSCPRC have been limited to month-long trips by groups studying mutually agreed-upon topics. Summaries of these visits—or "trip reports"—have usually been put together, published, and distributed to the American academic community by the CSCPRC. Copies have been forwarded to the Chinese authorities as well.

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and Eastern Europe. This kind of travel allows the scholar to subject to multiple tests impressions gained on any single occasion. Such a "methodology" is particularly important for assessing the quality of care which is dependent on a physician's (or other worker's) personal performance, and for discerning change over time in a country's medical care.

There has been similar, although much more limited, field research in the case of China. Thus, Hoffmann uses observations made on his own trip to China in 1974 and makes systematic use of an earlier study by Barry Richman which was based on extensive travel throughout China.[4] The Akhtar bibliography incorporates data from a few trip reports compiled by Western visitors, although not nearly as many data as might have been used. In fact, most of the reports currently available probably appeared after the bibliography was published in 1975. These on-site accounts are important for providing some indication of the range of medical services available; the extent of modern technology employed by the physician, both in major urban centers and in rural clinics; the level of professional medical training; and numerous related matters.

All seven volumes stand out for their absence of one kind of data used frequently in research on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China: interviews with émigrés and refugees. In this sense, the volumes may even be "atypical," since much of what we know about the "quality of life" in these countries has been based on reports by émigrés. This is certainly true in the case of China, in view of the numerous refugee interview projects conducted by China scholars in Hong Kong.

Overall, the basic approach in each of the volumes is to combine as many different strategies as possible in the investigation of a given topic. When basic statistical data are available, they frequently constitute the core of the analysis. Statistical evidence may be supplemented with evidence adduced by native scholarship and then checked against impressions gathered during on-site visits by Western scholars, physicians, or other specialists. Direct field research and on-site interviews clearly are the most useful, as well as the most difficult to arrange. The advantages which Weinerman derived from his trip are immediately obvious to even the lay reader. In contrast, a reliance on the description of exemplar collectives or unusual successes, while perhaps making for more colorful narrative, often suffers from a lack of credibility because of the sparseness and bias of the data.

WHAT, then, can one say about the prospects for the future regarding Western study of social policy in Communist countries? Here it seems necessary to differentiate between the countries. Already, in 1979, considerable progress has been made in research on the social policies of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe. To be sure, the situation in Eastern Europe makes research of all kinds much easier to arrange and more likely of success. Weinerman's work clearly supports such a judgment. As for the Soviet Union, it must be remembered that after the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, it was a long time before Soviet political authorities were willing to permit either the publication in the USSR of social policy data or on-site travel and study by outsiders even in policy areas where substantial achievements had been made. While Western scholars are now working in the area of social policy, their numbers still are small. Work is possible but is vulnerable to the arbitrariness of Soviet authorities. Patience and resourcefulness in research strategy are required of the scholar. Still, the books by Navarro and Kaser suggest the considerable bodies of data and the opportunities for research in selected areas of social policy that exist but remain unexploited.

With respect to China, the picture is hazier. Some national data are now becoming available, although this development may be related to the current "four modernizations" campaigns rather than a result of any governmental decision to increase the amount of information available to Chinese scholars (and hence to outside observers).[5] The decision to encourage the revival of professional and mass organizations, together with the growing emphasis on empirical research, may lead to a more open scholarly communication process both within the country and with scholars abroad. Though the study of social policy and social outcomes may not be of central concern for Chinese political authorities, this research may nevertheless profit from programs directed at other goals.

However, further progress in studies of the "quality of life" in China will require both additional statistical data, particularly at the national level, and expanded op-

4. See Barry Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China*, New York, NY, Random House, 1969.

5. A reading of *Beijing Review* (before January 1979, *Peking Review*) since 1978 shows a growing openness in the use of data. See especially its reports in March 1978 not only on modernization plans and difficulties but also on the discussions at science and education conferences.

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portunities for field research. The establishment of new social science research units may foreshadow a slow expansion of the pool of information on social policy.[6] Yet, until a greater degree of on-site access and study is available to specialists, research on the Chinese "quality of life" will remain limited in value, if tantalizing nevertheless.

6. These come under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. From information gleaned during the May 1979 visit to the United States of a delegation from the Academy of Social Sciences, it would appear that the development of the academy and its constituent institutes will definitely be a slow process.

European Perspectives on Eurocommunism

by Angela Stent Yergin

ERNEST MANDEL. *Critique de l'eurocommunisme* (Critique of Eurocommunism). Paris, Maspero, 1978. English-language edition, *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism*, New York, NY, NLB/Schocken, 1978.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD. *Eurokommunismus: Herausforderung für Ost und West* (Eurocommunism: Challenge to East and West). München, C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1978.

JORGE SEMPRUN. *Autobiographie de Federico Sanchez* (Autobiography of Federico Sanchez). Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1978.

FERNANDO CLAUDIN. *L'Eurocommunisme* (Eurocommunism). Paris, Maspero, 1977. English-language edition, *Eurocommunism and Socialism*, New York, NY, NLB/Schocken, 1978.

HERMANN VOGT. *Eurokommunismus—Ein Reader* (Eurocommunism—A Reader). West Berlin, Berlin Verlag, 1978.

HEINZ TIMMERMANN, Ed. *Eurokommunismus—Fakten, Analysen, Interview* (Eurocommunism—Facts, Analyses, Interviews). Frankfurt/Main, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1978.

ADOLF KIMMEL, Ed. *Eurokommunismus* (Eurocommunism). Köln, Böhlau Verlag GMbH, 1977.

C. M. HUTTER. *Eurokommunisten—Lenins treue Jünger* (Eurocommunists—Lenin's True Children). Krefeld, Sinus Verlag, 1978.

ALFONS DALMA et al., Eds. *Eurokommunismus—Italien, Frankreich, Jugoslawien, Portugal* (Eurocommunism—Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Portugal). Zurich, Edition Interfrom AG, 1977.

FRANÇOIS FONVIEILLE-ALQUIER. *L'Eurocommunisme* (Eurocommunism). Paris, Fayard, 1977.

MANFRED STEINKÜHLER, Ed. *Eurokommunismus im Widerspruch* (Eurocommunism in Conflict). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1977.

IN REVIEWING these varied and often contradictory books on Eurocommunism, this writer is reminded of Gertrude Stein's last utterance. When somebody asked, "What is the answer?," she sighed, answered "What is the question?," and expired. None of the authors here can agree on a common definition of the question.

Like the Eurocommunist movement itself, the study of Eurocommunism is in considerable disar-

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ray, with no consensus existing on the appropriate criteria for evaluating the parties. Observers in North America remain preoccupied with the effect of Eurocommunism on the Western alliance.[1] In Western Europe, however, Eurocommunism is more of an immediate domestic matter, and the American and international dimensions tend to be viewed as incidental. The authors of the books under review—ranging from Trotskyite Ernest Mandel and ex-Communists Wolfgang Leonhard, Jorge Semprun, and Fernando Claudin, to scholars Hermann Vogt, Heinz Timmermann, and Adolf Kimmel, and finally to journalists C. M. Hutter and Alfons Dalma—share a common European concern about the impact of communism on their societies. At the same time, they disagree fundamentally on how to assess this impact.[2]

As a group, the volumes under consideration here are valuable in particular because they afford insight into the West European dimension of the Eurocommunist question. That is, they deal with European perspectives on key political issues that do not loom especially large in the thinking of the United States. To be sure, the Eurocommunist specter does not seem to pose the immediate challenge today that it did when these books were written. The French Left failed to gain a legislative majority in the March 1978 national elections, and at the May 1979 congress of the French Communist Party (PCF), Secretary-General Georges Marchais ended the party's seven-year partnership with the French Socialists, further reducing the Communists' chances for future electoral success. Support for the Italian Communist Party (PCI) declined in the May 1978 local elections; and in the June 1979 national elections, the party, for the first time since 1948, lost backing in general elections, as its share of the vote fell by 4 percent. This was the biggest drop for any Italian party in over 30 years. Although these developments have greatly diminished the chances of Communist participation in Western governments in the near term, the Italian Communists remain the second most popular party in Italy, without whose cooperation no Italian administration will survive for very long.[3] Thus, Eurocommunism is stalemated at the moment, but the issues that the volumes raise about the role of Communist parties in Western Europe have by no means lost their relevance.

DESPITE the lack of consensus on a common framework of analysis, these books share three main areas of interest and contention: the domestic role of Eurocommunist parties, their foreign policies (especially their relationship to the USSR), and the relationship between Eurocommunist theory and practice. Turning to the first of these, one is struck, initially, by a certain irony in the concept of Eurocommunism. A basic tenet of this concept is the validity of different *national* roads to communism, yet the characterization of parties whose philosophies and policies differ considerably as a homogeneous group often tends to obscure these national peculiarities. Symptomatic of the ambiguities of the concept, the authors of the volumes under review cannot agree on which parties are Eurocommunist. In contrast to many of the authors, Dalma et al. treat the Yugoslav League of Communists as a Eurocommunist party, and both they and Kimmel include the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) in the Eurocommunist group. Moreover, as Leonhard and Claudin point out, the Japanese and Australian parties, although both are closer to the French, Italian, and Spanish parties than are either the Portuguese or West German Communists, can hardly be termed "Euro"-communist.[4] By discussing the various parties separately, most of the authors at least implicitly suggest that there is no such thing as Eurocommunism. Curiously, Mandel on the left and Hutter on the right are the least inclined to distinguish among Eurocommunist parties, instead criticizing their common faults.

Although none of the authors can agree on exactly which parties are Eurocommunist and a number of them are aware of the pitfalls of using the shorthand concept of Eurocommunism, there is general agreement that three main Eurocommunist parties exist: the PCI, the PCF, and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). Broadly speaking, these parties appear to share three defining characteris-

1. For analysis of this effect from a fairly critical perspective, see James Dougherty and Diane Pfaltzgraff, *Eurocommunism and the Atlantic Alliance*, Cambridge, MA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977.

2. For a succinct survey of the main issues and debates, see Neil McInnes, *Euro-Communism* (Washington Papers, No. 37), Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1976.

3. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) received 26.5 percent of the vote in the May 1978 local elections, as opposed to 34 percent in the 1976 general elections. However, the May 1978 elections were greatly influenced by the assassination of the Christian Democrat leader, Aldo Moro. In the June 1979 national elections, the PCI garnered 30.4 percent of the vote. It is also worth noting that in the March 1979 municipal elections in Spain, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) received 13 percent of the vote.

4. For a comprehensive description of the West European Communist parties, see US Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *West European Communist Parties*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977.

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tics: a declaration of independence from Moscow, implying the right to question the infallibility of the Kremlin and to formulate policy autonomously; the rejection of the universal validity of the Soviet model of socialist development and of the legitimacy of the Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary stage in the building of socialism; and a declaratory commitment to coming to power legally and nonviolently and, once in power, to respecting parliamentary institutions and pluralist political systems.

As the more historically-minded authors, particularly those who are (or were once) Marxists, stress, one cannot understand the Eurocommunism of the 1970's without taking into account the origins and development of the Comintern and the profound way in which the fissures in the international Communist movement and the resistance to fascism have shaped the three chief parties. Claudin, who was formerly a leading PCE theoretician and a member of the party's Central Committee but was expelled from the party in 1964 for his dissenting opinions, claims that "organizational and ideological monolithism has always concealed latent conflicts and forced them underground" (p. 30). Leonhard, who was a graduate of the Comintern School in Moscow and a leading member of Walter Ulbricht's first government in East Germany before his defection to Yugoslavia in 1949 and subsequent move to West Germany and who now teaches one semester a year at Yale University, dates the latent schism in the Communist movement to the early years of Yosif Stalin's rule. Mandel, the Trotskyite, considers that "the doctrine of Eurocommunism is a doctrine of demobilization and defeat of the European proletariat on the eve of the great prerevolutionary explosions that are now looming" (p. 81). He likens this doctrine to Karl Kautsky's 1910 theory of revisionism and traces the origins of Eurocommunism to the breakdown of the Second International in 1914 and to the birth of "socialism in one country" under Stalin in the mid-1920's.

Although Claudin, Mandel, and Leonhard take diverse ideological positions on the merits of Eurocommunism, they are convinced of its deep historical roots. The more academic books reviewed here neglect this continuity with the past. Perhaps only those who themselves were participants in the Comintern or other international Marxist movements are aware of the former's powerful impact in shaping today's Eurocommunist parties. The three writers were once magnetized by the dynamism of these movements and are keenly conscious of Moscow's relationship to fraternal parties.

The most vivid description of life in an underground Communist party controlled both by Moscow and by autocratic, narrow-minded, national functionaries is provided in Semprun's autobiography, written in the form of a novel with flashbacks. Semprun, screenwriter for "Z" and "The Confession," was expelled from the PCE (along with Claudin) after having survived Buchenwald and having helped organize the Spanish party in its illegal underground days. His experiences have left him bitter toward PCE Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo and former PCE Chairman Dolores Ibárruri, "La Pasionaria," who excommunicated him for his heresies. Because he was a Eurocommunist before his time, his powerful book has evoked considerable controversy within the PCE. On the one hand, his graphic narrative explains why Moscow was for so long Rome for its faithful followers and why Semprun himself remained a believer. After the period of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939–41 (a period which the PCI, PCE, and PCF conveniently tend to forget today), West European Communists viewed the USSR as the leader of the anti-fascist struggle, and it thus commanded the loyalties of all those opposing Francisco Franco in Spain. On the other hand, Semprun casts doubts on the degree to which Carrillo has now distanced himself from Moscow by showing with what ease he complied with the worst excesses of Stalinism. (One can question Semprun's implication, however. Just because it took Carrillo some time to change his outlook, it does not necessarily follow that the alterations in his views are not real. Indeed, many of today's leading Eurocommunists were once loyal followers of the Soviet Union.)

Semprun's book, it should be noted, raises a question with which none of the books adequately deals. Both the Spanish and Portuguese parties shared the experience of being forced underground and fighting fascism until the mid-1970's, while the French and Italian parties have been legal in the postwar era. Spain and Portugal have more in common culturally than do Italy and France. In view of these cultural and historical similarities, why did the PCE develop so differently from the PCP?

While events in both the world Communist movement and the international environment in Europe have affected the evolution of the Eurocommunist parties, they have not, however, been the sole determinants of that evolution. The three main Eurocommunist parties have always interacted dialectically with their domestic environments. On the one hand, they have influ-

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enced the history of the societies in which they have existed; on the other hand, they have been molded by the political cultures of the countries in which they have developed.

The role of political culture in shaping the evolution of the Eurocommunist parties becomes particularly important when one examines the relationship of the base to the leadership. One of the important questions about Eurocommunism is how far the more independent ideas articulated by the parties' leaders reflect the convictions of the Communist electorate. The evidence is mixed. In the case of the PCI, which has a more heterogeneous base than does the PCF, there has been conflict between more traditional-minded working-class supporters and leaders trying to adopt a more flexible position. Nevertheless, the PCI announced at its 1979 congress that a commitment to Marxism-Leninism is optional for members. The PCF has experienced somewhat similar problems, although the tensions are not as great, possibly because its departure from traditional Leninist precepts has not been as pronounced as the PCI's.

Despite such internal contradictions, however, these two parties retain their traditional Leninist organizational structures. This situation raises serious questions about the relationship between form and content and the degree to which the parties are committed to a pluralist and democratic polity—whatever their ideological differences with Moscow. Even the PCE, according to its party statutes, remains structurally modeled on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. In addressing this issue, Hutter, after painstakingly examining the statutes of the parties, concludes that they remain wholly Leninist. Dalma also claims that Antonio Gramsci's theoretical writings (which the PCI asserts are more flexible than Leninism) stress hegemony rather than pluralism. On the other hand, Timmermann (in Kimmel) argues that it is precisely Gramsci's ideological legacy which enables the PCI to take a line which treats the question of communism vs. capitalism in less sharply dichotomous terms than does traditional Marxism-Leninism.

It should be underscored, though, that a final verdict on this matter is still premature. The PCI and the PCE, for example, continue to debate whether to renounce democratic centralism in favor of freer organizational structures. What one can say is that the parties' willingness to eschew Leninist organization will surely remain a key criterion for judging the Eurocommunist commitment to pluralism.

Even if the Eurocommunist parties retain a Leninist form, of course, they have still evolved some distance from Lenin in the content of their policies. The more they change, however, the more they confront difficult and contradictory choices. In their attempt to broaden their electoral base, they inevitably lose their revolutionary image and forfeit a certain type of dynamism. To Mandel, the Eurocommunists have "sold out" to the bourgeoisie and are objectively enabling a decaying capitalism to survive, but more academic analyses point out the dilemma facing the parties. To gain power in their local contexts, the parties need to register electoral successes, yet those very electoral successes tend to bring about alienation of the parties' core traditional supporters, who feel uneasy about the "embourgeoisement" of the parties' leaderships. Sidney Tarrow, Georges Lavau, and Heinz Timmermann, writing (in Kimmel) about the PCI and the PCF, highlight this contradiction between the political and social strategies of the parties. The paradox of electoral success is that it often comes at the expense of the parties' social and cultural goals. It should be emphasized, however, that until the parties actually come to power, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which the achievement of electoral triumphs will require them to compromise with the system in which they operate.

DOUBTS about the degree to which the structure of the Eurocommunist parties has become more democratic are part of a larger question about the relationship between Moscow and the Eurocommunists. All the authors agree that the crucial litmus test for judging how far the parties have gone toward shedding their previous Stalinist garb is the amount of independence from the Kremlin they display, but the assessments of the degree of independence differ, with the Marxists and former Communists in particular strongly parting company with each other.

There is a consensus that the disagreements between Moscow and the Eurocommunists are genuine and not a carefully staged electoral tactic; nevertheless, most authors are skeptical about how far the parties are willing to carry their criticism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).[5] Mandel is the most severe critic of the Eurocommunists for failing to distance themselves from Moscow. Al-

5. This view is supported by Leonard Schapiro, in *The Soviet Union and "Eurocommunism"* (Conflict Studies, No. 99), London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1978. He even points out the advantages of Eurocommunism for the Kremlin.

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though he gives Jean Elleinstein and Santiago Carrillo credit for condemning the USSR, he claims that their attacks are too subjectivist and too partial. As a result, he contends, the Kremlin, despite its virulent attacks on Carrillo, is not particularly perturbed by these polemics. Claudin emphasizes that the Eurocommunist parties have yet to cut the umbilical cord tying them to Mother Russia. Hutter asks how the Eurocommunist criticisms of the USSR can be credible if the parties consistently proclaim their loyalty to Moscow. The May 1979 congress of the PCF would seem to support the skepticism. PCF leader Marchais said that his party had reached the conclusion that life and society in the Soviet bloc are "overall positive."[6] Leonhard, on the other hand, is more optimistic about the possiblity of a future break between the Eurocommunists and the Kremlin.

The real problem with the Eurocommunist position vis-à-vis the USSR has to do with the relationship between the whole and its parts. To differing degrees (the PCE, for instance, far more than the PCF), the Eurocommunists have criticized specific *aspects* of Soviet society, yet none of the parties has thus far been willing to take the next logical step and question what kind of *system* produces these violations of socialism, both domestically and in Eastern Europe.[7] As François Fonvieille-Alquier observes, Eurocommunists excel in applying trenchant Marxist critiques to capitalist society; however, their talent for dialectical analysis evaporates when faced with East European socialist societies. Claudin, who believes that the only viable path of development for Europe is democratic socialism (as opposed to revisionist social democracy), says that the Eurocommunist parties will only become credibly democratic when they admit that the USSR and Eastern Europe are not socialist societies. Certainly, what the Eurocommunists say and do about Eastern Europe will be an important indicator of their policies in the years ahead.

Not only do the PCI, PCF, and PCE, all the authors agree, merely question the symptoms rather than the causes of the Soviet system, but the parties—whether consciously or unconsciously—also continue to serve the ends of Soviet foreign policy. To be sure, Sergio Segre, PCI foreign policy spokesman, argues (in Timmermann's book) that to expect the PCI to break completely with Moscow is to ask it to go further than have Western capitalist states, which maintain diplomatic relations with the USSR. "One cannot expect Berlinguer to be more anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese than Nixon and Kissinger," he writes (p. 185). That, however, is not the point. The US government maintains pragmatic state-to-state relations with Moscow which in no way imply an endorsement of the Soviet system or of Soviet ideology. The Eurocommunist parties, on the other hand, as non-governmental organizations, are not obliged by diplomatic conventions to maintain as close ideological ties with the Kremlin as they currently do.

Furthermore, although the Eurocommunists have to some degree encouraged East European dissenters to speak out, these efforts to promote greater liberalization and ideological diversity in Eastern Europe have been tempered by an awareness of the possibility of Soviet countermeasures in the name of "proletarian internationalism" to prevent greater polycentrism. It is true, as Mandel, Leonhard, and Vogt demonstrate, that Eurocommunism has found echoes in Eastern Europe in the works of dissidents such as Rudolf Bahro, Robert Havemann, Milovan Djilas, and Edward Lipinski. Thus, Henry Kissinger (in Vogt) overstates the case when he claims that only in Western Europe do people still have illusions about the ability of communism to become more humane, for there are indeed Marxist East European dissenters. But the influence of the West European Communist parties on the parties in Eastern Europe exists more in the realm of ideology than pragmatic policy. In fact, the Marxist dissenters in Eastern Europe generally feel that the Western Eurocommunists have been too wary of Moscow to give them significant support.

The Eurocommunists' perception of the delicacy of the East European situation is part of their understanding of the implications of détente, as defined by the two superpowers. Most of the books under consideration contend that the US and USSR share essentially the same view of détente in Europe—they want to perpetuate the bipolar system where one half of Europe is Communist and the other half capitalist, with no shades of grey. Both, the argument goes, fear the destabilizing effects of a more autonomous Europe seeking an independent "third way" between the two blocs. In contrast to the superpowers, the Eurocommunists in their official statements endorse an independent Europe after the "dissolution of the blocs," and this position represents a pos-

6. *The Washington Post*, May 10, 1979.

7. For instance, in a conversation with the author (Rome, July 1978), Giancarlo Pajetta, a leading PCI politician, criticized the administration of justice in the Soviet Union and the trial of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, but he said that it was possible Shcharanskiy was a spy and also contended that an aberration in the administration of justice had led to this and similar trials.

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sible challenge to the superpowers. At the same time, the Eurocommunist parties recognize that they have benefited from détente. Détente has enabled them to gain popularity domestically, because it has led to a diminished sense of threat of international confrontation with the USSR among the populaces of the West European countries. For this reason, the Eurocommunists feel inhibited about pressing their notion of a European "third way" too strongly. Such inhibitions, of course, may in turn make it difficult for the parties to change the current European status quo.

In view of the Eurocommunist commitment to a European "third way," moreover, the Eurocommunist parties still manifest a high degree of distrust of the United States. Anti-Americanism remains an important component of the ideology of the mass of West European Communist voters, although the elite may be more sophisticated.[8] Yet even Claudin sees as sinister the designs of Trilateralism and is convinced that Washington can still control who takes power in Western Europe. Thus, as Leonhard and a number of the other authors maintain, Eurocommunism presents a challenge to the United States as well to the USSR. Although none of the authors defines this challenge precisely, they all infer a parallel between US and Soviet responses to Eurocommunism. The USSR, they imply, fears the impact of Eurocommunism on Eastern Europe but appreciates its utility as an irritant in Western Europe, while the United States fears its impact on the West but is aware of its potentially disruptive influence on Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

It is over the question of Western Europe that the Eurocommunists have distanced themselves most from Moscow. The PCI and PCE have come out firmly in support of European integration. However, the PCF remains a "candidate" Eurocommunist party in its reluctant acceptance of the European Community—as well as in a number of other respects. The campaigns for the direct elections to the European parliament in June 1979 highlighted the differences between the PCI and PCF positions on the Community. It should be noted, though, that the PCI's theoretical commitment to European internationalism sometimes gives way to protectionist, nationalist economic policies. There is less clear differentiation between the PCI and PCF on the NATO question. While the PCF remains Gaullist on the issue, the PCI is more equivocal about what position Italy would adopt on NATO were the party to come to power. This lack of a sharply defined foreign policy is to some extent a result of the fact that the PCI has never been faced with the task of formulating foreign policy. Until now, domestic questions have preoccupied it, and this factor may help explain why it has more or less endorsed the Soviet line on most international issues. With the PCI's progress toward participation in government in recent years, however, the party has founded the Study Center for International Policy (CESPI) to work on foreign policy issues.[9]

The evolution of the Eurocommunists' position on European issues is closely tied to their perceptions of European social democracy—a subject which preoccupies many of the authors here. Berlinguer has endorsed the "historic compromise" for the whole of Europe, accepting some form of cooperation with both social democrats and conservatives in the European Parliament.[10] Although the Eurocommunists explicitly differentiate themselves from social democrats, some observers have legitimately questioned the differences between the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the PCI on certain issues. Mandel and Claudin, for instance, consider that all the parties, in particular the PCI, have moved "dangerously" close to social democracy. The social democrats, or at least those of the "northern" persuasion, disagree. Horst Ehmke, vice-chairman of the parliamentary group of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and SPD Chairman Willy Brandt (in the introduction to Timmermann's book and in Vogt respectively) concede that the Eurocommunists have evolved away from the Soviet model, but retain serious reservations about them.[11] On specific issues, such as nationalization and austerity policies, the PCI has taken positions to the right of the Socialists. However, both the structure and ideology of the Eurocommunist parties differentiate them from social democrats, irrespective of specific policy positions.

8. Interviews at PCI headquarters in July 1978 revealed a great deal of interest in the US on the part of the PCI leadership, a more *differentiated attitude toward American* imperialism, and a desire to experience the US firsthand. Indeed, a number of leading PCI officials were taking English lessons, while *little Russian was in evidence.*

9. The Institute is particularly concerned to *increase PCI understanding of strategic* questions, and a non-Communist specialist on nuclear strategy has been hired for this purpose.

10. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), May 31, 1978.

11. For an analysis of the relationship between social democracy and *Eurocommunism, see Angela Stent Yergin,* "West Germany's *Südpolitik:* the Social Democrats and Eurocommunism," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1979, pp. 51–71.

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ONE OF THE MORE intractable questions about Eurocommunism concerns what the Marxists call "praxis," or the relationship of theory to practice. An opponent of Eurocommunism like Hutter bases his case on a detailed analysis of the statutes of various parties. Since the statutes embody all the essentials of an authoritarian Leninist party structure, he argues, the amorphous Eurocommunist commitment to pluralism has no genuine or credible organizational basis. Hutter ignores what the parties do or the national environments in which they function, which undoubtedly act as a restraint on them. Manfred Steinkühler's approach, although less judgmental, is to publish an exhaustive collection of Eurocommunist documents with little editorializing, anticipating that the documents will speak for themselves. This approach assumes that an examination of Eurocommunist documents is an adequate methodological tool of analysis.

There is another approach, though. Lavau (in Kimmel) says that "one should try to evaluate the PCF on the basis of its practice rather than its program" (p. 62). If one looks at the PCF's and the PCI's actions in, for example, the municipalities which they control, the parties appear to be far less revolutionary than their official ideology would suggest.

However, the role of the Eurocommunist parties in local government is not necessarily a reliable indicator of how they might behave if in power at the national level. The relationship between local and national actions is an area with which none of the authors deals adequately. Postwar European experience has shown that when left- (or right-) wing parties come to power, they tend to move toward the center and abandon their more doctrinaire positions. In this context, it might be useful to compare PCF, PCI, or PCE local government policies with statements made before the parties assumed authority, as a possible indication of what the relationship between the parties' theory and practice might be should they gain national power.

This problem is part of the larger issue of the function of ideology in Eurocommunist parties. Does ideology play the same role for them as it seems to play today in the USSR—serving as a means of legitimizing actions motivated by pragmatic considerations and as a force for mass mobilization—or is Marxist ideology a genuine motivating force in the PCI, PCF, and PCE? Many of the books raise the question of the sincerity of the Eurocommunists, under headings such as "Eurocommunism: Tactic or Genuine Change of Course?" This, it seems to the present reviewer, is not the question. The sincerity issue is a red herring because it is impossible to define such a subjective concept for analytical purposes. A far more salient—and manageable— question is the relationship between theory and practice, Unfortunately, as has already been noted, none of the books comes to grips with this question adequately. Some focus on what the Eurocommunists say, and some, on what they do. But a more thoroughgoing synthesis of these two approaches is what is really needed.

IN SUM, then, these books offer the reader a rich and varied picture of Eurocommunism. The document collections, particularly the excellent Vogt reader which contrasts Eurocommunist perspectives with those of their critics, give a panoramic view of Eurocommunist ideas. However, documents by themselves are not sufficient for an understanding of the Eurocommunist phenomenon. The volumes by former and current Marxists provide one with a feeling for the inner workings of the parties but are insufficiently objective for a complete assessment. The academic books offer useful analytic perspectives and insights and are a necessary complement to the document collections.

Some of these authors, particularly those who have been Marxists, are convinced that West European Communist parties have embarked on an irreversible course and be-

CORRECTIONS

There were several errors in the March–April 1979 issue of *Problems of Communism*.

1. The pumping station pictured on page 3 is, indeed, located in Astara, Iran, but of course is on the northern end of Iranian Gas Trunk Line Number 1, not the "Trans-Siberian Gas Main Line."

2. The subhead on page 15 should read "Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo."

3. In the second-to-last line of body text on page 16, the name of the second island should read "Kunashiri", not "Kumashi."

4. The photo of G. V. Romanov on page 40 mistakenly identifies him as Candidate Member of the CPSU Politburo; in fact, he has been a Full Member since the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976.

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lieve that the Eurocommunist parties will eventually mature to independent adulthood and provide a viable, democratic socialist alternative for Europe. Even Mandel, despite his criticisms, remains sanguine about an eventual international proletarian revolution. The more skeptical authors, however, view the Eurocommunists as rebellious adolescents who will remain tied to their Soviet parent and will continue to adhere to its value system, despite periodic outbursts of contrariness.

Although there has been a definite evolution away from a monolithic Communist movement, it would be premature to say that the schism between the Eurocommunists and Moscow is irreversible. Thus, Europeans are likely to remain fascinated with the elusive phenomenon of Eurocommunism and to continue to seek both the question and the answer concerning it. It is important to recognize, however, that Europeans pose the question and formulate the answer differently than do Americans. Consequently, the terms of the debate about Eurocommunism—whatever they ultimately become—may continue to be a source of disagreement in the West.

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